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Preface 
THE CONTROL of man's violence against man presents to mod- 
ern society its problem of problems. In the atomic age a ca- 
pacity to deal with the most devastating type of conflict- 
international war-is crucial to human welfare and even to the 
survival of civilization. Nations have become interdependent 
in technology and economy, but world political organization is 
based on a system of sovereign states now divided into hostile 
camps armed with absolute weapons. What principle of organi- 
zation offers the best hope for the settlement of international 
disputes and the control of international violence? Should re- 
liance be placed on power diplomacy, collective security, supra- 
national government, or some other approach to a stable inter- 
national order? 
This book presents the results of a case study of the "prin- 
ciple of concern," underlying a system of collective security, 
as it has developed since the first World War. In making such 
a case study it is necessary to consider two separate but inter- 
related questions. First, to what extent has a principle of 
political organization been formally and constitutionally ac- 
cepted? Second, to what extent has it been relied on in prac- 
tice and made actually effective? In other words, it is my pur- 
pose to analyze relevant trends in international organization 
from the viewpoint of both structure and function. 
I owe to many persons and books a greater intellectual debt 
than can be acknowledged in bibliography and footnotes. To 
Professors Amry Vandenbosch, University of Kentucky, and 
Quincy Wright, University of Chicago, I wish to express my 
gratitude for their helpful advice over a period of years. Any 
errors of fact or fallacies of interpretation are, of course, my 
own fault and responsibility. 
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C H A P T E R  O N E  
The Principle of Concern 
MODERN attempts to deal with the problem of war by means 
of collective security represent a reliance upon the "principle 
of concern" in international relations. This principle may be 
defined as a recognition that conflict among the members of a 
group affects the entire group and that a unilateral resort to 
violence against any member constitutes an offense against all 
members. It involves the idea of organization to preserve 
peace, an idea which lies at the basis of every political com- 
munity. 
During the century prior to World War I the nations sought 
to preserve peace by the balance-of-power policy, the Concert 
of Europe, and general co-operation. The concept of the bal- 
ance of power was that no state should become strong enough 
to dominate the others, this goal to be achieved by defensive 
combinations against any nation threatening to upset the equi- 
librium. Each country could preserve its independence and 
maintain its security by co-operating with others for the same 
purposes. In unity the weak might find strength to oppose the 
strong. However, the policy of balance and counterbalance 
degenerated into a system of opposing alliances, finally divid- 
ing Europe into two armed camps. 
The Concert of Europe undertook to maintain a kind of unity 
under the supervision of the Great Powers, on the basis of the 
status quo established at the Congress of Vienna, and in gen- 
eral to regulate the affairs of the continent to prevent a dis- 
ruption of the peace. The concert worked through a series of 
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conferences after the Napoleonic Wars, and the idea was re- 
vived later in connection with such conferences as the Con- 
gresses of Paris in 1856 and of Berlin in 1878. 
The Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907 represented an- 
other attempt to implement an interest in the preservation of 
peace. On the whole their purpose was to deal with the prob- 
lem of war in two ways: the provision of alternative pro- 
cedures for settling disputes and limitations to prevent needless 
suffering of noncombatants, prisoners, the wounded, and others. 
The agreement that a tender of "good offices" was not to be 
considered an unfriendly act implied that nations might have 
a concern in the settling of disputes not involving their own 
immediate interests. 
In the nineteenth century and up to World War I the re- 
lation of nations at peace to those at war was dominated by the 
principle of "traditional neutrality." Upon an outbreak of hos- 
tilities third states had the choice of participating as belliger- 
ents or of assuming a status of neutrality. In general the re- 
quirements of the law of neutrality were understood and ac- 
cepted. The prevailing idea was that neutral countries had 
certain rights against the belligerents and certain duties toward 
them. Failure to fulfil the obligations of neutrality brought the 
risk of reprisals from any belligerent adversely affected. It is 
true that there were controversies over particular rules and 
recurrent violations; nevertheless the principle of traditional 
neutrality found an increasingly secure place in the system of 
international law and organization. 
According to the nineteenth century conception resort to 
war was a fact outside the realm of law, like an earthquake. 
International law recognized no right of passing judgment on 
the legitimacy of participation in war by states. A collective 
interest in the maintenance of peace might be expressed, but 
no penalty was attached to recourse to war. No matter what 
the circumstances of an outbreak of war, nations that did not 
elect to participate were to observe neutrality, the basic prin- 
ciple of which was impartiality between belligerents. It is im- 
portant to recognize, however, that to some extent this view 
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reflected an interest in the maintenance of peace. Historically 
the principle of traditional neutrality originated in a demand 
for the right to stay out of war, and it tended to limit the geo- 
graphic scope of warfare. It did not attempt to prevent or to 
extinguish the conflagration, but it did try to keep the blaze 
from spreading. 
The Covenant of the League of Nations represented the first 
formal incorporation of the principle of concern into inter- 
national organization. This was a stage in a long development 
rather than a completely novel idea, but the extent of the 
change revolutionized the prevailing attitude toward inter- 
national conflict. The emphasis shifted from mild restraint to 
determined prohibition, from the national interest to the com- 
mon concern. International solidarity was asserted. The sov- 
ereign right of unilateral warmaking was qualified. The idea 
of protection by co-operation was generalized from a system 
of shifting ad hoc alliances to collective security. Instead of 
some against others, it was to be all against any who broke the 
peace. 
Formal agreement on a general principle means little unless 
its implications are made effective in practice. It is important, 
therefore, to give careful attention to the application of the 
principle of concern in the development of international organi- 
zation and in the policies of nations. Analysis of the record, as 
set forth in the following chapters, reveals a general acceptance 
in the drafting of the League Covenant, an immediate move- 
ment toward restriction and limitation, a period of modified 
application beginning in 1925, a disintegration during the 
1930's, and a reaffirmation with the establishment of the United 
Nations. 
C H A P T E R  T W O  
A ccefitance: The League of Nations 
ACCEPTANCE of the principle of concern by the League of 
Nations after World War I was a crucial event. The succeeding 
course of international organization has been marked by con- 
troversies over the principle, its soundness and its meanings; 
by the successes and failures of action based upon it; by its 
development and interpretation; and even by the alternatives 
suggested for it. 
Organized peace as a war aim had been expressed in Great 
Britain as early as 1914, when Prime Minister Asquith spoke 
of "a real European partnership based on the recognition of 
equal right and established and enforced by a common will."' 
Professed war aims of this type found a sympathetic response 
in the United States-increasingly so as the sentiment of neu- 
trality gave way to participation on the side of the Allies. 
Theodore Roosevelt had already suggested, in accepting the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 1910, that "it would be a master stroke 
if those great powers honestly bent on peace would form a 
league of peace, not only to keep the peace among themselves, 
but to prevent by force if necessary, its being broken by 
 other^."^ This "league for peace" idea had received wide ac- 
ceptance by the early months of the war. In April, 1915, a 
"Central Organization for a Durable Peace7' was created at 
The Hague. On May 3, 1915, the British "League of Nations 
Society" adopted a program calling for "a treaty binding mem- 
bers to peaceful settlement of all disputes" and for united 
A C C E P T A N C E  5 
action to see that "every member shall abide by the terms of 
the treaty." 
The plan of the American "League to Enforce Peace," stated 
by former President Taft at Cleveland, Ohio, on May 12, 1915, 
had four major points: a court for justiciable disputes; a con- 
ciliation commission for other disputes; conferences for the 
- 
development of international law; and an agreement "that if 
- 
any member of the League shall bring war against any other 
member of the League, without having first submitted the 
question, if found justiciable, to the arbitral court provided in 
the fundamental compact, or without having submitted the 
question, if found non-justiciable, to the Commission of Con- 
ciliation for its examination, consideration and recommenda- 
tion, then the remaining members of the League agree to join 
in the forcible defense of the member thus prematurely at- 
t a~ked . "~  
On May 27 a year later, President Wilson, speaking before 
the League to Enforce Peace, endorsed the idea of a universal 
association of nations to keep the peace and asserted the will- 
ingness of the United States to become a partner in such an 
enterprise. Apparently Wilson at the time hoped that such a 
league might be created on the basis of "peace without victory." 
This approach was followed by the Lansing note of December 
18 to the belligerents, asking for a statement of peace terms. 
An appeal for "peace without victory" was reiterated by Wilson 
himself as late as his address to the Senate on January 22, 1917. 
Shortly afterward this particular war aim was discarded, but 
the idea of a concert of powers after the war was retained, to 
be accomplished by the consent and partnership of the nations 
after removing the impediment of the "Hohenzollern tryanny." 
In his war message to Congress in April, Wilson stated that 
the object was to "vindicate the principles of peace and justice 
1 Speeches by the Ea7l of Oxfo7d and Asquith, K.C. (New York, 1927), 218. 
2 Quoted by Felix Morley, The Society of Nations, 5-6. 
3 For accounts of "peace as a war aim'' see Morley, 3-29; William E. Rap- 
pard, The Quest for Peace since the World War, 18-59; Margaret E. Burton, 
The Assembly of the League of Nations, 1-28. 
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in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power 
and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples 
of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will 
henceforth ensure the observance of those  principle^."^ 
The idea of a concert of powers, of the concern of all in any 
resort to war, was not only accepted by the United States and 
Great Britain, but in one form or another it found its way into 
the professed aims of all major belligerents. The degree of 
enthusiasm varied, of course, and sometimes support of the 
idea was a perfunctory gesture, with a propaganda appeal and 
perhaps some support from individual statesmen or segments 
of public opinion. All in all, the interest was "keener in the 
United States than in Great Britain, keener in Great Britain 
than in France, and keener in France than in any other of the 
European Great  power^."^ 
The war aim of an organized and enforcible peace was in- 
cluded in the armistice terms by the last of the famous Four- 
teen Points: "A general association of nations must be formed 
under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual 
guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity 
to great and small States alike." 
At the Peace Conference the objective of a general associa- 
tion for mutual guarantees was translated into the Covenant of 
the League of Nations. At this stage the principle of concern 
was asserted. Article 11 of the Covenant stated in its first 
sentence, "Any war or threat of war, whether immediately af- 
fecting any of the members of the League or not, is hereby 
declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the 
League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and 
effectual to safeguard the peace of nations." 
This provision of Article 11 may be regarded as the heart 
of the League Covenant; it was a basic concept underlying the 
territorial and political guarantees of Article 10, the settlement 
procedures of Articles 12 to 15, and the enforcement clauses 
of Article 16. The existence of the League of Nations, with 
4 President Wilson's State Papers and Addresses (New York, 1918), 378. 
5 Rappard, 42. 
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the system of collective security which it embodied and sym- 
bolized, depended upon an assertion that any war is of com- 
mon concern to all nations. For the first time the principle of 
concern was accepted and formally incorporated into inter- 
national law and organization. 
Article 11 was strengthened at succeeding stages in the de- 
velopment of the Covenant, gradually coming to occupy a 
more central place in the entire scheme.The  concept seemed 
to evolve as first, an interest in peace; second, a belief that 
peace, to be maintained, must be enforced; and finally, an 
affirmation of the principle of concern as the basis for the en- 
forcement of peace. In preliminary outlines of the Covenant 
a provision bearing a close resemblance to the eventual lan- 
guage of Article 11 appeared first in Colonel House's draft of 
July 16, 1918, which stated, "Any war or threat of war is a 
matter of concern to the League of Nations and to all the 
Powers, members thereof." Wilson's first draft provided, "Any 
war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the 
Contracting Powers or not, is hereby declared a matter of 
concern to the League of Nations and to all the Powers sig- 
natory hereto, and those Powers hereby reserve the right to 
take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to 
safeguard the peace of  nation^."^ 
The draft completed by the Commission on the League of 
Nations on February 14, 1919, stated the principle of concern 
substantially as it was finally accepted in the Covenant, but 
differed in providing that in the event of war or threat of war 
"the High Contracting Parties reserve the right to take any 
action that might be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard 
the peace of nations." The Cecil-Wilson agreement of March 
18, 1919, resulted in changing the words "reserve the right to 
take7' to the much stronger term "shall take."s Article 11 be- 
came, therefore, a clear and definite expression of the solidarity 
6 On the constitutional development of the League, including the various 
preliminary plans, Morley's The Society of Nations is invaluable; the relevant 
documents are presented in David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Couenant. 
7 Miller, 11, 7, 14. 8 Morley, 131-32. 
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of the members of the League, with the maintenance of peace 
made formally obligatory upon them rather than permissive 
and discretionary. 
Article 11 of the Covenant was the formal recognition of the 
- 
social fact of world interdependence, that the peace of the 
world is of concern to the whole world simply because a war 
anywhere has repercussions everywhere. Peace was a para- 
mount concern for nations which feared that they might be 
victims of aggression, for neutrals who under modern condi- 
tions of warfare might be affected almost as much as the 
belligerents, and for third states because of the tendency of 
war to ~ p r e a d . ~  The prevention of war had come to be recog- 
nized as one of the foremost duties of government. The pre- 
sumption of change only by peaceful means was adopted, and 
it was hoped that resort to aggression could be met by over- 
whelming resistance by members of the League acting as a 
group. 
In two important respects the League of Nations' plan for 
peace departed from centuries of precedents. First, it repre- 
sented a formal and governmental acceptance of an inter- 
national scheme for the prevention of war. Earlier peace plans, 
by contrast, had been put forth by individuals or small groups 
of people. The nearest approach to the League idea was prob- 
ably the Concert of Europe after the Napoleonic Wars. But 
this was carried out by a series of conferences based on the 
agreement of statesmen, with no formal delimitation of scope 
or constitutional provision for continuance. Such peace meas- 
ures as were incorporated into international law and organiza- 
tion were not designed to prevent, but rather to restrict, war- 
fare. 
Geographic and temporal limitations had been placed on 
war in the Middle Ages by such devices as the Truce of God 
and the Peace of God. The principle of traditional neutrality, 
9 "Since the Thirty Years' War there have been fourteen periods in which 
war existed with a great power on each side for over two years. There were 
only three of these major war periods . . . in which a single one of the great 
powers remained at peace throughout the period." Quincy Wright, A Study 
of War,  240. 
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which reached its highest development during the nineteenth 
century, was essentially, so far as its aspect of peace mainte- 
nance was concerned, a device for the geographic limitation of 
war. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also saw 
the development of restrictions designed to reduce the fre- 
quency of warfare and to ameliorate the suffering. Alternative 
procedures for the adjustment of international controversies 
were supplied in the form of good offices, conciliation, inquiry, 
mediation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and "cooling-off 
periods." If war unhappily came despite these devices, there 
were the conventions for the protection of noncombatants, 
prisoners, and the wounded. The flag of truce and the Red 
Cross were to be respected. These methods of pacific settle- 
ment and of ameliorating human suffering might be called pro- 
cedural limitations on warfare. Resort to war was viewed as 
an extralegal fact, as a permissible method for use in inter- 
national controversies, but some concern about its recurrence 
and effects was shown in the principle of traditional neutrality 
and in the various restraints on the initiation and conduct of 
hostilities. The time-honored geographic limitation on fighting 
was retained, but instead of being based primarily on the 
sanctity of churches and monasteries, it took the form of certain 
protections for nations not involved in a war. The temporal 
limitation, that fighting might not take place on certain days 
of the week, was largely abandoned. More reliance was put 
in procedural limitations. At the best, however, there was no 
challenge to a state's right to wage war if it decided that its 
interest so required. Such limitations on unrestricted warfare 
as existed could be enforced only through persuasion, good 
faith, or reprisal. 
A second difference between Article 11 and early peace 
plans which had found any formal or governmental acceptance 
was the interest in conflict as confiict. There is a real, though 
often wavering and nebulous, distinction between aggression 
viewed as a threat to one's own direct interest and as a threat 
to the peace and stability of the group. Third states have often 
objected to a resort to war because of what a belligerent might 
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gain, because of the possible consequences for the balance of 
power and other considerations. The principle of concern re- 
quires third states to object to any resort to war simply because 
it is a resort to war-thereby extending interest in consequences 
from the immediate effect upon national rights to the effect 
upon the stability and order of the international community. 
The assumptions are that the best security is a secure environ- 
ment and that the best protection against aggression is mem- 
bership in a society which prohibits aggression. I t  is a question 
of whether a nation shall prepare to defend itself or co-operate 
in an attempt to remove the necessity for defending itself. 
Probably the effective scope of Article 11 was limited by the 
provisions.of Articles 12 to 15. I t  is also true that there were 
- 
"gaps" in the Covenant, so that some wars remained licit. 
Nevertheless, Article 11 in itself was an unqualified acceptance 
of the principle of concern, and this article expressed the basic 
attitude of war prevention through international solidarity 
which lay at the heart of the League and the entire system of 
collective security. Limits on the scope of Article 11 arose in 
prescriptions of the manner and relative completeness of its 
application. They did not prejudice the fact that Article 11 
enunciated the principle to be applied. A number of disputes 
actually were brought before the League by invoking this 
article in preference to those which marked out the procedural 
steps to be taken.1° In any event, permissible war could exist 
only within the gaps of the Covenant. Some degree of regula- 
tion over international conflict was obtained by virtue of de- 
fining the conditions under which war would be prohibited 
and those under which it might be permissible. In principle, 
the gaps in the Covenant would be analogous to a national 
legal system which might continue to permit the duel and other 
10 Eighteen disputes were submitted to the Council under Article 11 by 
1929. See T. P. Conwell-Evans, The League Council in Action, 10-121, 278-81. 
The Sino-Japanese dispute first came before the League when China invoked 
Article 11 on September 21, 1931. Ethiopia appealed to the League under 
Article 11 in January, 1935. For an account of international disputes handled 
by the Assembly, see Burton, 284-374. By the end of 1939 the League had 
dealt with 66 political disputes, in 30 of which Article 11 was invoked alone 
or in connection with other articles. Wright, 1429-31. 
A C C E P T A N C E  11 
forms of forcible self-help. Of course, such an analogy would 
be valid only if the League had become effective within the 
scope of its authority, and then only subject to the great dif- 
ference in degree between gaps in international as compared 
with national control of conflict. 
At any rate, even the gaps involved a regulation and defini- 
tion of their boundaries, and in turn an implication existed 
that the gaps might be narrowed by a reinterpretation of the 
boundaries. All things considered, it is clear that there was 
general acceptance of the principle of concern at the end of 
World War I, with the precise extent of its incorporation and 
application left open for future development. The legal and 
organizational basis for control of international codic t  was 
adopted. The question then became: To what extent would 
formal acceptance be matched by functional effectiveness? 
C H A P T E R  T H R E E  
Limitation 
No SOONER had the principle of concern been accepted than 
its limitation began to develop. This retreat from general 
acceptance took place in several ways. First, there was a geo- 
graphic limitation when membership in the League of Nations 
did not become universal. The original hope and intention 
was that the League would function on a world-wide basis. 
Obviously, however, this could not take place unless all im- 
portant nations undertook to carry out the obligations of the 
Covenant. Second, there was a limitation by interpretations 
incompatible with the implications of full acceptance. This 
weakened the basic assumptions on which the League was 
built and later provided a rationalization for dilatory and in- 
effective action. Third, there were certain survivals of the 
principle of traditional neutrality. These clearly limited the 
principle of concern, since by definition a declaration of neu- 
trality is inconsistent with attempts to apply adverse differ- 
ential treatment against a nation which resorts to war. Finally, 
the negotiations concerning proposals for disarmament, secu- 
rity, and arbitration rejected the principle of concern as a 
feasible basis for practical action. 
It is important to trace these developments in some detail, 
in order to examine the extent to which the principle of con- 
cern became functionally effective. In following this analysis, 
the precise relationship between various key terms must be 
kept in mind. The principle of concern refers to an attitude 
toward conflict among the members of a group; it is the funda- 
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mental concept on which the others are based. Collective se- 
curity may be defined as "general co-operative action for the 
maintenance and enforcement of peace."l Diferential treat- 
ment means that third states will assist a victim of aggression 
and penalize the aggressor, in contrast to an impartial position 
as required under the principle of traditional neutrality. The 
League of Nations was the organization, or institutional means, 
by which the principle of concern was to be implemented and 
the necessary action taken. The question of functional effec- 
tiveness of the principle of concern, therefore, has been one of 
developing a system of collective security and strengthening 
the League of Nations (and later the United Nations). 
Refusal of the United States to become a member of the 
League can well be taken as the point of departure for con- 
sidering the trend toward limitation and restriction of the 
principle of concern. Chronologically this is the first step, as 
the crucial vote in the United States Senate came on March 
19, 1920,' only a little more than two months after the League 
of Nations officially came into existence and almost eight 
months before the first meeting of the Assembly. Moreover, 
this action on the part of the United States withdrew the sup- 
port of the leading proponent just as the organization was com- 
ing into existence. The United States under the leadership of 
President LVilson had taken the initiative in the acceptance 
of the principle of concern in international organization. It 
also took the initiative, with the repudiation of Wilson's leader- 
ship, in the limitation of that principle. 
The absence of the United States from the League left a 
huge gap in that geographic inclusiveness which would be 
1 See Chapter VI, section 3. 
2For an account of the issue in the United States and the action of the 
Senate, see Denna F. Fleming, The United States and the Leagtce of Nations, 
191 8-1 920, and his The United States and the World Organization, 1920-1 933, 
3-41. 
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one of the essential prerequisites to a complete acceptance. 
But the effect was more than one of a lack of geographic in- 
clusiveness. The implications for the two leading members of 
the League at the time-France and Great Britain-were great. 
At the Peace Conference France had been primarily inter- 
ested in arrangements for its own future. security. Opposing its 
ideas for the basis of postwar international organization was 
the United States. The latter proposed a system of collective 
security to achieve a warless world; France was more vitally 
interested in a firm guarantee against the menace of a militant 
and aggressive n e i g h b ~ r . ~  One advocated a general, the other 
a specific, approach. And the general system was accepted by 
France with the understanding that the specific guarantees 
were included as a part of the arrangement. 
The Covenant of the League, based on the Anglo-American 
draft, was developed at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 
by the Commission on the League of NationsS4 At the eighth 
meeting of this commission, on February 11, 1919, the French 
representative brought up the issue of an international force 
to compel respect for the Covenant. "The argument that the 
League must establish its members in a position of se'curitk 
nationale, with the implication that otherwise each State must 
be the sole judge of its armaments requirements, was strongly 
stressed by the French delegates at this meeting. From that 
day to this the French position has not deviated from the 
thesis that if the League does not absolutely insure the security 
of its members, those members are not justified in trusting the 
efficacy of the Covenant as a way of permanent p e a ~ e . " ~  
At this same meeting of the commission the French proposed 
three amendments to the draft of the Covenant: ( a )  to re- 
quire as a condition of admission to membership in theLeague 
effective guarantees of an intention to respect the Covenant 
3 This difference can be accounted for by considerations of geography and 
national interests. See Rappard, The Quest for Peace, 100-102. 
4 For a succinct account of the work of this commission, see Morley, The 
Society of Nations, 77 ff. The relevant documents are given in Miller, The 
Dmfting of the Covenant. 
5 Morley, 108. 
L I M I T A T I O N  15 
and to emphasize the obligation of a new member to conform 
to the League's regulations on armaments; ( b )  to establish an 
international control of troops and armaments; and ( c )  to ap- 
ply sanctions to enforce a unanimous opinion of the Council 
on a dispute submitted to it. The French delegation again 
proposed amendments dealing with an international armed 
force during the meeting of a drafting committee on the next 
day (February 12). One day later another debate on the 
French amendments took place in the Commission on the 
League of Nations. On this occasion the French representative 
said, "One of the conditions necessary for the League of Na- 
tions to be able to impose peace, is that the whole world knows 
that it has the means to impose it and to impose it at once."6 
The same French contention was continued and elaborated at 
the twelfth meeting of the commission on March 24.7 
The final meeting of the Commission on the League of Na- 
tions was held on April 11, 1919. Apropos of the formal 
approval of Article 15, paragraph 7,' the French representative 
commented, "The whole idea of obligation has now disap- 
peared. It will, therefore, be necessary to continue and to 
conclude separate alliances, inasmuch as the League admits its 
inability to offer a formal guarantee of protection to its own 
members . "~ga in ,  when the Covenant was formally adopted 
by the Peace Conference, the French delegate spoke for the 
rejected amendments, urging a system for the mutual verifica- 
tion of armaments and the establishment of a permanent mili- 
tary commission in connection with the Council's responsibility 
for maintaining peace. In accepting the Covenant without 
these amendments, France expressed the hope that they might 
be embodied in the Covenant at a later date.1° 
Even a cursory examination of the French attitude toward 
6 Miller, I, 256. 7 Morley, 155-60. 
8 "If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by 
the members thereof, other than the representatives of one or more of the 
parties to the dispute, the members of the League reserve to themselves the 
right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance 
of right and justice" (italics added). 
9 Morley, 195. 10 Same, 207. 
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the League of Nations reveals a development from indifference 
or even unfriendliness to acceptance and support only as the 
principle of a collective guarantee was accepted in return and 
as there appeared to be a willingness on the part of Great 
Britain and the United States to back up such a guarantee. 
The major efforts of the French in the drafting of the Covenant 
were devoted to strengthening the guarantees which would 
operate to protect the French frontier in case of attack. They 
sought a machinery of sanctions to make their security more 
reliable. The cleavage between the French and the Anglo- 
American positions and concepts were bridged over by com- 
promises and by concessions to the French point of view. 
Rejection of the Covenant by the United States destroyed that 
bridge. The assurances actually obtained by France were those 
of support from Great Britain and the United States through 
the League and of mutual support in case of aggression. Ameri- 
can nonparticipation rendered valueless those assurances for 
which France had been persuaded to relinquish her more 
drastic demands as against Germany. The French basis for 
accepting the League, that it should have force to protect the 
security of France, was largely eliminated by the action of the 
United States in rejecting the Covenant. 
The attitude of the British government was more in harmony 
with American concepts of the nature of the League than was 
the case with France, especially since there had been a great 
deal of Anglo-American co-operation in preparing the early 
drafts of the Covenant. The effect of American absence from 
membership was therefore different for Great Britain than for 
France. To Great Britain fell a heavy share of the responsi- 
bility for underwriting collective security. Without the co- 
operation of the United States the British government could 
not fulfill this obligation. What if the American government 
should insist on its neutral rights in opposition to a British 
fleet engaged in blockade operations against a state designated 
as an aggressor by the Council of the League? 
Sir Edward Grey had said in 1916 that unless the United 
States was a member of a league of nations, and a member that 
L I M I T A T I O N  17 
could be depended on to intervene, the peace of the world 
would be no more secure in the future than it was in 1914.11 
Stanley Baldwin said in 1934 that he would not permit the 
British navy to be used for an armed blockade of any country 
until he knew in advance what the position of the United States 
government would be. Between the times of these two state- 
ments the British continually showed reluctance to go "all out7' 
in undertaking obligations of collective security because pos- 
sible nonco-operation or opposition by the United States would 
impair the efficacy of sanctions, disrupting the trade of par- 
ticipating nations to no gain in security. 
Abstention of the United States from the League of Nations 
weakened the security of the nation most conscious of the need 
for security and exposed to greater risks in guaranteeing se- 
curity the nation which would have the heaviest responsibility 
in that task. I t  made the danger greater and the means for 
meeting the danger less potent. How, then, should one ap- 
praise the real significance of American action on the League 
system of collective security and therefore on the acceptance 
and the limitation of the principle of concern? President Wil- 
son had said in January, 1920, "The maintenance of the peace 
of the world and the effective execution of the treaty depend 
upon the whole-hearted participation of the United States."12 
There can be no question that failure to receive that participa- 
tion was a heavy blow. But there is no reason to believe that 
this one blow was necessarily fatal or that the single fact of 
rejection by the United States conclusively doomed the League 
to failure from the very beginning. No doubt the chances for 
success were lessened, but it does not follow that the chances 
were destroyed. 
There is no way to analyze and evaluate the real effect of 
American rejection on the League except by inference. There 
can be no record of the League with American membership to 
compare with the record without it. Yet even though the 
11 See John Fischer Williams, Smne Aspects of the Covenant of the League 
of Nations, 31.  
12 Messages and Papers, 11, 1162. 
18 I N T E R N A T I O N A L  C O N F L I C T  
question is not susceptible of definitive proof, it does offer 
possibilities of a rather convincing conclusion. Let us look at 
a few typical opinions on this question. The neutral Swiss stu- 
dent, sympathetic observer, teacher, and for some time par- 
ticipant in the affairs of the League, William E. Rappard, 
considered the blow a stiff one indeed, as if a symphonic con- 
cert should be offered with the co~nposer-conductor suddenly 
prevented from appearing. lTwo other statements may be 
quoted from the same authority: 
"One may either contribute to the enforcement of the block- 
ade or render it ineffective and therefore impossible. Political 
isolation and nonco-operation, whatever their motives, are in 
fact obstruction."14 
"The members of the League are inhibited from granting 
each other the necessary measure of mutual protection because 
the lack of universality of the League leads them to fear ex- 
ternal complications if they should faithfully carry out the 
pledges of the Covenant."15 
The proposed amendments to the Covenant demonstrated 
that American absence influenced League policy by encourag- 
ing efforts to modify the Covenant to please the United States 
and by making member states unwilling to undertake obliga- 
tions which might bring them into conflict with the United 
States if put into practical effect.16 
Sumner Welles from the vantage point of the problems of 
another peace said: "Another major reason for the failure of 
the last peace was the refusal of the United States to enter the 
League of Nations and to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, and 
the beginning of a period of withdrawal by the American 
people from any share of responsibility in international af- 
fairs."17 
F. P. Walters in h s  masterful history of the League of Na- 
13 The Quest for Peace, 136. 
1 4  International Relations as Viewed from Geneva, 143. 
15 The Geneva Experiment, 107. 
16 Grace E. Rhoads, "Amendments of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
Adopted and Proposed," 192. 
17 Where Are W e  Heading?, 76. 
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tions stated, "The abandonment of the League by the United 
States was a blow whose effects can hardly be over-esti- 
mated."ls Nevertheless, he explained, the other Allied govern- 
ments thought the League might prove valuable and effective, 
and ought to be given a trial. 
The opinions just quoted are sufficient to bring out the fact 
that competent observers, writing from different points of view 
and with no disposition to excuse or gloss over the mistakes 
of American policy, were inclined to agree that the effect of 
rejection by the United States was serious but not necessarily 
fatal.lg They did not say that the United States killed the 
League, but rather they commented in terms of reduced vitality 
and lowered life expectancy. They did not speak of a death 
warrant, but used terms like obstruction, inhibition, a major 
reason for failure, a serious blow. 
Other evidence exists for the view that rejection by the 
United States was serious but not fatal. For one thing, the 
League did operate without American membership for twenty 
years, and it did achieve some successes, especially in the first 
ten years of its existence. In addition to its accomplishments 
in the nonpolitical field the League had considerably influence 
in settling a number of disputes during that period." Strangely 
enough, the League had its greatest successes in the control of 
international conflict during the years when the United States 
was the least co-operative. This is, of course, a coincidence in 
chronology and not a significant correlation. There were many 
other reasons for the League's ability to handle comparatively 
minor disputes during the 1920's and its failure to halt vastly 
more serious aggression by major powers during the 1930's. 
The disputes which were settled without American participa- 
I s A  History of the League of Nations, I, 72. 
1 W n e  highly competent account of the League of Nations leaned somewhat 
to the optimistic side at this point by seeing some advantage to Europe in the 
nonmembership of the United States. "The result has proved that the co- 
operation of the United States was not necessary to the success of the League 
nor to the safety of Europe." John S. Bassett, The League of Nations: A 
Chapter in World Politics, 32. 
20 See Conwell-Evans, The League Council in Action; Burton, The Assembly 
of the League of Nations. 
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tion or co-operation were those in which such assistance was 
not necessary in the premises. Nevertheless, it remains true 
that the League could and did function to some extent without 
the United States. 
Another consideration lies in the fact that membership in 
itself is no guarantee of co-operation or of success. Lack of 
co-operation can be shown within an organization. The atti- 
tude of the United States toward joining the League did not 
of itself make the difference between failure and success of 
the latter because, if for no other reason, membership would 
not have assured success. It  would certainly be a fallacy to 
argue that rejection by the United States was solely responsible 
for the failure, since such an argument would imply the assump- 
tion that no other significant causes of failure existed. A com- 
parison of attitudes of various states toward the League might 
be helpful at this point. The United States never joined but 
showed some willingness to co-operate after 1928. Germany 
joined in 1926 but gave notice of withdrawa121 in 1933 and 
from then on openly defied the League. Japan was an original 
member but precipitated a cycle of aggression in 1931. The 
U.S.S.R. joined in 1934, but the co-operation between the 
Soviets and the other members was far from wholehearted, 
and the U.S.S.R. achieved the distinction of being the only 
state ever expelled from the League. As a matter of fact, there 
was a time when some members of the League showed a will- 
ingness to turn a nonmember (Germany) against a fellow 
member (the U.S.S.R.) for their own conception of their 
national interests. Finally, Great Britain and France, leading 
members of the League from the beginning, had their moments 
of appeasement, which certainly went further in weakening 
collective security than absolutely required by any appre- 
hensions about the position of the United States. 
The nonmember of next importance to the United States was 
the U.S.S.R. Here again there was a limitation of geographic 
inclusiveness, leaving a large gap indeed, the implications of 
21 Under Article 1, paragraph 3, a member might withdraw by giving two 
years' notice of intention, provided all its obligations were fulfilled. 
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which went beyond geographic incompleteness to an impor- 
tant effect on the attitudes and policies of the League mem- 
bers. The early attitude of the Soviet Union toward the League 
of Nations is concisely set forth in the following paragraph: 
The attitude of the Soviet Government to the so-called League 
of Nations has frequently been expressed in the declarations of its 
responsible representatives. The Soviet Government's attitude to 
the so-called League of Nations remains unaltered. It  regards it as 
a coalition of certain States, endeavouring to usurp the power over 
other States and masking their attempts on the rights and inde- 
pendence of other nations by a false appearance of groundless 
legality and in the form of the mandates issued by the Council or 
. . . Assembly of the League of Nations, etc. The Soviet Govern- 
ment maintains its conviction that this pseudo-international body 
really serves as a mere mask to conceal from the broad masses the 
aggressive aims of the imperialist policy of certain Great Powers 
or their vassals. The Soviet Government finds confirmation for its 
convictions every time that a State assuming the leading role in the 
League of Nations makes a decision on international questions, 
touching the interests of the Soviet R e p u b l i ~ . ~ ~  
Presumably this attitude was overcome or at least muffled, 
as the U.S.S.R. later became a member of the League, made 
contributions of some importance to discussions of collective 
- 
security, and in the disarmament conferences repeatedly sug- 
gested that the way to disarm was to disarm. This collabora- 
tion between Moscow and Geneva was comparatively short- 
lived, however, ending with expulsion of the Soviet Union for 
aggression against Finland. Even during the most co-operative 
period, furthermore, more than a modicum of mutual suspicion 
existed between the Soviets and the Western democracies. 
Undoubtedly apprehension in London and Paris over a west- 
ward expansion of communism played its role in the reluctance 
to take severe measures against the fascist governments which 
had come to power in the main buffer zone against that ex- 
pansion. Sanctions which toppled the governments of Italy 
22 From "Appendix A-Consent of Government of R.S.F.S.R. to Attend Con- 
ference on Reduction of Naval Armaments. Note Sent by People's Commissariat 
for Foreign Affairs to General Secretary of League of Nations, March 15th, 
1923." Quoted by Marina Salvin, "Soviet Policy Toward Disarmament," 60. 
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and Germany might open those countries to the inroads of 
communism. The suspicion which stood in the way of effective 
collaboration was well stated by Sumner Welles in these words: 
The reasons the Allied powers failed to make of their victory a 
lasting settlement of the German problem, embodying the real ends 
for which the war had been fought, became ever more clear as the 
years passed. These reasons can be very simply set forth. 
In the first place, the Soviet Union remained outside the family 
of nations. The Allied powers regarded her as a dangerous menace 
in international affairs. Some of the powers, notably Great Britain 
and France, considered her an even greater danger to their security, 
in the troubled social conditions which arose after the war years, 
than Germany herself. The Soviet Union undertook to flirt with 
the Weimar government, thus giving the Western powers a severe 
attack of nerves, and thereby making it less likely that any con- 
tinuing form of Western pressure would be brought to bear upon 
the Soviet Union.23 
Thus, to the concern lest the application of sanctions incur 
the wrath of a friend was added the fear that they might also 
result in strengthening a hostile power. To risk opposition from 
the United States and to take a chance on the extension of 
Soviet influence into eastern and central Europe would have 
been serious business for the leadership of ~ r a n c e  and Great 
Britain. 
Only one other Great Power-Germany-was outside the 
League of Nations at its inception. This particular limitation 
on full acceptance of the principle of concern was of com- 
paratively little significance, provided only that this gap be 
filled as the defeated nations found their way back into full 
participation in international affairs. Germany became a mem- 
ber of the League in 1926. It was not in the first years of that 
organization, but later, that the attitude of Germany became 
a really serious obstacle to its success. 
23 Welles, 75. 
Another way in which acceptance of the principle of concern 
was limited lay in a series of interpretations adopted for the 
guidance of the League. These interpretations were directed 
at Article 16, which provided for sanctions in the event that a 
- 
member of the League should take up arms contrary to its 
obligations for pacific settlement under the Covenant. The first 
paragraph of Article 16 read: 
Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of 
its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be 
deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members 
of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it 
to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition 
of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the 
covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, com- 
mercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the cove- 
nant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether 
a Member of the League or not. 
This language had to be interpreted for two reasons: ( a )  the 
lack of procedural machinery for determining when a state 
had resorted to war in violation of the Covenant and ( b )  the 
difficulty of carrying out completely the sanctions stipulated 
by Article 16. There was a recoil from these drastic provisions 
as some of their implications became more obvious and as it 
became clear that the League was not to be a universal institu- 
tion. 
The first major attempt to interpret the obligations of Article 
i 6  was made by the International Blockade Committee, which 
submitted its report in 1921. The work of this committee and 
consideration of its recommendations resulted in three basic 
interpretative  principle^,'^ which remained the official guiding 
rules of the League. They were: 
2"eague of Nations, O$cial Journal, 1920, 1921, 1922; The Records of the 
First Assembly, Meetings of the Committees, 11, 261-70, 329-39, Plenary Meet- 
ings, 392-410; The Records of the Second Assembly, Meetings of the Commit- 
tees, I, 355-58, Plenary Meetings, 425 ff.; Reports and Resolutions on the Sub- 
ject of Article 16 of the Cocenant. 
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(1 )  Each member of the League should decide for itself the 
applicability of sanctions. Obviously the enforcement meas- 
ures of Article 16 had to come into use either automatically as 
the result of a violation by a member of the League, by decision 
of the Council, or by decisions of the other members. Auto- 
matic application was rejected early, in fact in the drafting of 
the Covenant. The so-called Phillimore draft had provided, 
"If . . . one of the Allied States should break the covenant . . . 
this State will become ipso facto at war with all the other Allied 
States." It was pointed out that this language would violate 
the constitution of the United States, providing for the declara- 
tion of war by C o n g r e s ~ . ~ ~  The final language of Article 16 pro- 
vided that the covenant-breaking state "shall ipso facto be 
deemed to have committed an act of war against all other 
members of the League." There was, of course, no language 
in the final form of Article 16 to bar the automatic application 
of sanctions as the result of such an act of war. However, 
recognition of the need for procedural machinery was sufficient 
to destroy any possibility of purely automatic application. 
Furthermore, to treat sanctions as automatic would give a 
violator of the Covenant the power to throw other members of 
the League into a state of war. 
If the action of a violating state did not ipso facto give rise 
to the application of sanctions, it followed that either some 
organ of the League or the individual members themselves 
must be vested with the responsibility of making the decision. 
The official interpretations of Article 16 rejected the former 
possibility and left the determination to the individual mem- 
bers. 
(2)  The application of sanctions might be gradual and par- 
tial, rather than immediate and complete. I t  was felt that the 
provisions of Article 16 were too drastic, if taken literally, to 
be enforced. Therefore, the International Blockade Committee 
recommended only the measures which "would most closely 
accord with the facts of the situation." Sanctions were con- 
26 Miller, 11, 80. 
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sidered to be essentially economic in character; only such 
measures needed to be taken as would be calculated to exercise 
a decisive influence on the economic resisting power of the 
defaulting state. The word "immediately" was taken to mean 
"at the earliest possible moment at which unanimous action 
could be secured." I t  meant that a breach of the Covenant 
would give rise to an immediate obligation to take the appro- 
priate measures, but not necessarily an obligation to take them 
imrnediatel~.'~ 
( 3 )  The "peculiar position" of each state might be taken 
into consideration. Switzerland insisted on safeguarding its 
traditional neutrality; Denmark, Norway, and Sweden pro- 
posed to amend Article 16 so that a member of the League for 
whom the application of sanctions "might entail serious danger" 
could be authorized by the Council to maintain certain rela- 
tions with a covenant-breaking state; a Canadian memoran- 
dum expressed objections to measures likely to divert the 
markets of members of the League to competitors free of the 
onerous obligations of Article 16. The International Blockade 
Committee recognized that the granting of certain exceptions 
might be required, since "it is possible to imagine cases in 
which the full application by some State of the financial and 
commercial measures laid down would create such hardships 
and dangers as to be almost in t~ lerable ."~~ In connection with 
a consideration of the amendments to the Covenant proposed 
by the Scandinavian governments the committee suggested 
that Article 16 should be amended by the addition of the fol- 
lowing sentence: "The Council may,- however, at the request 
of a Member which can show that the facilities demanded are 
essential for its economic or political security, grant such 
exemptions as in its opinion will not conflict with the aims of 
Article 16."28 
Thus, the principle of concern was limited through interpre- 
26 League of Nations, The Records of the Second Assembly, Plenary Meet- 
ings, 431. 
27 League of Nations, Reports and Resolutions, 19. 
28 Same, 19-20. 
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tations of the obligations undertaken. Instead of the crucial 
determination of a violation of the Covenant being placed 
with an organ of the entire group, the individual members were 
left free to make their own decisions. Instead of immediate 
and complete application of sanctions, the measures would be 
taken on a gradual and partial basis. Instead of full participa- 
tion by all members of the League (and co-operating non- 
members), some might be excused on account of their "peculiar 
position." This was indeed a limitation on general acceptance. 
The limitations arrived at by interpretations of Article 16 
during 1920-1921 resulted from a compromise of the maximum 
view of collective sanctions against a violator of the Covenant, 
that controls over international codict  should be centralized 
in some organ or agency of the entire League. Since the 
Council of the League had the major responsibility for enforc- 
ing the peace, the problem became one of the extent of the 
Council's effective authority. International solidarity in the 
face of a breach of the peace was an essential postulate of the 
entire League system. This could not be maintained without 
some centralization of decisions and co-ordination of measures 
to effect the decisions. From this point of view the interpreta- 
tions of 1920-1921 limited the principle of concern and thereby 
weakened the League even more than appeared from the 
statements and resolutions themselves. 
The compromise finally accepted was based on the first of 
the principles set forth by the International Blockade Com- 
mittee. The resolution adopted by the First Assembly provided 
in substance that each member would be the final judge of an 
occasion for sanctions, but that its duty to take the measures 
envisaged by Article 16 would follow automatically from recog- 
nition of such an occasion. The resolutions concerning the 
procedure for notification and application of sanctions tended 
to convey the impression that a decision by individual mem- 
bers would be followed by co-ordinated action taken by all 
according to certain standard criteria. However, a close exami- 
nation of the language used shows that nothing was really 
left to control by the Council as a centralizing authority. The 
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Council's opinion would be sent to all members of the League 
with a statement of reasons and "an invitation to take action 
accordingly." The Council would "recommend the date on 
which the enforcement of economic pressure, under Article 16, 
is to be begun, and shall give notice of that date to all the 
Members of the League." It would suggest a plan for joint 
action on the various economic, commercial, and financial 
measures to be taken. All members would be treated alike in 
the application of the measures with certain stipulated excep- 
tions, but the resolutions were silent on the question of 
authority to pass on the validity of exceptions which might be 
sought by the members. Thus, even in the application of 
sanctions after the appropriate decision had been made, the 
Council could only recommend, invite, and notify. The inter- 
pretative resolutions carefully refrained from saying that the 
Council directed anything. The way was left open for the 
individual members to decide for themselves not only if sanc- 
tions would be applied, but when, how, and to what extent. 
The interpretations of 1921 were adopted as provisional 
measures pending the amendment of Article 16 as proposed by 
the Assembly resolutions. It was expected that the interim 
governed by provisional interpretations would be compara- 
tively short. Constitutional recognition that the text of Article 
16 was too stringent for practical application seemed to be in 
order. However, the proposed amendments did not secure the 
required number of ratifications, and the original text of Article 
16 remained officially in force. Yet limitation by interpretation 
was not a passing phase, with general acceptance of the prin- 
ciple of concern renewed by failure of the proposed amend- 
ments. The limiting interpretations prevailed despite the con- 
tinuance of the original text. Confirmation of this fact is found 
in an examination of a later series of interpretaions during the 
period 1926-1928.29 
The question of interpreting the principle of concern in rela- 
tion to the League of Nations arose also in connection with the 
29 For the interpretations used in connection with the practical application 
of sanctions, see Chapter V, section 1. 
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work of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Con- 
ference. A French proposal raised two questions : 
1. "On what principles will it be possible to draw up a scale 
of armaments permissible to the various countries, taking into 
account . . . the degree of security which, in the event of aggres- 
sion, a State could receive under the provisions of the Covenant 
or of separate engagements contracted towards that State?" 
2. "Can the reduction of armaments be promoted by exam- 
ining possible means for ensuring that the mutual assistance, 
economic and military, contemplated in Article 16 of the Cove- 
nant shall be brought quickly into operation as soon as an act 
of aggression has been committed?"O 
On the basis of these questions there was referred to a com- 
mittee of the Council the consideration of the methods or 
regulations which would "enable the Council to take such 
decisions as may be necessary to enforce the obligations of 
the Covenant as expeditiously as possible." This committee 
based its discussion of this problem upon a report31 submitted 
at its request by de Brouckbre of Belgium. 
The embarrassment at the situation with respect to the limit- 
ing interpretations, their acceptance in fact but not by con- 
stitutional process, is well shown by the following statements 
in the de Brouckbre report: 
The starting-point had been Article 16 as drafted by the authors 
of the Covenant, and an endeavour had been made to determine 
the most satisfactory rules for its application. Certain rules had 
then been conceived the effect of which should, in the mind of 
those responsible for them, have been most satisfactory, but which 
were not entirely consistent with part of the text. An endeavour 
was then made to obviate this difficulty by a system of interpreta- 
tion which was in certain cases somewhat bold. It had then been 
decided that the best solution of the difficulty was to modify Article 
16 itself by means of amendments referring to various provisions 
of that article. The result was that, after having sought to find rules 
to fit the text, an attempt was finally made to find a text to fit the 
rules.32 
30 League of Nations, Reports and Resolutions, 61. 
3l For text, see same, 60-72. 32 Same, 62. 
L I M I T A T I O N  29 
The de BrouckAre report recognized the crucial importance 
of the question, Whose duty was it to decide whether sanctions 
were applicable? Not every act of international violence would 
give rise to an occasion for action. For example, an unin- 
tentional and clearly insignificant violation of a remote colonial 
frontier would not justify the invocation of Article 16. Any 
measures taken must be proportionate to the seriousness of the 
attack and justified by the imminence of the danger. This 
involved the concept of "legitimate defense." A country which 
flagrantly exceeded the bounds of legitimate defense would 
be the real aggressor. Accordingly the determination of a 
"resort to war" under Article 16 might not always be clear, 
obvious, and easy. This enhanced the importance of the locus 
of authority to make the controlling decision. On this point 
the report unhesitatingly followed the interpretations of 1921 
and affirmed that the Covenant allowed only one reply to be 
given-each member must decide for itself. However, some 
qualification was placed on this interpretation by stating that 
the duty of each member to decide did not leave it free to 
make any arbitrary decision whatsoever. Refusal to apply 
sanctions in an obvious case of aggression would be a violation 
of the Covenant and might lead to expulsion from the League. 
Furthermore, if a member took advantage of false allegations 
that another state had resorted to war, it might well become 
the object of sanctions itself. 
The other two leading principles of interpretation-that sanc- 
tions might be gradual and partial and that the peculiar posi- 
tion of individual members might be taken into account-the 
de Brouckkre report considered incompatible with the text of 
the Covenant. It pointed out that the question of gradual, 
partial, and incomplete application of sanctions would lose 
much of its importance if recourse to Article 16 was under- 
stood as a last desperate measure after all attempts to conserve 
peace had failed. If war should occur, delay in taking action 
against the aggressor could only result in retarding the restora- 
tion of peace. In this connection the report stated: 
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Article 16 deals with a contingency to be dreaded. It lays down 
terrible measures for the extreme case in which the pacific endeav- 
ours of the League finally fail before the criminal determination of 
a State resolved on war. Recourse to this article, except where 
absolutely necessary, would embitter conflicts instead of allaying 
them. It would, moreover, be extremely unfortunate to appeal to 
it in vain when the intention is not to apply it or to make but a show 
of applying it. To say that ambassadors only will be recalled under 
an article which definitely requires the breaking-off of all personal 
relations; to say that certain commercial relations will be gradually 
severed when the text demands that they should all be broken off 
forthwith is to make an almost ridiculous use of a clause in which 
the peoples most exposed to aggression see their supreme safe- 
guard. It means weakening it dangerously and at the same time 
weakening the whole League.33 
One other point of interest in connection with the de 
Brouckkre report is its recognition that control over the deci- 
sion to apply sanctions implied control over the measures 
taken in their application. "Since it is the States which, from 
a strictly legal point of view, are empowered to decide whether 
sanctions should be applied, it seems to follow that they alone 
are qualified to control them in practice." The Council would 
make recommendations "to ensure concerted and effective 
action," but actual control of armed forces would remain with 
the members themselves and economic sanctions would be 
applied "by the various States on similar lines."34 
Another study of the problem of sanctions is found in a 
report, submitted to the Council of the League in June, 1927, 
by the Secretary-General, on the subject of "the legal position 
which would be brought about by enforcing in time of peace 
the measures of economic pressure indicated in Article 16 of 
the Covenant, particularly by a maritime blockade."35 This 
report was concerned with the legal situation arising from the 
application of Article 16 rather than with an interpretation of 
its provisions with respect to the extent of the obligations 
resting upon the members of the League. However, the report 
33 Same, 70. 34 Same, 73. 
35 Text in same, 83-88. See also League of Nations, Official Journal, 1927, 
pp. 834-39. 
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accepted the interpretation of 1921 but "assumed that any 
application ol the article would in fact be preceded and con- 
trolled by recommendations of the Council and that it would 
be a misapplication of the article, which would not be tolerated, 
if a Member or group of Members should claim to act under 
it on their own account in defiance of the general sentiment of 
the L e a g ~ e . " ~ ~  
The report distinguished the legal position of a League mem- 
ber applying sanctions with respect to ( a )  the Covenant- 
breaking state, ( b )  other members of the League, and ( c )  
third states. For the first of these the Covenant was held to 
provide a basis for the legality of adverse differential treatment 
of an aggressor, whether or not a state of war was recognized 
to exist. With reference to the second type of situation, relating 
to the other members of the League, it was obvious under the 
interpretative resolutions that it would be possible for some 
members to decide that sanctions were applicable in a given 
case and for other members to disagree. In this situation 
would a member deciding not to apply sanctions be bound 
to recognize that other members had a right to make an affirma- 
tive decision, even though the interests of the former might 
be adversely affected? Or would the attitude of each member 
be guided solely by its own opinion as to the occasion for 
sanctions? In this dilemma the view taken by the Secretary- 
General was stated as follows: 
Although the matter is not free from doubt, the better view 
appears to be that the Member, while entitled to decide for itself 
if there has been a breach of the Covenant which justifies and 
obliges it to apply Article 16, is bound as a party to the article to 
recognise the right of the other Members to hold for their part that 
there has been a breach of the Covenant and to interrupt inter- 
course with the peccant State and the nationals and territory of all 
other States, including those of the Member itself. . . . Its position 
is in fact one for which express provision is not made in Article 16, 
which appears to be inspired by the hope that the nilembers of the 
League will in fact be u n a n i m o u ~ . ~ ~  
36 League of Nations, Oficial Journal, 1927, p. 834. 
37 Same, 836. 
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The last type of situation, with reference to third states, 
was considered as the one giving rise to the most delicate legal 
questions. The opinion expressed was that third states had 
no treaty obligation to acquiesce in the measures taken under 
Article 16, that they had rights under international law that 
prudently must be respected, and that hopefully they would 
take a benevolent attitude toward a defensive alliance acting 
in the sole interest of enforcing the pacific settlement of inter- 
national disputes. 
The studies were continued under the auspices of the Pre- 
paratory Commission for the Disarmament conference and of 
its Committee on Arbitration and Security. A "Memorandum 
on Articles 10, 11, and 16 of the C ~ v e n a n t " ~ ~  was submitted to 
the committee early in 1928 by Rutgers of the Netherlands. 
This memorandum also took note of the anomalous situation 
created by the fact that the provisional interpretative resolu- 
tions of 1921 had not found support in ratification of the 
amendments on which they were based. This uncertain situa- 
tion was considered unsatisfactory, and it was recommended 
that the proposed amendments either be ratified or finally 
abandoned. 
The mandate of the Committee on Arbitration and Security 
was to explore the possibilities of the Covenant without chang- 
ing the obligations of members of the League and without 
making any attempt at interpretation. Nevertheless, the Rut- 
gers memorandum reflected the acceptance of the earlier in- 
terpretations of Article 16. It  agreed that each member of the 
League must decide for itself when a breach of the Covenant 
has been committed, and continued: 
This doctrine is generally accepted today, and even if it were not 
the Council could not invoke a text or apply a sanction to oblige a 
Member to obey a decision of the Council in virtue of Article 16 
which that Member did not consider to be well founded. It is the 
Members themselves who must decide on the performance of their 
obligations under Article 16. It must therefore be realised that 
when they are called upon to take this extremely grave decision 
38 For text, see same, 1928, pp. 670-86. 
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they will be guided by their own conception of their obligations 
under Article 16. 
We may go even further than this. If ever the question of the 
application of Article 16 arose, the decision of the different countries 
would not depend upon interpretations, however authoritative, or 
on the deductions of lawyers; the great question would be whether 
the principle of Article 16 was or was not a living reality. To carry 
out the grave obligations contained in Article 16, States would have 
to be inspired by the spirit of responsibility and solidarity which is 
at the root of Article 16 and of the whole League of  nation^.^^ 
This memorandum also recognized that the control of the 
application of sanctions would rest with the individual mem- 
bers, stating: "It is not the Council which has the last word on 
the measures to be taken in the execution of Article 16. I t  is 
for the Members, bearing constantly in mind their duty, to 
enforce respect for the Covenant, to decide upon what meas- 
ures they can take. To deal effectively with the aggressor, co- 
operation is essential. I t  is clear that, for this co-operation to 
succeed, it is most desirable that States should have the guid- 
ance, in regard to the general situation, of a weighty and 
authoritative opinion."40 
The conclusion to be drawn from the discussions of Article 
16 during the period 1926-1928 is that the trend toward limita- 
tion by interpretation was confirmed. The crucial issue of the 
controlling decisions was left on exactly the same basis as be- 
fore, that each member must decide for itself. Even where 
some of the resolutions of 1921 were criticized or their unsatis- 
factory results alluded to, there was no escape from the fact 
that these same resolutions had been officially adopted by both 
the Assembly and the Council, even though provisionally. 
No action ever was taken to rescind the interpretations of 
1921 as guiding rules of League action. As a matter of fact 
the deliberations of 1926-1928 took place immediately upon 
the heels of a definite indication that the League would be 
guided by these very interpretations. Germany became a mem- 
ber of the League in 1926. During the preceding negotiations 
39 Same, 679. Paragraph numbering omitted from quotation. 
40 Same, 680. 
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the German delegates raised questions about obligations under 
Article 16 and claimed special recognition for Germany's status 
as a disarmed power.41 The reply by the Council (March, 
1925) was based upon the concept that the occasion for sanc- 
tions would be decided by the individual members of the 
League, but that a decision to apply sanctions would introduce 
a binding obligation on all members to participate in the meas- 
ures. After stating that with respect to military forces the 
Council would make recommendations and Germany then 
would decide to what extent she was in a position to comply, 
the reply continued: 
As regards economic measures, the States Members of the League 
themselves decide, either separately or by prior agreement, the 
practical steps to be taken for the execution of the general obliga- 
tion which they have undertaken. But the provisions of the Cove- 
nant do not permit that, when action is undertaken in pursuance 
of Article 16, each Member of the League should decide separately 
whether it shall take any part in that action. The Council feels 
bound to express its clear opinion that any reservation of this kind 
would undermine the basis of the League of Nations and would be 
incompatible with membership of the League. It seems to the 
Council impossible that a Member of the League, and of the Coun- 
cil, should, in the event of operations undertaken against a cove- 
nant-breaking State, retain a status which would exempt its nationals 
from the general obligations imposed by the C o ~ e n a n t . ~ ~  
This might seem to give the Council somewhat more control 
than contemplated by the interpretative resolutions of 1921. 
However, the force of the Council's position was blunted to 
some extent by another statement made in connection with 
Germany's entrance into the League. In their collective note 
dated December 1, 1925, the Locarno Powers indicated their 
interpretation that each member of the League "is bound to 
co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant 
and in resistance to any act of aggression to the extent which is 
compatible with its military situation and takes its geog~*aphical 
position into account."43 Furthermore, in an exchange of notes 
41 Same, 1925, pp. 323-26. 42 Same, 490-91. 
43 League of Nations, Treaty Series, 54:299, 301. Italics supplied. 
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after signature of a treaty of friendship and neutrality between 
Germany and the U.S.S.R. in 1926, the German government 
stated that the question of sanctions against the U.S.S.R. could 
be determined for Germany with binding force only by her 
own consent.44 
Thus the official interpretations by the League itself and the 
understanding by which Germany became a member of the 
League placed limitations upon the obligations of collective 
security. 
One more bit of evidence may be added to this record of 
limitation by interpretation, namely, the debates on a proposed 
amendment of Article 10 .4Th i s  question was raised originally 
by Canada at the First Assembly in the form of a proposal for 
the complete elimination of the article. The absence of the 
United States obviously put Canada in a hazardous position if 
enforcement measures ever were taken by the League. Also, 
there was considerable sentiment to the effect that the League 
was an instrument of European power politics in which Canada 
had no interest.46 After discussions at the First and Second 
Assemblies Canada submitted a new proposal to the Third As- 
sembly that ( a )  the political and geographic circumstances of 
each state be taken into consideration and ( b )  the opinion of 
the Council should be regarded as of highest importance but 
not necessarily obligatory. The Third Assembly deferred the 
discussion, leaving it to the Council to provide for the detailed 
study of the proposal. The Council decided to invite the views 
of the members of the League. 
The replies were received and the matter was again con- 
sidered in 1923. After long discussion in committee and before 
44 Same, 53:395. 
45 League of Nations, Records of the Fourth Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 
75-87, 190-91; Minutes of the First Committee, 11-18, 24-28, 43-53. Article 
10 provided: "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve 
as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political in- 
dependence of all members of the League. In case o f  any such aggression or in 
case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon 
the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." 
40 See, for example, statements by F .  H.  Underhill and T .  W .  L. MacDermot, 
in Maurice Bourquin ( e d . ) ,  Collective Security: A Record of the Seventh and 
Eighth International Studies Conferences, 49-54. 
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the full Assembly, a vote was taken on the following interpreta- 
tive resolutibn: 
The Assembly, 
Desirous of defining the scope of the obligations contained in 
Article 10 of the Covenant so far as regards the points raised by 
the delegation of Canada, adopts the following resolution: 
It is in conformity with the spirit of Article 10 that, in the event 
of the Council considering it to be its duty to recommend the ap- 
plication of military measures in consequence of an aggression or 
danger or threat of aggression, the Council shall be bound to take 
account, more particularly, of the geographical situation and of the 
special conditions of each State. 
It is for the constitutional authorities of each Member to decide, 
in reference to the obligation of preserving the independence and 
the integrity of the territory of Members, in what degree the Mem- 
ber is bound to assure the execution of this obligation by employ- 
ment of its military forces; 
The recommendation made by the Council shall be regarded as 
being of the highest importance, and shall be taken into considera- 
tion by all the Members of the League with the desire to execute 
their engagements in good faith.47 
The result is interesting. Twenty-nine states, including all 
the Great Powers then members of the League, voted for the 
resolution; twenty-two nations were absent or abstained from 
voting; and one country, Persia, voted in the negative, explain- 
ing that the full guarantee was necessary for a small country 
surrounded by nonmembers of the League like Russia, Turkey, 
and Afghanistan. The interpretative resolution on Article 10, 
thus failing of unanimity, was not adopted. However, the 
whole discussion on this matter indicated an overwhelming 
sentiment for limiting the force of the article. This sentiment 
could not fail to have its effect, even though the wording of the 
Covenant remained as before. 
47 League of Nations, Records of the Fourth Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 86. 
Coincident with the incorporation of the principle of concern 
into international law and organization there was also mani- 
fested some dependence upon the principle of traditional neu- 
trality. It is obvious, of course, that refusal on the part of a 
state to become a member of the League of Nations was a 
rejection of the principle upon which the League was based, 
and if such a nation did not in some other way accept the 
principle of concern, either explicitly or implicitly, it would 
presumably remain attached to the principle of traditional neu- 
trality. In addition to this situation involving nonmembers, 
there were some positive survivals of the concept of neutrality. 
Switzerland, because its people were convinced that their 
national welfare demanded the continuance of a status of neu- 
trality (which had been recognized by Article 435 of the 
Treaty of Versailles), was admitted to the League of Nations 
by a Council resolution recognizing the unique position of that 
country and its status of perpetual neutrality. For its part, 
Switzerland recognized the duties of solidarity imposed by 
membership in the League. It was understood that the Swiss 
government would not consider the presence in Geneva of a 
military commission acting under the authority of the League 
as incompatible with Swiss neutrality, and a representative of 
Switzerland went so far as to state before the Assembly, 
"Switzerland intends to remain neutral from the military point 
of view, but she does not deny the duty she owes to economic 
solidarity. She is prepared, if called upon, to bring the eco- 
nomic weapon into play against an enemy of the human race; 
but on conditions compatible with the conception of neutrality 
recognized as applying to Swit~erland."~~ 
48 League of Nations, The Records of the First Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 
398. A concise statement of the understandings accompanying Swiss entry into 
the League may be found in Manley 0. Hudson, "Membership in the League 
of Nations," American Journal of International Law, XVIII ( 1924), 439, 440, 
and notes. For a brief discussion of the dilemma of Switzerland with regard to 
military neutrality and economic sanctions, see Walter H. Zahler, "Switzerland 
38 I N T E R N A T I O N A L  C O N F L I C T  
During the Greco-Turkish War the Allied governments is- 
sued, in 1921, a collective declaration of neutrality, when 
Greece was a member of the League and Turkey was not. 
The Nine-Power Treaty concluded at the Washington Con- 
ference of 1922 between the United States and eight members 
of the League having interests in the Far East contained a 
provision to the effect that China's rights as a neutral in time 
of war "to which China is not a party" would be respected. 
In the decade after the adoption of the Covenant several 
- 
bilateral neutrality treaties were signed by various members 
of the League. Probably the most important development with 
regard to this type of treaty was its use as an essential element 
in the security system of the U.S.S.R. The restoration of peace 
between the Soviet republics and adjacent countries was ac- 
companied by a series of treaties designed to prevent the recur- 
rence of wars (especially attacks by "capitalist" nations upon 
the communist society) by means of recognition of the inde- 
pendence of the newly created boundary states, reciprocal 
guarantees against future attacks, acceptance of the principle 
of nonintervention, and an assumption of a policy of neutrality 
by signatories toward each other in the event of ho~ti l i t ies .~~ 
Immediately after the adoption of the Treaties of Locarno 
in 1925 the U.S.S.R. concluded with Turkey the first of a series 
of bilateral mutual security treaties which accepted the prin- 
ciple of ne~trality.~'  This was followed in April, 1926, by a 
treaty between the U.S.S.R. and Germany which provided 
(Article 2)  that "should one of the Contracting Parties, despite 
- 
its peaceful attitude, be attacked by one or more third Powers, 
and the League of Nations," 753-57. In the case of Belgium the neutralization 
treaties of 1839 were abrogated by Article 31 of the Treaty of Versailles, and 
Belgium became a member of the League without any recognition that its 
position was "unique." For the status of Belgium, see Harold J. Tobin, "Is 
Belgium Still Neutralized?" American Journal of International Law, XXVI 
(1932), 514-32. In 1936, however, Belgium insisted on a right to remain 
neutral in the event of war, adopting a policy aimed "solely . . . at placing 
us outside the quarrels of our neighbors and keeping war from our territory." 
49 Malbone W. Graham, Jr., "The Soviet Security Treaties," American Journal 
of International Law, XXIII ( 1929), 336. For the Soviet security policies, see 
T.  A. Taracouzio, The Sooiet Union and International Law. 
60 Graham, 339. 
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the other Contracting Party shall observe neutrality for the 
whole duration of the ~onf l ic t . "~~ 
In a note of the same date the German government declared 
that there could be no conflict between the provisions of this 
treaty and the entry of Germany into the League of Nations, 
since the application of sanctions against the U.S.S.R. under 
Article 16 of the Covenant would come into consideration only 
if that state should enter upon a war of aggression, and thk 
question of whether the U.S.S.R. had committed such an ag- 
gression could be determined for Germany only by her own 
consent. With reference to the question of whether and to 
what extent Germany "would be in a position to take part in 
the application of sanctions," attention was called to the note 
of interpretation of Article 16 addressed to the German repre- 
sentatives on the occasion of the signing of the Treaties of 
L o ~ a r n o . ~ T h e  government of the U.S.S.R. "took note of" these 
explanations without further comment. 
A treaty of nonaggression between the U.S.S.R. and Lithu- 
ania, signed September 28, 1926, while not using the term 
"neutrality" in the treaty itself, provided by Article 3 that 
"each of the two Contracting Parties undertakes to refrain 
from any act of aggression whatsoever against the other Party. 
Should one of the Contracting Parties, despite its peaceful 
attitude, be attacked by one or several third Powers, the other 
Contracting Party undertakes not to support the said third 
Power against the Contracting Party attacked."53 
In an exchange of notes the Lithuanian government declared 
that Lithuania's membership in the League of Nations could 
not constitute an obstacle to friendly relations with the U.S.S.R. 
and that in view of Lithuania's geographical position the obli- 
gations of League membership "cannot constitute an obstacle 
to the Lithuanian nation's aspirations towards neutrality, which 
is the policy best suited to her vital  interest^."^^ 
Finally, a treaty of guarantee and neutrality between Persia 
51 League of Nations, Treaty Series, 53:393. 52 Same, 393-96. 
53 Same, 60:153. This treaty was renewed on May 6, 1931 (same, 125:255- 
63). 
54 Same, 60: 155-57. 
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and the U.S.S.R., signed October 1, 1927, contained a pledge 
of neutrality binding on the victim of aggression as well as its 
cosignatory: "Should either of the Contracting Parties become 
the victim of aggression on the part of one or more third 
Powers, the other Contracting Party agrees to observe neu- 
trality throughout the duration of the conflict, while the Party 
which is the victim of aggression shall not violate that neu- 
trality, notwithstanding any strategical, tactical, or political 
considerations or any advantages it might thereby obtain."55 
Another aspect of the principle of traditional neutrality re- 
lated to the formulation of belligerent and neutral rights and 
duties in time of war. The controversies over neutral rights and 
duties which had arisen between Great Britain and the United 
States from 1914 to 1917 had been left for later adjustment, 
and the claims and counterclaims were settled by an exchange 
of notes of May 10, 1927. This settlement definitely abandoned 
any attempt on the part of the United States government to 
ascertain the validity of claims against Great Britain for violat- 
ing neutral rights. Furthermore, no regulation for the future 
was adopted, it being provided "that the right of each Govern- 
ment to maintain in the future such position as it may deem 
appropriate with respect to the legality or illegality under 
international law of measures such as those giving rise to claims 
covered by the immediately preceding paragraph is fully re- 
served, it being specifically understood that the juridical posi- 
tion of neither Government is prejudiced by the present agree- 
ment."56 
The Havana Convention on Maritime Neutrality, signed in 
1928, formulated the rights and duties of neutrals in time of 
war, but it was ratified only by the United States and a few 
of the smaller Latin American countries. The several multi- 
lateral treaties for the regulation of certain facilities and utili- 
ties of international concern (such as navigable waterways 
and commercial aviation) did not undertake to define neutral 
55 Same, 112:292. Persia was a member of the League at the time. 
66 Article 1, section 3, United States Department of State, Treaty Series, No. 
756, pp. 1, 4. 
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and belligerent rights and obligations in time of war. Although 
the problem of restating or clarifying the status of the law of 
neutrality was recognized early in the history of the League, 
the work of various committees of jurists, both official and un- 
official, did not result in the formulation of any generally ac- 
cepted code. 
Any dependence upon traditional neutrality raises the prob- 
lem of the relation of that principle to the development of a 
system based upon differential treatment. An interpretation of 
the implications of continued acceptance of the nineteenth 
century conception in any form must logically either construe 
the two alternatives as definitely exclusive of each other or 
posit the assumption that certain aspects of the earlier system 
will function as transitional elements in the establishment and 
integration of a system of collective security. The so-called 
"neutrality treaties" furnish an apt instance of this problem. 
There has been no occasion for a court of competent jurisdic- 
tion to pronounce upon the rights and duties flowing from 
these treaties, and therefore no authoritative opinion of their 
juridical import is available. Clearly, nevertheless, to interpret 
the neutrality treaties as requiring impartiality left-so far as 
League members were concerned-the possibility of conflict 
with the obligations of Article 16. However, a promise to re- 
main neutral might be interpreted as superseded by the obliga- 
tions of Article 16, provided a cosignatory were found to be a 
victim of aggression. According to such an interpretation the 
neutrality treaties would be supplementary to the peace system 
of the Covenant. On the other hand, the obligations of a 
neutrality treaty combined with the accepted interpretation 
that each state might decide its own participation in sanctions 
obviously might operate to impede the functioning of a collec- 
tive system. 
The problem of interpreting the significance of the neu- 
trality treaties was merely one instance of confusion with 
respect to international law and organization for the restraint 
of violence among states. The partial acceptance of the prin- 
ciple of concern and the uncertain position of neutrality meant 
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the coexistence of two antithetical principles, neither of which 
was accorded the support requisite to its functioning as a 
dependable instrument for the control of international violence. 
Neutrality, as well as collective security, contemplates the 
existence of an international system. The control or restriction 
of international violence absolutely requires the regularization 
of the relations of third states with nations involved in hostili- 
ties. When two juridical systems compete with each other 
within the same area of social organization the result is likely 
to be their mutual destruction. This is true because the very 
existence of law depends upon the "security of expectation." 
When customary law is no longer observed and no law by 
agreement takes its place, there is no positive basis for that 
general acquiescence essential to law. Whenever unregulated 
violence, in the form of undeclared wars and coercive diplo- 
macy, occurs, the essential relevance of any international juri- 
dical system is denied. 
The problem of disarmament is implicit in the problems of 
war and peace, of international law and organization, of na- 
tional safety and collective security. To separate the devising 
of means from the choice of ends is to adopt a false dichotomy 
and to sever two vitally connected aspects of the same funda- 
mental issue. If war is expected or planned, the weapons of 
war will not be abandoned. Any willingness to reduce arma- 
ments will be the result of a desire to reduce an opponent's 
armaments still more or a bid for the sanction of moral appro- 
bation. On the other hand, if war should become a defunct 
institution, national armaments would become merely quaint 
relics of a past era. In fact, under the expectation of peace 
there would be competition in reduction of armaments. 
As it is, desire for peace is reconciled with feverish prepara- 
tion for war by the argument that lack of preparedness will 
increase the likelihood of involvement in war. A weak defense 
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is said to invite an offensive attack. But when all states attempt 
to achieve the strongest possible military defense and when an 
effective offense is considered the best defense, the armaments 
which are to guarantee peace may become an important cause 
of war. To a fortunate few among the states national arma- 
ments may bring a more or less permanent security against 
war, but such a peace will be an interval between wars, and 
what security there is will be little more than a protracted 
interruption of active hostilities. Under a genuine system of 
collective security wars might occur, since "perfect peace7' is 
a figment of the imagination, but they would be no more than 
unfortunate incidents in an essentially sane world. Each state 
would not be in momentary expectation of fighting for its 
existence. The difference between peace by armament and 
peace by disarmament is the difference between whether a 
system based upon the ultimate sanction of nationalistic war 
is to be the normal or the abnormal condition of international 
relations. It is clear, therefore, that the status of the armaments 
problem is an excellent test of whether or not the principle of 
concern is being made functionally effective in international 
organization. 
The Covenant of the League of Nations provided that "the 
Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of 
peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the 
lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforce- 
ment by common action of international  obligation^."^^ A 
Temporary Mixed Commission was constituted to prepare re- 
ports and proposals for the reduction of armaments, and each 
member of the League was requested to furnish a statement 
of considerations in this matter. The conclusion which emerged 
was that under existing conditions the majority of govern- 
ments would be unable to accept the responsibility for a serious 
reduction of armaments unless they received in exchange a 
satisfactory guarantee of the safety of their countries. In other 
words, the governments expressed willingness to reduce their 
armaments, but they also emphasized the jeopardy to national 
57 Article 8, paragraph 1. 
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safety if they did so. Security had to precede disarmament. 
The Temporary Mixed Commission's report accordingly pro- 
posed that the security upon which disarmament depended 
be achieved by a general defensive agreement requiring im- 
mediate and effective assistance to any signatory which might 
be the object of attack, such an agreement to be conditional 
on an actual reduction of armaments. There would be dis- 
crimination against any state which might "resort to war." 
Thus the principle of differential treatment was applied to the 
problem of disarmament. 
The Assembly, after considering the report of the Tempo- 
rary Mixed Commission, adopted a resolution instructing the 
commission to continue its investigations and to prepare a 
draft treaty embodying the principle of achieving disarmament 
as a result of security based on an assurance of mutual assist- 
a n ~ e . ~ '  In pursuance of this resolution a draft Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance was submitted to the Assembly in 1923. Article 1 
of the draft treaty provided that "the High Contracting Parties 
solemnly declare that aggressive war is an international crime 
and severally undertake that no one of them will be guilty of 
its commission." 
By Article 2 the signatories would undertake, jointly and 
severally, to "furnish assistance, in accordance with the pro- 
visions of the Present Treaty, to any one of their number 
should the latter be the object of a war of aggression, provided 
that it has conformed to the provisions of the present Treaty 
regarding the reduction or limitation of armaments." 
The sanctions of the draft treaty were contained in Article 5, 
by which the signatories would undertake, in case a situation 
arose under Article 2, to furnish assistance in the form de- 
termined by the Council of the League as the most effective 
and "to take all appropriate measures without delay in the 
order of urgency demanded by the circumstances." In par- 
ticular the Council would be authorized to decide to apply 
5 8  "Resolutions and Recommendations Adopted by the Assembly during Its 
Third Session," League of Nations, Oficial Journal, Special Supplement No. 9 
( October, 1922), 26-27. 
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immediately to the aggressor state the economic sanctions 
contemplated by Article 16 of the Covenant, to invoke by 
name the signatories whose assistance it req~i red ,~ '  to de- 
termine the forces which each nation furnishing assistance 
should place at its disposal, to prescribe all necessary measures 
for securing priority for the communications and transport con- 
nected with the operations, to prepare a plan of financial co- 
operation, and to appoint the higher command and establish 
the object and nature of his duties. Thus the draft treaty 
provided for an increase of some importance in the authority 
of the Council, since the latter would be authorized to make 
the final decisions upon the application of economic and 
military sanctions. 
On September 29, 1923, the Assembly passed a resolution 
which, after noting that the discussion of the draft treaty had 
revealed some divergencies of opinion and that a large num- 
ber of governments had not yet expressed their views, re- 
quested the Council "to submit the draft Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance to the Governments for their consideration, asking 
them to communicate their views in regard to the aforesaid 
draft Treaty."" 
A total of twenty-nine governments, including three non- 
members of the League,61 submitted their comments before 
the meeting of the Fifth Assembly in 1924.62 The attitude of 
most of the replies was an acceptance of the draft treaty as a 
basis for discussion, with more or less strenuous objections to 
some of its particular provisions. A few states rejected the 
draft altogether; among them was the United States, which 
merely noted the more important provisions and stated that it 
would "find it impossible to give its adhe ren~e . "~~  
59 Subject to the provision that no signatory situated in a continent other 
than that in which operations take place would, in principle, be required to co- 
operate in military, naval, or air operations. 
60 League of Nations, Oficial Journal, Special Supplement No. 13  ( 1923) ; 
Records of the Fourth Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Text of the Debates, 154. 
61  Germany, the United States, and the U.S.S.R. 
o2 League of Nations, Arbitration, Security, and Reduction of Armaments, 
221-60. 
63 Same. 232-34. 
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Those with specific objections fell into three principal 
First, the U.S.S.R., Norway, and Sweden refused to 
accept the principle upon which the draft treaty was based- 
namely, that the limitation of national armaments should be 
contingent upon the establishment of an international organi- 
zation for the prevention of war. Norway pointed out in par- 
ticular that Article 8 obligated the members of the League to 
reduce their armaments without guarantees other than those 
in the Covenant itself.66 
Second, a large number of objections were based on doubts 
about the value of such a treaty. Twelve governments con- 
tended that the guarantees provided were not sufficient to 
justify reduction of armaments, or in slightly different words, 
that the treaty, even if accepted, would not accomplish its 
purpose. The same point was involved in other references to 
the probable delays in bringing assistance to a victim of ag- 
gression and to the belief that the treaty did not provide 
security because it would be too easy to denounce. Finland 
further stated that the signatories would not know how much 
- 
assistance they could count on when estimating to what extent 
they could reduce armaments and that it was not clear how 
mutual assistance was to be organized. 
64 It is necessary to enter the warning that an itemization of the objections 
to the draft treaty is a relatively crude index of the degree of its acceptance. 
A given criticism might be presented either as an insuperable obstacle to ac- 
ceptance of the treaty or as a mildly desirable modification. A government 
hostile to the treaty might simply state its attitude without specifying a single 
defect, or it might not reply at all. A suggestion for a change in wording 
might be made with the intention either of strengthening the treaty or of 
rendering it practically meaningless by a subterfuge. The real question was 
not whether any objections were presented, but whether some effective plan 
could be worked out and adopted within a reasonable length of time. How- 
ever, the objections presented in the comments of the various governments may 
be accepted as a reasonably accurate indication of the difficulties involved in 
working out a system of disarmament by adverse differential treatment of any 
state which might resort to war. 
65 In answer to the argument that Article 8 required disarmament regardless 
of any guarantees, it had been held that the interdependence of disarmament 
and guarantees of security were the result of practical experience, not a legal 
principle. League of Nations, Reduction of Armaments, 3. However, a more 
defensible position would have been an invocation of the qualifying phrase, 
"the lowest point consistent with national safety." 
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Some governments considered that aside from being ineffec- 
tive, the adoption of the draft treaty would be actually harm- 
ful. The Netherlands questioned whether the plan was in 
accord with the principles of the Covenant, and Norway ob- 
jected to treaties of guarantee increasing the obligations im- 
posed by the Covenant. Several governments thought an un- 
wise extension of the powers of the Council would be involved, 
and Sweden objected that the sanctions of the Covenant would 
be extended without a corresponding extension of rules for the 
pacific solution of international disputes. 
One of the most disputed points was the provision which 
would permit the conclusion of complementary regional agree- 
ments within the framework of the draft treaty. These would 
ostensibly be designed to supplement the general treaty and 
increase its effectiveness by the formation of especially strong 
systems of mutual assistance in regions where the danger of 
aggression might be acute. However, a revival of the prewar 
system of hostile alliances was widely feared, and thirteen gov- 
ernments registered their objections to allowing such regional 
agreements. 
The U.S.S.R. contended that under the existing conditions 
an international organization such as that contemplated by the 
draft treaty would become an instrument of an aggressive 
policy by dominant states. Germany took a similar position 
in stating that the dictates of the Council might involve third 
states in a war more serious for them than for the original 
participants; the Netherlands objected that there was no legal 
guarantee that aid would be extended only to those nations 
in a position to claim it rightfully. Germany also stated that 
the draft treaty contained no objective standards for disarma- 
ment and concurred with Sweden in the view that a dispropor- 
tion existed between the burdens and the advantages which 
would result. Norway made the criticism that there was too 
much dependence on military strength. Great Britain, Greece, 
and the Netherlands feared that the net result might even be 
an increased necessity for armaments. 
Another series of objections to the draft treaty based on 
48 I N T E R N A T I O N A L  C O N F L I C T  
doubts about its effectiveness and constructive consequences 
involved references to the special circumstances of particular 
Lithuania pointed out that a guarantee to respect territorial 
integrity presupposes that frontiers have been regularly estab- 
lished and are recognized by the states concerned. This condi- 
tion was not satisfied with regard to Vilna. Accordingly the 
Lithuanian government stated that it "could not undertake to 
come to the assistance of Poland, should the latter be the 
victim of an act of aggression, unless and until she restores 
Vilna, the age-long capital of Lithuania, together with the ad- 
jacent territory, which Poland now occupies in violation of 
treaties and of her own international  engagement^."^^ 
Canada felt that her position in the British Empire affected 
the protection afforded her by the continental limitation of 
the application of the treaty. Canada had already expressed 
disapproval of an interpretation of Article 10 of the Covenant 
which would require her to intervene actively under that 
article, and it was her view that the proposed treaty created 
an obligation wider in its extent and more precise in its implica- 
tions than any which Article 10 could be interpreted as im- 
posing. 
Uruguay objected that its geographical location, combined 
with the difficulty of communications, would leave it in an 
unprotected position, and therefore the treaty would be useless 
in promoting that country's national security. Uruguay espe- 
cially objected to the grouping of the Americas into three con- 
tinental divisions for the purpose of the treaty, pointing out 
that so far as military, naval, and air operations were con- 
cerned, no state in North or Central America would be obli- 
gated to come to the assistance of any South American state. 
The Greek government found itself in a "very special posi- 
tion," based on the claims that the territorial status of Greece 
66 One may safely assume that "special circumstances of particular states" 
were not forgotten in the formulation of general objections to the draft Treaty 
of Mutual Assistance. 
67 League of Nations, Arbitration, Security, and Reduction of Armaments, 
253. 
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and nearly all the vital questions affecting her national life 
were governed by the Treaties of Neuilly and Lausanne, that 
Bulgaria had consistently violated the military clauses of the 
former,Gs and that the latter imposed on Turkey no restrictions 
in regard to her military and naval forces. The conclusion was: 
"In order to provide for her security, Greece is therefore obliged 
to take military measures which she would have been glad to 
be able to reduce if she had been placed in more favorable 
 circumstance^."^^ 
Siam referred to the "peculiarity" of her geographical situa- 
tion and emphasized the fact that although military assistance 
was limited to the continent in which a conflict occurred, 
there was a chance that a colony of a European state might 
make an aggressive attack on an Asiatic country with forces 
drawn from Europe. To meet this situation the Siamese gov- 
ernment suggested the possibility of a joint treaty of com- 
pulsory arbitration signed by Asiatic states together with 
European states having colonies in Asia. 
Australia also found herself in a special situation in that 
"being a young country, Australia, in the adoption of measures 
for her own defence, has not yet attained the lowest point con- 
sistent with national safety; and therefore the obligation re- 
lating to reduction or limitation of armaments is without that 
special significance for us which it has for other and older 
 state^."^^ Moreover, the treaty would be an anomaly as far 
as Australia was concerned. That country, being an entire 
continent in itself, would derive neither obligations nor bene- 
fits with respect to military, naval, or air assistance. 
The third group of criticisms of the draft Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance related to Article 4, which provided that "in the 
event of one or more of the High Contracting Parties becoming 
engaged in hostilities, the Council of the League of Nations 
shall decide, within four days of notification being addressed 
to the Secretary-General, which of the High Contracting Parties 
68 This drew an indignant disclaimer from Bulgaria. 
69 League of Nations, Arbitration, Security, and Reduction of Armaments, 
259. 
70 Same, 234. 
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are the objects of aggression and whether they are entitled 
to claim the assistance provided under the  treat^."^^ 
No fewer than twelve governments referred to the difficulty 
or impossibility of determining with accuracy, especially within 
the limited period of four days, the exceedingly important and 
delicate question of whether a state had committed "aggressive 
war" in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. France, in 
accepting the draft treaty, stated that although it was difficult 
to define all cases of aggression, it was possible to specify the 
most flagrant cases and that the phrase "within four days" 
might be changed to "as speedily as possible," allowing, for 
example, two weeks. 
I t  is obvious that an acceptable definition of aggression 
and a reliable procedure for determining when an act of ag- 
gression has occurred are essential to a practicable system 
of collective security. Solution of the problem of effective 
applicability of a basic principle marks the dividing line be- 
tween the purposive organization of consequences and the 
futile reiteration of desired but unattainable objectives. An 
international system in which disarmament is made to depend 
upon national security and national security in turn upon 
adverse differential treatment of any aggressor has as its in- 
dispensable condition the dependable expectation that a state 
which has become an aggressor will be named and proceeded 
against as such. If this cannot be accomplished, the entire 
system collapses. 
Attempts to solve this difficulty are confronted with the 
dilemma that mutual assistance must be immediately available 
when needed, but it may not be possible at once to determine 
which state actually precipitated hostilities. The grave con- 
sequences of finding that a nation has committed aggression, 
the complexity of the issues involved in international con- 
troversies, the fact that no single test of aggression can be 
regarded as definitive in itself, the certainty that each party 
to a dispute would regard itself as acting in self-defense, the 
possibility that third states might disagree on the identity of 
71 League of Nations, Reduction of Armaments, 7 .  
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the aggressor, the difficulty of arriving at the true facts of the 
situation, and the acknowledged influence of misleading propa- 
ganda are some of the considerations that plausibly suggest the 
unlikelihood of an immediate, accurate, and substantially 
unanimous decision. Yet delay and uncertainty will vitiate 
any conclusion which may be reached and will operate to the 
advantage of a state able to achieve a fait accompli by the 
sudden and unscrupulous use of force. And after all these dif- 
ficulties have been overcome, there remains the problem of 
acting against a designated aggressor. 
The Fifth Assembly, in 1924, gave a large share of its at- 
tention to the problems of disarmament and mutual security, 
specifically to the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of Inter- 
national Disputes, more commonly referred to as the Geneva 
The consideration which the Fifth Assembly and its com- 
mittees devoted to disarmament and security was based upon 
the results of previous attempts to find a solution for the prob- 
lems involved, taking as its point of departure the draft Treaty 
of Mutual Assistance and the comments of the various govern- 
ments upon it. The principle of making the reduction of na- 
tional armaments contingent upon the establishment of an 
international organization for the prevention of war was ac- 
cepted and extended. 
In substance, the objections to the draft Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance were met by the provision of a new scheme embody- 
ing the additional feature of compulsory pacific settlement of 
international disputes. Such a development had been sug- 
gested by a draft Treaty of Disarmament and Security drawn 
up by a group of American citizens and circulated among the 
members of the League in the summer of 1924.73 This plan 
proposed that every dispute involving aggressive war, acts of 
72 See League of Nations, Arbitration, Securitv, and Reduction of  Arma- 
ments; ~ a l t e r s ,  I, 268-76. 
73 Walters. I. 261-64: also see David Hunter Miller. The Geneva Protocol. 
263-70; P. J. Noel-~akkr, The Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement 4 
International Disputes, 18-19. Professor James T. Shotwell was the founder 
of the committee which prepared the "American Plan." See his On the Rim 
of the Abyss, 14-21. 
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aggression, or preparation for acts of aggression be submitted 
to the Permanent Court of International Justice; that the court 
have jurisdiction to decide, on the complaint of any signatory, 
whether or not in any given case such prohibited acts had been 
committed; and that any signatory which refused to accept the 
jurisdiction of the court be deemed an aggressor. 
The work of the Fifth Assembly was based upon the formula, 
"arb i t ra t i~n ,~~ security, disarmament." Disarmament had been 
made to depend upon the guarantee of security, and since the 
nonexecution of decisions reached by pacific methods would 
mean a reversion to the system of armed force, security in turn 
depended upon assurance that effective procedures for the 
pacific settlement of international controversies could be estab- 
lished. The fundamental principle of the Geneva Protocol was 
that national security was to be guaranteed and reduction of 
national armaments was to be attained by adverse differential 
treatment of any state which violated the provisions of an 
established procedure for the pacific settlement of international 
disputes. 
Article 1 of the protocol provided that the signatory states 
would make every effort in their power to secure the introduc- 
tion into the Covenant of amendments along the lines of the 
provisions of the protocol and that these provisions would be 
binding among themselves from the coming into force of the 
protocol. By Article 3 the signatory states would undertake to 
accept as compulsory ipso facto the jurisdiction of the Perma- 
nent Court of International Justice in the cases covered by 
paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the court. Provisions for com- 
pulsory pacific settlement of all international disputes were 
then elaborated. 
This, in summary, was the plan offered to close the gaps of 
74 The word "arbitration" was used in connection with the Geneva Protocol 
to refer to the settlement of international disputes under the auspices of a 
machinery provided by the protocol and the Covenant of the League. The 
concept of arbitration differed from that of the Hague Conference in that in 
the Geneva Protocol arbitration was a part of the machinery for the com- 
pulsory pacific settlement of disputes, the principle of "equity" was applied, 
and acceptance of the result did not rest solely upon the good faith of the 
parties. 
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the Covenant, provide a pacific solution for all international 
disputes, guarantee national security against aggression, and 
bring about a reduction of national armaments. The Geneva 
Protocol would overcome the objections raised against the 
draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance by providing a dependable 
and universal guarantee. "The reduction of armaments wiil 
result, in the first place, from the general security created by a 
diminution of the dangers of war arising from the compulsory 
pacific settlement of all disputes. It will also ensue from the 
certainty which any State attacked will have of obtaining the 
economic and financial support of all the signatory  state^."'^ 
The Geneva Protocol attempted to deal with the problems 
involved in the concept of "aggression" by providing an "ade- 
quate and automatic" test based on the principle of arbitration. 
Thus, "aggression" would be a resort to war in violation of the 
procedures of peaceful settlement laid down in the Covenant 
of the League and the Geneva Protocol; the protocol was 
designed to complement the Covenant, thereby insuring that 
every war would be prohibited and that any state which started 
a war would be penalized by international collective a ~ t i o n . ' ~  
- 
As soon as an aggressor was designated, the Council would 
call upon the signatory states to apply sanctions, in which case 
the obligations of Article 16 of the Covenant would immedi- 
ately become operative. These obligations would require each 
of the signatory states "to co-operate loyally and effectively in 
support of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and in 
resistance to any act of aggression, in the degree to which its 
geographical position and its particular situation as regards 
armaments allow." In accepting the Geneva Protocol the sig- 
75 League of Nations, Arbitration, Sectirity, and Reduction of Armaments, 
361-62. 
76 The conclusion of the report of the Third Committee stated in part: "Our 
purpose was to make war impossible, to kill it, to annihilate it. To do this, 
we had to create a system for the pacific settlement of all disputes which might 
arise. Arbitration, therefore, is provided for every kind of dispute, and ag- 
gression is defined in such a way as to give no cause for hesitation when the 
Council has to take a decision. These reasons (that there should be no loop- 
holes in the system) led us to fill in the gaps in the Covenant and to define 
the sanctions in such a way that there should be a sound and definite basis 
for the feeling of security" (same, 362-63). 
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natory states would further give a joint and several undertaking 
to come to the assistance of the nation attacked or threatened 
and to give each other mutual 
The Geneva Protocol was to go into effect as soon as it had 
been ratified by a majority of the permanent members of the 
Council and ten other members of the League, and a plan for 
the reduction of armaments as worked out by a disarmament 
conference had been accepted. In October, 1924, the Assembly 
passed a resolution recommending the adoption of the protocol. 
Fourteen states signed at the time, and several others followed 
their example a little later. However, in March, 1925, the 
British government presented to the Council of the League a 
statement rejecting the Geneva P r o t o ~ o l . ~ ~  One argument ad- 
vanced in support of this decision was that the method of 
"systematic completeness" had been rightly rejected by the 
framers of the Covenant, since "the objections to universal and 
compulsory arbitration might easily outweigh its theoretical 
 advantage^."^^ 
The major objection of the British government, however, was 
that by the adoption of the protocol dangerous new responsi- 
bilities would devolve upon the members of the League. 
"Fresh classes of disputes are to be decided by the League; 
fresh possibilities of defying its decisions are thereby created; 
fresh occasions for the application of coercive measures follow 
as a matter of course." 
I t  was pointed out that economic sanctions, which the 
Geneva Protocol had accepted as a weapon for restraining 
aggression, would operate in a way essentially different from 
that contemplated when the Covenant was adopted. Such 
measures, if simultaneously directed by all other states against 
a nation which was not economically self-sufficing, would be 
so powerful and effective that their use would seldom be neces- 
77 Same, 366. It was provided that in the contingency that both parties to a 
dispute were aggressors, sanctions would be applied to both of them. 
78 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Statement by the Right Hon. Amten Cham- 
berlain, M.P., on Behalf of  His Majesty's Government, to the Council of  the 
League of Nations, respecting the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of Inter- 
national Disputes. 
79 Same, 3. 
sary. The situation would be entirely different, however, with 
the mere existence of powerful economic communities outside 
the League. The adoption of economic sanctions "might force 
trade into unaccustomed channels, but it could hardly stop it; 
and, though the offending States would no doubt suffer, there 
is no presumption that it would be crushed, or even that it 
would suffer most."80 
hioreover, the protocol might actually operate in favor of 
an aggressor, since no preparations for war could be made 
from the moment when a dispute arose until proceedings 
for a pacific settlement had been concluded. This would per- 
mit an unscrupulous government to distribute its armed forces 
in the best possible strategic position and then start a dispute, 
whereupon the victim would be prohibited from strengthening 
its defensive position." 
- 
In this connection the British communication referred to the 
"inherent impossibility of distinguishing, in any paper defini- 
tion, military movements genuinely intended for defence, and 
only for defence, from movements with some ulterior aggres- 
sive p ~ r p o s e . " ~ ~  
The Geneva Protocol, in the view of the British government, 
would destroy the balance and alter the spirit of the Covenant. 
The emphasis laid upon sanctions and the elaboration of mili- 
tary procedure would, it was alleged, suggest the idea that the 
business of the League was not so much to promote "friendly 
co-operation and reasoned harmony" as to preserve peace by 
organizing war.83 
The essence of the situation was that hesitation over dis- 
armament was not prompted by fear of the gaps in the Cove- 
nant but by fear lest the Covenant would not be kept at all. 
"Brute force is what they [those who hesitate to disarm] fear, 
80 Same, 4. The point was also made that the danger of war might be in- 
creased by treating as aggressors nonmembers of the League who refused to 
accept the methods and decisions of the League. 
81 On the other hand, if the protocol were really effective, such a situation 
would be met by the combination of all other states against the aggressor. 
82 Great Britain, Foreign Office, 5. 
83 Such an emphasis on war was likened to the case of a man always brood- 
ing over the possibility of sonle severe surgical operation! 
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and only brute force enlisted in their defence can (as they 
believe) give them the security of which they feel the need."84 
The British government in accordance with the above argu- 
ments took the position that the situation would not be bet- 
tered by the Geneva Protocol and suggested as an alternative 
that the Covenant be supplemented by "making special ar- 
rangements in order to meet special needs."s5 
The key to the attitude of the British government at this 
time lay in the judgment that acceptance of the Geneva Proto- 
col would add "dangerous new responsibilities" upon the states 
which would have to take the lead in enforcing the system of 
collective security against an aggressor. Various practical con- 
siderations influenced this judgment. The fact alone that the 
United States was still absent from the League was sufficient 
to create a substantial difficulty for Great Britain if ever that 
country should be called upon to employ its fleet for an eco- 
nomic blockade in the application of sanctions. The opinion 
of the Dominion governments had been consulted, and it will 
be remembered that Canada was taking a leading part in try- 
ing to get the obligations of League membership decreased in- 
stead of increased. Great Britain, with its far-flung empire, its 
large navy, and its great economic and commercial interests, 
would perhaps carry the heaviest burden in the application of 
sanctions, and at the same time it would be exposed to opposi- 
tion or at least reluctance on the part of its own dominions and 
also to possible serious difficulties in its relations with the 
United States. For these reasons alone the Geneva Protocol 
was not an agreement to be lightly accepted. 
Then there were practical considerations with respect to 
the continent of Europe, particularly as concerned the Anglo- 
French-German triangle. France, with Germany in mind, 
wished to obtain additional guarantees of security as a prelude 
to reduction of armaments. Since the rejection of the League 
and of the tripartite guarantee by the United States, Great 
Britain had been unwilling to commit herself in any way to a 
unilateral underwriting of French security. In the immediate 
84 Great Britain, Foreign Office, 7. 85 Same, 9. 
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postwar years British and French policy sharply diverged, 
notably in the disagreements over reparations and in French 
insistence on occupation of the Ruhr. It is true that by the 
time of the Fifth Assembly in 1924 this breach had been some- 
what healed by the meeting of a reparations conference in 
London, the adoption of the Dawes Plan, and the evacuation 
of the Ruhr. The time for renewed collaboration seemed 
favorable, and an aspect of the guarantee proposals which 
constituted a grave defect from the British viewpoint had been 
adjusted. The draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was based 
upon the concept "security before disarmament." The Geneva 
Protocol added the concept of arbitration. The significance 
of this lay in the fact that the system of collective security 
would not be available to a state which refused to submit its 
disagreements to third-party judgment. In the simplest terms, 
the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance represented a French 
attempt to get help in enforcing the peace treaties; the Geneva 
Protocol represented a British attempt to force France to 
arbitrate her claims in return for additional guarantees of 
security. 
Why, then, did Great Britain reject the Geneva Protocol? 
Rappard has pointed outs"hat, although the Labour and Con- 
servative governments took opposing stands on the Geneva 
Protocol, the former rejected the draft Treaty of Mutual As- 
sistance for practically the same reasons that the latter rejected 
the protocol. The answer, of course, lies in the fact that the 
Labour government considered "new responsibilities" dangerous 
without France's agreement to arbitrate her claims, while the 
Conservative government considered them dangerous even 
with that agreement. Without the support of Great Britain 
further consideration of the Geneva Protocol was pointless. 
Consequently the attempt to develop the League system in the 
direction of complete and universal guarantees was abandoned. 
sG Internationcl Relations as Vieroed from Geneva, 182-84. 
C H A P T E R  F O U R  
THE PRINCIPLE of concern was accepted as a basis for inter- 
national organization after World War I and then limited in 
the ways described in the preceding chapter. During 1925- 
1926 a new trend-toward modified application-was intro- 
duced. The limitation of general acceptance was replaced by 
an attempt to develop collective security on a more modest 
and gradual basis. The principle of concern was regionalized. 
The erection of a new system to replace the old was discarded 
for particular arrangements which, it was hoped, would de- 
velop in the direction of a more general or universal system. 
I t  became clear that general acceptance of the principle of 
concern could not be implemented. Therefore, attention was 
turned to piecemeal or partial measures which had the double 
virtue of being consistent with the ideal of collective security 
and at the same time feasible under the circumstances. It was 
recalled that after all, politics is the art of the possible and that 
"leg over leg the dog went to Dover." If complete and uni- 
versal acceptance of the principle of concern could not be 
effectively incorporated into international organization, the 
elaboration of more restricted measures might eventually arrive 
at the same goal. The attainment would be delayed, but 
there would be an immediate settlement of some of the danger 
spots to give the time required for fruition of the gradual 
evolutionary approach. 
A series of settlements and agreements could supplement 
and integrate with each other, finally arriving at a system 
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without gaps or loopholes. Since immediate realization of the 
goal was ruled out, a "step in the right direction" had everything 
to commend it. And enough steps in the right direction would 
lead to the goal, or at least much closer to it than futile in- 
sistence on immediate attainment. Up to 1925 the develop- 
ment of international organization through the League of Na- 
tions proceeded on the hypothesis that any war or threat of 
war was of concern to all the members. During 1925-1926 the 
viewpoint was adopted that some wars and threats are of more 
immediate concern than others, especially with respect to the 
members which would have to carry the chief burden of ap- 
plying sanctions. The situations which were the most danger- 
ous and of the greatest immediate concern logically called for 
prior attention. Collective security would be organized on a 
regional basis. This would be done in western Europe, then 
in other regions; and finally the various regional settlements 
could be integrated in a general system. Adoption of this con- 
cept and approach begins the period of modified application 
of the principle of concern. 
In rejecting the Geneva Protocol the British government had 
suggested as an alternative the procedure of supplementing 
the Covenant by special arrangements to meet special needs. 
This suggestion was accepted, and attention was turned to the 
matter of providing a guarantee against war in western Europe. 
The resulting agreements took the name of the town where 
they were signed-Locarno, in Switzerland. 
The task of arriving at these agreements was essentially one 
of finding a formula that would meet French demands for ad- 
ditional security; that would serve as a basis for bringing Ger- 
many into the League of Nations; and that would offer Great 
Britain the means of participating in a regional contribution 
to collective security, as its government had proposed, but a 
contribution which would be severely restricted in its scope 
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and not, in effect, a one-sided backing of France. Examination 
of the preliminary correspondence leading to the negotiation 
of the Locarno agreements reveals this clearly. 
A German proposal for an agreement in Europe was made 
by Stresemann early in 1925 and communicated by the Ger- 
man ambassador in Paris to Herriot, President of the Council 
and French Minister of Foreign Affairs.' This suggestion was 
based on an undertaking by the powers interested in the Rhine, 
notably Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany, to renounce 
war among themselves, with the United States as "trustee"; a 
comprehensive arbitration treaty; and acceptance by Germany 
of the territorial status quo in the Rhineland, as well as guar- 
antees of the demilitarization of that area as provided in 
Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles. 
France and Great Britain corresponded in order to arrive 
at a mutually agreeable reply to the German memorandum. 
A draft proposal incorporating the position of France was 
forwarded to the British government in a note of May 12. The 
reply suggested in this document would accept the German 
proposal as "an earnest of pacific intentions" but raised certain 
questions on which agreement would be necessary as a pre- 
liminary step for further negotiations. The main points out- 
lined by France were: Germany must enter the League of Na- 
tions, with the same obligations and rights as other members; 
no revision in the peace treaties could be considered; Belgium 
must be included in the proposed Rhineland pact, and such an 
agreement could not affect existing provisions for the occupa- 
tion of the Rhineland; arbitration treaties should apply to any 
disputes whatever and should leave room for coercive action 
only in case of failure to observe the agreements to be con- 
cluded. The question of eastern Europe was raised rather 
obliquely by reference to the necessity of similar agreements 
of those neighbors of Germany "who, without being parties to 
the suggested Rhineland Pact, are signatories of the Treaty of 
Versailles." Finally, the French government suggested the 
1 George Glasgow, From Dawes  t o  Locarno; Walters, A History of the 
League o f  Nations, I ,  285-94. 
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whole series of agreements be co-ordinated in a general con- 
vention to be placed under the auspices of the League of 
Nations. 
A British request of May 19 for explanation and clarification 
of certain points in the French draft was answered on May 25. 
Then on May 28 Chamberlain stated in a memorandum the 
conditions on which Great Britain could concur in the proposed 
reply to the German proposal. Any new obligation which the 
British government undertook must be specific and limited to 
the existing territorial arrangement on the western frontier of 
Germany. The French draft went considerably beyond what 
the British government could endorse consistently with this 
principle; an example was the broad scope of the proposed 
arbitration agreements, which Great Britain would not be pre- 
pared to underwrite as one co-ordinated and indivisible system, 
although the various agreements might well come into force 
simultaneously. Parenthetically it may be remarked that the 
great care which the British government took to intimate that 
it would enter into only severely restricted agreements was 
reflected not only in the statement of its general position, but 
also in the use of such language as "subject to a careful exami- 
nation of the actual terms ultimately proposed," "proposals 
whose exact shape could only be determined when the time 
was reached for considering a draft instrument," and "must 
reserve its liberty to define more precisely at the proper time 
the interpretation to be placed upon them." 
The British memorandum offered a substitute draft reply in 
which it would be prepared to concur. This draft was framed 
in such a way as to place strict limitations wherever the French 
draft had stated or implied a broad guarantee. One example 
of this was in references to arbitration treaties. The French 
draft, as has been noted, contemplated a general system of such 
treaties to be guaranteed along with the Rhineland pact. The 
British substitute draft limited this to an arbitration treaty be- 
tween France and Germany. Where the French draft said 
that there should be no room for coercive action "save in case 
of failure to observe the provisions of the various treaties and 
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agreements contemplated in the present note," the British sub- 
stitute was "save where such action may be taken consistently 
with the provisions of treaties in force between the parties." 
Then, after limiting the scope of any arbitration treaty supple- 
mentary to the proposed Rhineland pact, the British substitute 
draft qualified the statement that observance would be assured 
by a joint and several guarantee by adding: "so as to ensure 
that any failure to refer a dispute to arbitration or to carry out 
an award would, if coupled with a resort to hostilities, bring 
the guarantee into immediate operation. In the absence of a 
resort to hostilities, the Council of the League shall propose 
what steps should be taken to give effect to the treaty." 
Another example of the difference between the British and 
French approaches at the time was the omission by the former 
of a paragraph in the French draft which in effect called for 
a system of arbitration treaties with Germany's eastern neigh- 
bors. In the same connection, where the French draft had 
tied up the proposed Rhineland pact with the "peace of 
Europe," the British substitute changed the language to make 
such a pact an "essential step" toward the peace of Europe. 
The crux of the difference between the French and British 
governments was the question of whether the guarantees 
would be restricted to western Europe only or extended to the 
eastern boundaries of Germany as well. Great Britain was 
willing to participate only in the former. France considered 
the latter also essential. The French viewpoint was expressed 
in a note of June 4 replying to the British suggestions for a 
substitute draft. In the French opinion any attempt to modify 
by force the state of affairs created by the peace treaties would 
constitute a menace to peace to which France could not remain 
indifferent. An essential condition of the proposed Rhineland 
pact was that France would retain its liberty of action to go to 
the assistance of states parties to the Treaty of Versailles but 
not directly interested in the Rhineland. Therefore the French 
government proposed to reinsert the paragraph omitted in the 
British substitute draft, but changed to give signatories of the 
proposed Rhineland pact the option of constituting themselves 
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the guarantors of arbitration treaties between Germany and her 
eastern neighbors. Thus France, unable to persuade Great 
Britain to participate in such a guarantee, insisted on the 
liberty of making it an essential element in her own policy. In 
this Great Britain concurred, and a sufficient identity of French 
and British views was reached to permit a reply under date of 
June 16 to the German proposal of the preceding February. 
The Franco-British discussions over broad versus limited 
commitments toward guarantees of security turned to the 
Franco-German discussions over broad versus limited condi- 
tions for the acceptance of the German proposal. The German 
government wanted to restrict the proposed agreement to the 
territorial status quo on its western boundary. The French 
government desired a reaffirmation of the entire Versailles 
system, including an acceptance by Germany of the territorial 
status quo in the east and of all existing treaty provisions for 
the Rhineland. A compromise basis for negotiation had to be 
reached, just as it had been necessary between France and 
Great Britain. 
The German government counterreplied in a note of July 20. 
Three major points were raised. The first showed the German 
anxiety not to preclude questions of revising the peace treaties. 
The relevant part of the statement was: 
The conclusion of a Pact of Security as outlined in the German 
suggestions does not represent a modification of existing treaties. 
There should, therefore, be no need for special statements in this 
respect. The German Government consider as self-evident that it 
is not meant to exclude for all future time the possibility of adapting 
existing treaties at the proper time to changed circumstances by 
way of peaceful agreement. They may point out that even the 
Covenant of the League of Nations allows for such necessities. 
If the Allied Governments emphasize, for instance, that the Pact 
of Security must not affect the treaty provisions in force concerning 
the military occupation of German territories, it is correct that the 
German Memorandum has not made the conclusion of the Pact 
dependent on a modification of those provisions. But should the 
Allied Governments intend to set those provisions up as a sacrosanct 
for the future, the German Government would, in answer to this, 
like to point out that the conclusion of a Security Pact would 
64 I N T E R N A T I O N A L  C O N F L I C T  
represent an innovation of such importance that it could not but 
react on the conditions in the occupied territories and the questions 
of occupation in generaL2 
The second point raised by the German government was its 
apprehension about a possible unilateral determination to ap- 
ply coercive measures for an alleged violation of one of the 
treaties or agreements. The third point had to do with the 
conditions of admission to the League of Nations. Germany 
was still insisting on some recognition of her special status as 
a disarmed power and the danger of involvement in the armed 
conflict of third countries. Germany, as a member of the 
League, could "only be considered as enjoying equal rights 
when her disarmament is followed by the general disarmament 
provided for by the Covenant of the League of Nations and the 
preamble to Part V of the Treaty of Versailles. Therefore, if 
the immediate entrance of Germany into the League of Nations 
is to be rendered possible, a solution has to be found to tide 
over the time till general disarmament has become a reality. 
The solution would have to pay due regard to the special 
military and economical as well as to the special geographical 
situation of germ an^."^ 
The French reply, on August 24, to these German observa- 
tions again precluded any question of modifying any of the 
provisions of the peace treaties in connection with the pro- 
posed agreements, saying, "However liberal the spirit, however 
pacific the intentions, with which France is ready to pursue the 
present negotiations, she cannot surrender her rights." The 
German contention about recognition of her special position in 
relation to the League was again rejected. It  was stated in part: 
The Allies are convinced that membership of the League of 
Nations would provide Germany, once she has entered the League, 
with the most efficacious method of establishing her requirements 
as other States have done in regard to their own interests. The entry 
of Germany into the League of Nations is the only solid basis for a 
mutual guarantee and a European agreement. It is not, in fact, 
from outside that a State can properly express reservations, which 
2 Glasgow, 160. 3 Same, 162. 
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would thus assure the character of conditions; it is from within that 
it can submit its wishes to the Council in the exercise of a right 
common to all the States members of the Leaguee4 
Finally, the French note of August 24 rejected the German 
apprehensions about the interpretation of arbitral agreements 
as ill founded but in turn expressed the fear that German 
reservations would restrict such agreements to the point that 
they would not be effective in the maintenance of peace. 
It  was then agreed that a further exchange of preliminary 
views would serve no useful purpose, and the actual negotia- 
tion of the Locarno agreements proceeded. Accordingly, repre- 
sentatives of the Gennan, Belgian, British, French, Italian, 
Polish, and Czechoslovak governments met at Locarno from 
October 5 to 16, 1925, in order to arrive at some agreement on 
the problem of European security. 
As a result there were concluded5 a Treaty of Mutual Guar- 
antee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and 
Italy; an arbitration convention between Germany and France; 
and an arbitration treaty between Germany and Poland, and 
an identical treaty between Poland and Czechoslovakia. A col- 
lective note was sent to Germany on the interpretation of 
Article 16.6 And finally, France signed treaties with Poland 
and Czechoslovakia providing for reciprocal supplementary 
guarantees. 
The basic provision of the Locarno agreements was a col- 
lective and several guarantee of the boundaries between Ger- 
many and France, and between Germany and Belgium, by 
these three countries together with Great Britain and Italy. 
Germany and France, and Germany and Belgium, agreed that 
they would not attack, invade, or resort to war against each 
other except in the exercise of the right of legitimate defense;? 
4 Same, 164. 5 League of Nations, Treaty Series, 44:289-363. 
6 See Chapter 111, section 2. 
7 "Legitimate defense" was defined as resistance to a violation of the under- 
taking against attack or resort to war or to "a flagrant breach of Articles 42 and 
43 of the . . . Treaty of Versailles, if such breach constitutes an unprovoked 
act of aggression and by reason of the assembly of armed forces in the de- 
militarised zone, immediate action is necessary" (Article 2 ) .  
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action under Article 16 of the Covenant; or action as a result 
of a decision made in pursuance of Article 15, paragraph 7, of 
the Covenant, provided that the action was directed against 
the state which was the first to attack. In view of these agree- 
ments Germany and Belgium, and Germany and France, 
undertook to settle by peaceful means all questions of every 
kind which might arise between them. 
An alleged violation of the undertaking not to attack or 
resort to war, or of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, 
would be brought to the attention of the Council of the League, 
and upon its finding that such a violation had been committed, 
the signatories of the treaty would immediately come to the 
assistance of the state against which the violation was directed. 
In case of a flagrant breach of the same undertakings, each of 
the other contracting parties would be bound to come to the 
assistance of the victim as soon as they had satisfied them- 
selves that an unprovoked act of aggression had been com- 
mitted and immediate action had become necessary. Never- 
theless, the Council would be apprised of the question, and the 
signatories would be bound to follow its recommendations if 
concurred in by all the members other than the parties to the 
dispute. Also, the recommendations of the Council were to be 
followed in case a signatory, without committing the mentioned 
violations, should refuse to submit a dispute to peaceful settle- 
ment or to comply with an arbitral award or judicial decision. 
The Locarno arbitration agreements provided that all dis- 
putes in which the parties were in conflict over their respective 
rights and which could not be settled amicably by the normal 
methods of diplomacy would be submitted to an arbitral tri- 
bunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice. By 
agreement, prior resort could be had to the machinery of a 
permanent conciliation commission, established by each of 
the Locarno arbitration agreements. All disputes which were 
not otherwise settled amicably and which could not be solved 
by a judicial decision were to be referred to the processes of 
conciliation. If agreement could not be reached in this way, 
the question might, at the request of either party, be brought 
M O D I F I E D  A P P L I C A T I O N  67 
before the Council of the League to be dealt with according to 
Article 15 of the Covenant. 
Such, in summary, was the series of agreements and guar- 
antees reached at Locarno during October, 1925. Their effec- 
tive date was dependent upon German entry into the League 
of Nations. This was accomplished the next year, and the 
Locarno agreements went into force on September 14, 1926.8 
With reference to the achievement, the final protocol of the 
conference stated: "The representatives of the Governments 
represented here declare their firm conviction that the entry 
into force of these treaties and conventions will contribute 
greatly in bringing about a moral relaxation of the tension 
between nations, that it will help powerfully towards the solu- 
tion of many political or economic problems in accordance 
with the interests and sentiments of peoples, and that, in 
strengthening peace and security in Europe, it will hasten on 
effectively the disarmament provided for in Article 8 of the 
Covenant of the League of  nation^."^ 
The Locarno agreements went a considerable way toward 
meeting the aspirations of the three Great Powers most directly 
concerned, as put forth in their preliminary correspondence. 
France received a guarantee of her Rhineland boundary backed 
up by Great Britain and Italy, a sort of reinsurance treaty with 
two of her eastern allies, and saw Germany undertake the 
obligations of League membership. Germany for her part was 
admitted to the League on an equality with other members 
and received an interpretation of her obligations toward the 
application of sanctions which in effect left such a decision in 
her own hands. Great Britain was able to participate in a 
regional arrangement as a contribution to collective security, 
but an arrangement which was confined to an area considered 
essential for British national defense anyhow. An alternative 
for the Geneva Protocol was found without any real extension 
of British commitments, since in any event she could not stand 
idly by if France or Belgium were attacked. 
What was the effect of the Locarno agreements on the 
SLeague of Nations, Treaty Series, 44:291. 9 Same, 299. 
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League of Nations? They were placed within the framework of 
the League, as the French had insisted all along. The Council 
of the League was given important responsibilities in connec- 
tion with disputes or violations by the arbitration agreements 
as well as by the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee itself. Also, it 
was provided by Article 7 of the latter that "The present 
Treaty, which is designed to ensure the maintenance of peace, 
and is in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Na- 
tions, shall not be interpreted as restricting the duty of the 
League to take whatever action may be deemed wise and 
effectual to safeguard the peace of the world."1° 
On the other hand, the Locarno agreements could be in- 
terpreted as paying formal respect to the League but recog- 
nizing that no real dependence was being placed in its efficacy. 
The provision for terminating the Locarno agreements read 
like a confession of weakness on the part of the League. 
Article 8 of the main treaty, immediately after the statement 
just quoted, provided for its registration with the League and 
then continued: "It shall remain in force until the Council, 
acting on a request of one or other of the High Contracting 
Parties notified to the other signatory Powers three months in 
advance, and voting at least by a two-thirds' majority, decides 
that the League of Nations ensures sufficient protection to the 
High Contracting Parties; the Treaty shall cease to have effect 
on the expiration of a period of one year from such decision."ll 
Only time would tell whether the Locarno agreements would 
be the starting point of a stronger League or of a system of 
alliances only nominally consistent with the principles and 
objectives of that organization. The outlook in 1926 seemed 
to have been overwhelmingly hopeful. "Locarno ended the 
war" was a widely accepted judgment.12 Victors and van- 
quished were becoming equal collaborators, and definite prog- 
ress was being made in settling some of the major difficulties 
in Europe. Chamberlain said, "These treaties are the real 
dividing line between the war years and those of peace7'; and 
10 Same, 295. 11 Same. 
1 2  See Harold Quigley, From Versailks to Locarno. 
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Briand, "We are now only Europeans." The effective re-estab- 
lishment of peace was to take place through the "spirit of 
Locarno." The Locarno agreements portended real progress in 
disarmament, thus beginning "the dimilitarization of human 
society, a reversal of the insidious and devastating perversion 
of life and riches to military ends which the last two genera- 
tions of European statesmen thrust upon the peoples of the 
world."13 
A British writer, George Glasgow, offered a typical example 
of the more optimistic opinions of the time: 
So far as the diplomatic opinion of the seven countries is con- 
cerned, the only important thing done at Locarno-but it is all im- 
portant-is that those countries have openly committed themselves 
to a pacifist policy in the future. For the first time in diplomatic 
history Great Powers have surrendered their historic "right to make 
war" . . . and it will be next to impossible for them to recapture, 
even if they wanted to recapture, so dangerous a "right". The value 
of Locarno may be put in this way. Hitherto the mass of sensible 
people have longed for peace, but fear and stupid tradition have 
made them disbelieve in it, and the whole conception of inter- 
national relations has been based on the hypothesis that there would 
be war, somewhere at some time. The difference now is that, 
whereas national honour in the past was bound up with war, it is 
now bound up with peace. After Locarno war is synonymous with 
national dishonour. The plunge has been taken in favour of paci- 
fism, for the first time in European history.14 
The same author also quoted a conversation with Edward 
Benes of Czechoslovakia, in which the latter said in part: "For 
the first time since the war the four Great Powers say the same 
thing. It  is a tremendous advance on anything that has yet 
been accomplished. In one sense it is a partial Protocol, for 
whereas the Protocol aimed at the universal outlawry of war, 
the Pact outlaws it so far as one particular danger spot is con- 
cerned. For the first time in diplomatic history nations have 
renounced their sovereign 'right to make war.' That fact brings 
with it an entirely new conception of international war and 
peace."15 
13 P. J. Noel-Baker, Disarmament, 3. 14 From Dawes to Locarno, 123. 
15  Same, 126. 
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However, in a foreword to the same book former prime 
minister Ramsay MacDonald, whose government had endorsed 
the Geneva Protocol, saw in the Locarno agreements an op- 
portunity rather than a significant achievement. One of his 
comments is of particular interest. He said: 
Locarno does not face any of the problems that could be, in the 
widest stretch of imagination, an immediate cause of a European 
war. I have never met anybody yet . . . who sits in a European 
Foreign Office and who believes that in our lifetime, or in anybody's 
lifetime, there is going to be a war between France and Germany 
directly and specifically caused over the Rhine frontier. That is not 
how the war will come in Europe. If anybody thinks that by getting 
agreement on the Rhine frontier we have made European war im- 
possible, he should think again. If there should be another Euro- 
pean war, it is perfectly true that the Rhine frontier will be an 
element in it, but it will be raised only after war has broken out.1° 
Another British writer published a book17 containing a chap- 
ter entitled "Back to Common Sense uia Locarno." The argu- 
ment for this judgment was based on the comparison between 
general and regional pacts, to the great disadvantage of the 
former. This matter is so important to the principle of concern 
in international organization that a rather lengthy quotation 
seems appropriate: 
It is nevertheless true to say that there is between the ~e'gime of 
the League and the re'gime of bi-partite agreements or regional 
pacts a real and fundamental difference of principle, at all events 
in regard to the motive for which the stipulated assistance is af- 
forded. The opposition is still more apparent between the more 
highly developed system of the Protocol and the system of such 
limited agreements or pacts. The one system seeks security by 
means of international guarantees and sanctions; the community 
of nations imposes peace by bringing its combined force to bear 
upon the law-breaker. In the other system security is based on 
self-help. It is the solidarity of interests of the nations concerned 
16 Same, ix. 
17 J. M. Spaight, Pseudo-Security. By this term he meant "the kind of 
security which the League of Nations purports to afford to its members by 
preventing by cmnbined force either certain wars, as under the existing system, 
or all wars, as under the developed system proposed in the Geneva Protocol 
of 1924" (p. 1). 
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which binds them together in a regional pact; it is a wider and 
more unselfish motive which inmires the general scheme. 
Self-help is none the less self-Lelp whe i  it takes the form of as- 
sistance rendered to an ally. You help your ally or he helps you 
because you or he would suffer if either were attacked in isolation 
and defeated. It  is immediate self-interest which is the motive for 
the rendering of aid. Quite different is the basic impulse in the 
league of peace. There the underlying motive is a wider one, a 
nobler one, perhaps, than that which inspires the regional pact or 
alliance. It  is not, of course, pure knight-errantry. It  embraces the 
selfish motive, too, for the individual shares with the community in 
the blessings of unbroken peace. But the member of a league of 
peace must look above and beyond the end of his own self-preserva- 
tion to another end which will bring to him, it is to be supposed, 
his reward in the satisfaction of saving not only his skin but his soul 
alive. Something over and above patriotism must be the compelling 
influence. A league of peace that is not inspired by an abundant 
international charity-as well as by a very plentiful measure of faith 
and hope, which will assuredly be needed-is nothing.18 
The great and abiding merit of regional pacts is that they do not 
confront one with the inescapable dilemma presented by any and 
every system of international guarantees and sanctions such as that 
represented by the Protocol of 1924: that if security is to be safe- 
guarded the system will be unacceptable to some nations because 
the commitments are too onerous and rigid, and if the commitments 
are loose and discretionary it will be unacceptable to others because 
it does not give security. Security and commitments go hand in 
hand in regional pacts. The security which is afforded is geo- 
graphically limited but within its limits it is reasonably strong, 
because the motive for the rendering of the stipulated assistance is 
the practical and compelling one of self-interest.lg 
Thus, the regionalization of the principle of concern posed 
the question of whether that fact would be a step in its general 
implementation or in effect the abandonment of that principle 
for a reliance solely upon a self-help for such control of inter- 
national conflict as it might be possible to organize. 
18 Same, 132-33. 19 Same, 145-46. 
The period of modified application of the principle of con- 
cern happened to coincide with a renewed attack on the prob- 
lem of disarmament. It will be remembered that the Geneva 
Protocol had developed from attempts to solve this very ques- 
tion. After the conclusion of the Locarno agreements there was 
a double reason for intensifying the search for a solution. First, 
the obligation of the Covenant remained, and with German 
entry into the League the promise of general, rather than 
unilateral, disarmament could not be ignored. In the second 
place, the very success of the Locarno agreements and the 
optimism accompanying them offered a basis for hopes of sub- 
stantial success. These reasons were, of course, in addition to 
the continuing realization of the burdens and dangers of a high 
level of national armaments. 
The connection made by the League at this time between 
disarmament and international organization for the control of 
conflict may be expressed in the words of a resolution adopted 
by the Assembly on September 26, 1927. Speaking of assuring 
the success of the work of disarmament, the Assembly ex- 
pressed its conviction "that the principal condition of this suc- 
cess is that every State should be sure of not having to provide 
unaided for its security by means of its own armaments and 
should be able to rely also on the organised collective action 
of the League of  nation^."^^ 
Accordingly, consideration of the means for preventing war 
was carried on in close connection with the work of preparing 
for the Disarmament Conference (which was finally convened 
at Geneva in 1932). 
Three agreements on the place of war in international organi- 
zation may be noted here.21 The first of these was the Assembly 
20 League of Nations, Records of the Eighth Ordinary Session of the Assem- 
bly,  Plenary Meetings, 177. 
21 There were also various proposals and studies designed to expedite the 
application of sanctions, should the occasion arise. Examples were arrange- 
ments to expedite communications with Geneva in the event of an emergency 
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resolution of September 24, 1927, condemning wars of aggres- 
sion and declaring that pacific means must be employed to 
settle disputes which arise among nations.22 This resolution 
had been presented on September 9 by the representative of 
Poland, who urged its adoption as "a great world declaration 
of confidence." The Geneva Protocol had been rejected, and 
no complete system for the prevention of war was immediately 
feasible. But, he continued, "Just as some public demonstration 
of the wish for mutual understanding often precedes the con- 
clusion of an alliance between two States, so the solemn re- 
nunciation of all acts of aggression would constitute a solid 
foundation for the great mechanism of guarantees and se- 
c ~ r i t y . " ~ ~  The Italian delegate opposed the resolution on the 
ground that it was superfluous, futile, and tended to discredit 
the League and undermine its prestige by putting it in a posi- 
tion by which its recommendations were certain to be disre- 
garded by governments. The proposal was later referred to 
the Third Committee (on Reduction of Armaments), which 
approved it by acclamation after a brief discussion. There 
was no debate on it at the time of its adoption by the Assembly 
itself. 
One might hesitate to call the Assembly resolution against 
aggression a "mere gesture." However, it was certainly con- 
fined to an expression of opinion, without legal force and with- 
out any suggestion of binding the members of the League in 
any way. This was expressly stated at the time of its adoption 
by the delegate who made the proposal. It was presented for 
its "moral and educative effect." 
The second measure arising out of considerations associated 
with preparations for a disarmament conference was the Gen- 
eral Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 
endorsed by the Assembly in a resolution of September 26, 
and the Finnish proposal for financial assistance to victims of aggression. Such 
proposals were matters of procedure and method, and did not have any direct 
implications for defining the status of international conflict under international 
organization. 
z2 League of Nations, Records of the Eighth Assembly, 155. 
23 Same, Plenary Meetings, 83. 
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1928. A Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Con- 
ference had been set up by the Council in December, 1925,24 
and given the task suggested by its name. At its meeting on 
November 30, 1927, the Preparatory Commission constituted 
a Committee on Arbitration and Security to consider measures 
for giving all states the guarantees necessary to enable them 
to fix the level of their armaments at the lowest possible fig- 
 re.^^ This committee in its studies and discussions basically 
took the approach of attempting to extend the idea of regional 
security pacts and to expand the coverage of procedures for 
pacific settlement. The logic of Locarno was not lost. Efforts 
to develop a complete system of collective security were to be 
superseded by more modest arrangements, with the twin virtues 
of current acceptability and promise of eventual universality. In 
the words of the committee's report of February, 1928: 
This method of special or collective treaties appears at the present 
moment to be the only practical means which can be recommended 
to States in search of more effective guarantees of security. 
Those nations which consider that the general measure of security 
afforded by the Covenant is inadequate for their needs, and which, 
more particularly in view of their geographical situation, feel 
themselves more liable than others to be drawn into a war in case 
of a failure of all the machinery designed to prevent armed con- 
flicts, must at the present moment regard the conclusion of security 
pacts with other States in the same geographical area as the only 
practical or possible form of supplementary guarantee. Even if the 
other Members of the League of Nations cannot give their effective 
guarantee to such treaties they can at  least accord them their moral 
support and do everything in their power to facilitate their con- 
clusion, provided always that such treaties are conceived in the 
spirit of the Covenant of the League and are co-ordinated within 
its  provision^.^^ 
In this way, the "network of preventive measures" would be 
extended. 
The committee's study of arbitration procedures was based 
upon a "Memorandum on Arbitration and Security" submitted 
24 League of Nations, Official Journal, 1926, pp. 164-69. 
25 Same, 1928, p. 610. z v a m e ,  653. Paragraph numbering omitted. 
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by the representative of Finland.27 His analysis of the pro- 
cedure already being followed revealed three general types of 
conventions in force. The first, represented by thirty treaties 
registered with the League, called for the submission of all 
disputes to arbitration. The second, represented by the Lo- 
carno agreements, provided for the arbitration of juridical 
disputes and conciliation of the others. The third type, used 
chiefly by Switzerland and the Scandinavian states, provided 
for conciliation only. Various reservations were found to apply 
to all three types of conventions. It was recommended that 
procedures for pacific settlement be developed by extension of 
coverage and by co-ordination. 
At the same time, a "Memorandum on Security Questions" 
was submitted by the Greek delegate.28 The basic approach 
of this study is shown by the first three paragraphs of its con- 
clusions : 
It  is impossible at present to contemplate the conclusion of a 
general agreement-adding to the obligations assumed under the 
Covenant-with a view to giving the nations greater security. 
States which require wider guarantees of security should seek 
them in the form of separate or collective agreements for non- 
aggression, arbitration and mutual assistance, or simply for non- 
aggression. 
Regional pacts comprising non-aggression, arbitration and mutual 
assistance represent the completest form of security agreement, and 
the one which can most easily be brought into harmony with the 
system of the Covenant. Such pacts should always include the fol- 
lowing provisions : 
( a )  A prohibition to resort to force; 
( b )  The organisation of pacific procedures for the settlement of 
all disputes; 
( c )  The establishment of a system of mutual assistance, to oper- 
ate in conjunction with the duties of the League C ~ u n c i l . ~ "  
Accepting these conclusions, the Committee on Arbitration 
and Security undertook the preparation of a series of model 
27 Same, 654-60. 
28 Same, 660-70. A third study was the Rutgers "Memorandum on Articles 
10, 11, and 16 of the Covenant." 
2Wame, 669. Paragraph numbering omitted. 
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conventions to expedite the expansion and co-ordination of pro- 
cedures for arbitration and security. All a state had to do was 
to pick out the provisions to which it was willing to commit 
itself and sign on the dotted line. As other nations did likewise, 
an integrated system of pacific procedures would automatically 
be extended over wider and wider areas. 
The General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes30 contained four chapters. The first included a gen- 
eral conciliation convention, which merely codified and repro- 
duced the provisions of a large number of bilateral conciliation 
treaties already in force. It had the merit of providing one 
multilateral agreement, making the negotiation of individual 
bilateral conventions no longer necessary. The second chapter 
of the General Act added compulsory arbitration for all justici- 
able disputes, which would be referred to the Permanent Court 
of International Justice or to an arbitral tribunal by agreement 
of the parties. For nonjusticiable disputes a procedure of com- 
pulsory conciliation was provided. If this failed, disputes 
would be referred to the Council of the League for handling 
under Article 15 of the Covenant. The third chapter provided 
the most comprehensive procedure of all. It extended judicial 
settlement and arbitration to all disputes without distinction. 
Justiciable disputes would go to the Permanent Court and 
others to a special arbitral tribunal. 
The final chapter contained the general provisions relating 
to the entire document. The act allowed partial accessions. 
That is, a state could accede to all four chapters at once or to 
the separate chapters, with a choice of three methods of com- 
bining them. The act could be accepted by a nation with or 
without stipulated reservations. Further elasticity was obtained 
by allowing an acceding state to extend the scope of its under- 
takings at any time by a simple declaration. Thus, by an in- 
genious scheme every shade of choice from the mildest kind 
of conciliation to the most comprehensive acceptance of com- 
30League of Nations, Treaty Series, 93:343-63. For reports and discussions 
on the General Act and the accompanying draft agreements, see Oficial 
Journal, 1928, pp. 610-706; Records of the Ninth Ordinary Session of the As- 
sembly, Plenary Meetings, 167-84, 217-21, 486-527. 
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pulsory arbitration was made available to any country by the 
mere act of accession. It would come into effect when accepted 
by any two nations and would remain open for accession 
indefinitely. 
The General Act found a considerable measure of accept- 
ance, as more than twenty governments acceded to some or all 
its  provision^.^' 
In addition to the General Act the Committee on Arbitration 
and Security drew up three model bilateral conventions, the 
provisions of which corresponded to the terms of the first three 
chapters, respectively, of the General Act. Thus, the flexibility 
of the entire scheme extended even to a choice between the 
bilateral and multilateral approaches. The recommendations 
of procedures for pacific settlement were completed by three 
draft resolutions. One recommended the General Act and the 
model bilateral conventions; the second was designed to facili- 
tate wider acceptance of the Optional Clause of the Permanent 
Court; and the last was concerned with the good offices of the 
Council in connection with the negotiation of procedures of 
pacific settlement. 
With respect to security questions model draft treaties were 
offered for consideration. The first, a model collective treaty, 
was the most comprehensive. It included three features taken 
from the Locarno agreements-nonaggression, pacific settle- 
ment, and mutual assistance. However, it differed from the 
Locarno pact in that it contained no special territorial guar- 
antees, no guarantees by third states, no special provision for 
cases of flagrant aggression, and no stipulations regarding 
demilitarized zones. The second model security treaty was 
similar to the first, except that it omitted the feature of mutual 
assistance. The third model treaty had the same provisions as 
the second, but was bilateral in form. These three draft models 
also carried with them appropriate resolutions. 
Only brief mention need be made of the General Convention 
to Improve the Means of Preventing War. Its basic idea was 
that in the event of a dispute between them being brought 
31 Manley 0. Hudson, International Legislation, IV, 2529. 
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before the Council of the League, the signatory states would 
observe certain conservatory measures recommended by the 
Council to prevent an aggravation of the situation. Such meas- 
ures would include, for example, the evacuation of certain 
zones or the fixing of lines not to be passed by military forces. 
This draft convention was approved by the Assembly3' on Sep- 
tember 26, 1931, with the hope that a large number of govern- 
ments would ratify it prior to the scheduled opening of the 
Disarmament Conference on February 2, 1932. Unfortunately, 
the Manchurian incident had started only a few days before 
the adoption of the convention by the Assembly, and the situa- 
tion did not prove conducive to the acceptance of its obliga- 
tions by the member states. Sufficient ratifications were never 
obtained to bring it into force. 
The attempt during the period 1926-1932 to facilitate prepa- 
rations for a disarmament conference by working out pro- 
cedures for pacific settlement and guarantees of security re- 
turned to a technique used prior to World War I. The Hague 
Conventions and other agreements such as the Bryan concilia- 
tion treaties had been based upon the idea of reducing the 
likelihood of war by providing alternative methods of settle- 
ment and cooling-off periods. The General Act of 1928 and its 
companion efforts were likewise based upon reducing the like- 
lihood of war by the provision of alternative procedures and 
by promises of self-restraint in the use of aggressive force.33 
Before World War I the failure of the pacific alternatives and 
a resort to war brought no penalties against an aggressor per se. 
Neutrality was incumbent upon third states, unless their in- 
32 League of Nations, Oficial Journal, 1931, pp. 1123-24, 1452-60, 2305-307; 
Records of the Tulelfth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 
147-49, 237-43. This draft convention was worked out by a special committee 
of the Council and the Third Committee of the Assembly. It  may be of in- 
terest to note that the Japanese delegate on the special committee refrained 
from voting on the proposal during a meeting in May, 1931. See John W. 
Wheeler-Bennett, Disarmament and Secz~rity since Locarno, 1925-1931, 300-306. 
33 There was also some revival of the idea of limiting the severity of war, as 
in pre-War conventions. There was much discussion of restricting submarine 
warfare and other measures considered unjustifiably inhumane. A protocol 
for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, 
and of bacteriological warfare, was signed in 1925 and was ratified by a num- 
ber of states. 
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terests or circumstances brought them into the war as par- 
ticipant belligerents. On the other hand, violation of supple- 
mentary obligations of pacific settlement after World War I 
would leave the Covenant of the League applicable in situa- 
tions covered by its terms. The General Act was integrated 
with the Covenant, but it did not pretend to enlarge the scope 
of the latter. Violation of an undertaking under the General 
Act presumably would not make a state subject to sanctions 
unless the Covenant were also violated. 
Under the older system there was an interest in reducing 
the likelihood of war but no collective penalty for a breach of 
the peace. Under the newer system the interest in reducing 
the likelihood of war was accompanied by provisions for ad- 
verse differential treatment of a state resorting to war in some, 
but not all, cases, hlodified application of the principle of 
concern represented a limited and partial reliance upon it in 
international organization. Techniques of arbitration and con- 
ciliation were applicable under both systems because their 
successful use in contributing to the maintenance of peace 
would assist in the establishment of collective security. The 
Hague Conventions and similar agreements were procedural 
restrictions upon the resort to war. The General Act of 1928 
attempted to use the same type of procedural restrictions to 
fill the gaps in the Covenant. If alternative procedures could 
confine the free sweep of the unfettered right to wage war 
before 1914, they could be adapted to whittle down the wars 
remaining licit in 1928. 
One cannot escape the conclusion that the General Act, with 
the related measures described above, was a slight contribution 
indeed to that security upon which disarmament depended. 
But although the contributions were slight and insufficient, it 
is difficult to see how any others were possible of accomplish- 
ment in the circumstances. The dilemma of disarmament was 
that adequate measures to achieve security were not feasible 
(because they would not be accepted), and feasible measures 
were not adequate. The former Allies would not disarm until 
they felt more secure. The Covenant of the League, after the 
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process of limitation, did not give them the requisite feeling 
of security. The Geneva Protocol, intended to enhance security, 
was not accepted. Locarno did provide some increase in se- 
curity, but it was not felt to be enough. If, then, the Covenant 
plus Locarno did not give enough security and arrangements 
analogous to the Geneva Protocol could not be put into effect, 
what path to peace was open? About the only practicable 
course was the one adopted. The attempt was made to find 
something stronger than the Covenant plus Locarno, but not 
strong enough to suffer the fate of the protocol. The result 
was moderately acceptable but entirely inadequate. 
Signature of the Pact of Paris-or Treaty for the Renuncia- 
tion of War-on August 27, 1928, was an important event in 
the process of redefining the position of war in international 
law and organization. By its provisions practically every state 
in the world obtained a right or vested interest in the mainte- 
nance of peace. Resort to war could not be considered a matter 
of legal indifference. Furthermore, the United States for the 
first time accepted an international obligation based upon the 
principle of concern. The pact did not mark the abandonment 
of a policy of neutrality by the United States government, but 
it did provide an optional basis for discrimination between 
participants in a war and it did involve the acceptance of a 
principle whose implications were incompatible with an un- 
qualified dependence upon the concepts of traditional neu- 
trality. The Pact of Paris, of course, became a "dead letter" 
in the cycle of events leading to the second World War, but 
it turned out to have an enduring significance when it was used 
as a basis for indictment of the principal German and Japanese 
"war criminals." The theory in this connection was that the 
legal right of a state to resort to war (aggression) had been 
removed by ratification of the Pact of Paris and that the initia- 
tion of war was the act of an illegal conspiracy for which the 
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government officials involved were individually and personally 
responsible. 
The idea of a solemn and universal condemnation and 
renunciation of war was initiated during negotiations for a 
treaty of perpetual friendship between France and the United 
States, and was developed into a multilateral agreement with 
almost universal acceptance. The pact, in the form finally 
agreed upon, stated that the contracting parties "condemn 
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, 
and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their 
relations with one another" and "agree that the settlement or 
solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of 
whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, 
shall never be sought except by pacific means."34 
To what extent did the Pact of Paris modify the acceptance 
of the principle of concern in international law and organiza- 
tion? In the interpretation of the pact, both practical and 
theoretical, the fundamental question involved its relevance 
to the principle of adverse differential treatment of a nation 
which resorted to war. In other words, in what position would 
a violator of the pact stand with respect to third states? 
First of all, the Pact of Paris was important as a solemn 
declaration of governmental policies and a considered reflec- 
tion of public opinion in nearly all states of the world. By it 
war was publicly and officially repudiated and renounced. 
Nations covenanted with one another to remove war as a 
legitimate method of settling any disputes whatsoever which 
might arise among them. 
But the Pact of Paris was more than a statement of policy, 
which might be changed at any time. As a treaty it was an 
instrument of international law, with legal consequences flow- 
ing from it just as from any treaty. The questions of the rights 
or obligations of a state under the pact in any specific case 
would be a matter of treaty interpretation, for which it would 
34 For the negotiation and conclusion of the pact, see David Hunter Miller, 
T h e  Peace Pact of Paris; Denys P. Myers, Origin and Conclusion of t h e  Paris 
Pact; James T .  Shotwell, W a r  as a n  Instrument of National Policy; John E.  
Stoner, S. 0. Levinson and t h e  Pact of Paris. 
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be appropriate to use the customary procedures of interna- 
tional adjudication. As a hypothetical example, a dispute over 
whether some particular action of State X was a violation of the 
pact would have to be decided on the basis of whether the act 
complained of was in fact "other than pacific" or a "recourse 
to war" within the meaning of the treaty. Since it was under- 
stood that warlike measures taken in self-defense were not 
forbidden by the pact, the plea of defensive necessity could 
be entered by State X and would have to be examined by the 
adjudicatory tribunal hearing the controversy. Furthermore, 
some statement in the travaux preparatoires, such as the British 
. . 
reservation of special interest in certain regions, might have to 
be i n t e r ~ r e t e d . ~ ~  
The real significance of the Pact of Paris, however, must be 
found in the broader question of its relation to and effect upon 
the basic principles of international law and organization. 
Specifically, to what extent did it modify previously existing 
rights and obligations of third states with respect to a nation 
having recourse to war? Clearly a party to the Pact of Paris 
could no longer use war as an instrument of national policy 
or seek the settlement of disputes by other than pacific means 
without violating the terms of a treaty with practically every 
other state in the world. The signing and ratification of, or 
adherence to, the pact by any state was ipso facto an assertion 
of national concern with reference to the settlement of any 
international dispute among the parties by nonpacific means 
and likewise constituted an admission that all the other parties 
had a similar interest in the question of whether that signatory 
or adherent would ever seek to achieve its national ends by 
recourse to war. 
What would be the juridical consequences of a violation of 
the Pact of Paris? No specific sanctions and no procedure for 
dealing with a violator were included in the pact. Its brevity 
35 AS a matter of fact, a dispute serious enough to provoke recourse to armed 
force would probably not be submitted to international adjudication-except 
under coercion. The hypothetical example is adopted merely as a device to 
state the questions which would arise in interpreting the legal application of 
the Pact of Paris to a specific controversy. 
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and generality were conceived by its authors to be among its 
chief advantages. The possibility of a violation was not even 
mentioned in the body of the pact. The preamble, however, 
stated that the signatories are "convinced that "any signatory 
Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national in- 
terests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished 
by this Treaty." Two points concerning the legal force of this 
clause might be raised: ( a )  are declaratory statements in the 
preamble of a treaty legally binding? and ( b )  if so, is the force 
of the declaration weakened by the fact that it does not provide 
that violators lose the "benefits of the Treaty," but only that 
the signatories are convinced that they should? Fortunately, 
the answer to these questions becomes practically unimportant 
when we consider that any contention that a violator of a 
treaty can continue to claim the benefit of its provisions would 
be immediately rejected as unsound and absurd. 
It seems to be established that a state which violated the 
Pact of Paris automatically would release the other signatories 
from their promise to it not to have recourse to war and make 
itself subject to the general sanctions of international law for 
treaty violation. That is, a violation of the pact would involve 
a reversion to the status quo ante with respect to the legal right 
of the other signatories to go to war or to use nonpacific means 
of settlement as against the violator.36 But it should be empha- 
sized that the loss of the "benefits of the Treaty" would not be 
a mere cancellation of its provisions with respect to a signatory, 
such as that involved in the normal lapsing of any treaty. A 
breach of the pact would constitute an injury to all its signa- 
tories and thereby lay the violator open to reprisals-measures 
against which the act of violation had destroyed the defaulting 
state's legal defense. A nation which did not observe its obliga- 
tions under the Pact of Paris would lose the advantages con- 
ferred by that instrument and in addition take upon itself the 
onus of treaty violation. Since reprisals may legitimately be 
36 The other signatories remain bound among themselves, and their obliga- 
tions to the violator under other treaties might or might not be affected. Only 
the consequences of a violation of the Pact of Paris itself are under considera- 
tion here. 
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proportioned to the seriousness of a wrong suffered, it would 
be open to third states to adopt a grave view of the conse- 
quences of a disturbance of the peace and to take any measures 
appropriate and effective to curb the aggressor. 
That the Pact of Paris was not conceived to be merely an 
idle gesture is suggested by the subsequent development of 
the principle of nonrecognition of acquisitions made by force 
of arms.37 When hostilities broke out between China and the 
U.S.S.R. in 1929, communications were addressed to the two 
governments, on the initiative of the United States, by thirty- 
one signatories of the pact, expressing concern at the resort to 
force and calling upon the disputants to settle their quarrel by 
peaceful means.38 Secretary of State Stimson said with respect 
to this action that "this government regards the Pact of Paris 
as a covenant which has profoundly modified the attitude of 
the world toward peace and . . . this government intends to 
shape its own policy ac~ordingly."~~ 
When the Chaco hostilities broke out between Bolivia and 
Paraguay, the Pact of Paris had not been ratified by the for- 
mer. However, nineteen American states asserted in a note 
to the disputants that "the Chaco dispute is susceptible of a 
peaceful solution" and that they would not recognize "any ter- 
ritorial arrangement of the controversy which has not been 
obtained by peaceful means nor the validity of territorial ac- 
quisitions which may be obtained through occupation or con- 
quest by force of arms."40 
During the course of Sino-Japanese hostilities in Manchuria 
the United States government formally notified both Japan and 
China on January 7, 1932, that it would not recognize any 
situation, treaty, or agreement which might be brought about 
by means contrary to the covenant and obligations of the Pact 
of Paris. On the following March 11 the Assembly of the 
League of Nations unanimously adopted a resolution, with 
Japan refraining from voting, declaring that "it is incumbent 
37 See Section 4 of this chapter. 
38 United States Department of State, Press Releases, December 7, 1929, 
pp. 83-84. 
39 Same, 86-87. 40 Same, August 6, 1932, pp. 100-101. 
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upon the Members of the League not to recognize any situa- 
tion, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by 
means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or 
to the Pact of Paris."41 
Secretary of State Stimson, in discussing the significance of 
the pact in his speech of August 8, 1932, said: "On its face it 
is a treaty containing definite promises. . . . As it stands, the 
only limitation against war is the right of self-defense. . . . 
From the day of its ratification . . . it has been the determined 
aim of the American Government . . . to insure that the Pact 
of Paris should become a living force in the world. . . . But 
now under the covenants of the Briand-Kellogg Pact such a 
codic t  [that in Manchuria] becomes of concern to everybody 
connected with the Pact. All of the steps taken to enforce 
the treaty must be judged by this new ~ituation."~' 
Also, it is of interest to note that the Budapest Articles of 
Interpretation, adopted by the International Law Association 
in 1934, affirmed that the pact was a multilateral law-making 
treaty and provided in part that 
in the event of a violation of the Pact . . . by one signatory State 
against another, the other States may, without thereby committing 
a breach of the Pact or of any rule of International Law, do all or 
any of the following things: 
( a )  Refuse to admit the exercise by the State violating the Pact 
of belligerent rights, such as visit and search, blockade, etc.; 
( b )  Decline to observe towards the State violating the Pact the 
duties prescribed by International Law, apart from the Pact, for a 
neutral in relation to a belligerent; 
( c )  Supply the State attacked with financial or material assist- 
ance, including munitions of war; 
( d )  Assist with armed forces the State attacked.43 
So much for the rights which third states signatory to the 
Pact of Paris acquired against a violator of its terms. There is, 
however, a further question, namely, what obligations, if any, 
41 Westel W. Willoughby, The Sino-Japanese Controoersy and the League 
of Nations, 206, 300. 
42 Henry L. Stimson, The Pact of Paris: Three Years o f  Deoelopment, 5-7,lO. 
4 3  International Law Association, Briand-Kellogg Pact of Paris: Articles of 
Interpretation as Adopted by the Budapest Conference, 1934, 63-64. 
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would third states acquire as a result of the breach of the pact? 
Or, was there a legal duty to apply differential treatment? 
There have been a large number of contentions to the effect 
that the Pact of Paris "ended neutrality" among its signatories. 
In 1928 David Hunter Miller wrote, "Following the Covenant, 
one of the consequences of this Treaty is that neutrality, in 
case of war, in the hitherto accepted sense of neutrality, is 
ended."44 
In 1929 an article in the American Journal of International 
Law contained the statement, "To the extent, therefore, that 
the signatories and adherents to the Pact of Paris have really 
renounced war, they have of necessity renounced neutrality 
also, as neutrality, in its last analysis, is a co-function of the 
status of 
A noted British journalist wrote that "those Governments 
which had renounced war, by signing and ratifying the Briand- 
Kellogg Pact, really renounced at the same time their right to 
be neutral towards a war maker."46 
Secretary Stimson in his speech of August 8, 1932, inter- 
preted the pact as rendering obsolete the traditional notions 
of neutral rights and duties. He said, "War between nations 
was renounced by the signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty. 
This means that it has become illegal throughout practically 
the entire world. It is no longer to be the source and subject 
of rights. It is no longer to be the principle around which the 
duties, the conduct, and the rights of nations revolve. I t  is an 
illegal thing."47 
The Budapest Articles of Interpretation contained the state- 
ment that "the signatory States are not entitled to recognize as 
acquired de jzcre any territorial or other advantages acquired 
de facto by means of a violation of the Pact."4s 
44 The Peace Pact of Paris, 132. 
45 Graham, "The Soviet Security Treaties," 347. 
46 Wickharn Steed, Vital Peace, 197. 
47 The Pact of Paris, 4 ,  5 ;  cp. Quincy Wright, "The Meaning of the Pact of 
Paris," American Journal of International Law, XXVII ( 1933), 39-61. 
48 International Law Association, 64. 
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Can it be assumed that a renunciation of war as an instru- 
ment of national policy and a covenant not to seek the solu- 
tion of disputes by other than pacific means necessarily in- 
volved a renunciation of the right to be impartial if the under- 
taking was violated by another party to it? 
The answer to this question is clearly in the negative. First, 
no stipulation that third states are bound to adopt measures 
against a violator was included in the text of the pact. This 
alone would be a conclusive point, since existing obligations 
and relationships persist unless modified by express agreement 
or necessary inference. Strict construction is to be placed on 
the allegation of new rights and duties not definitely set forth. 
Second, mandatory sanctions were not even considered as a 
possibility in the negotiations leading to the pact. There was 
no suggestion of adding to the obligations under the League 
Covenant and the Locarno agreements. When signatory states 
had insisted that each member must decide for itself the ap- 
plicability of sanctions under the Covenant and had con- 
sistently rejected proposals to place such a decision with the 
Council, there could be no reason to anticipate that their at- 
titude would be otherwise in connection with the Pact of Paris. 
Finally, an automatic prohibition of the right to remain 
neutral was inconsistent with the basis on which the United 
States was willing to consider a general treaty for the renuncia- 
tion of war. The whole conception and direction of the pro- 
posal was quite otherwise. Although the point was not raised 
during the negotiations, specific mention was made of it in a 
report from the Committee on Foreign Relations in connection 
with the consent to ratification by the United States Senate. 
Nothing in this report had the effect of a reservation to the 
pact, but with the United States outside the League and not 
risking membership in the world court, there could be no 
doubt that the following statement on record in the Senate 
and uncontradicted by the Executive was an accurate reflection 
of United States policy. The report made assurance twice (or 
thrice) sure in these words: 
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The committee further understands the treaty does not provide 
sanctions, express or implied. Should any signatory to the treaty 
or any nation adhering to the treaty violate the terms of the same, 
there is no obligation or commitment, express or implied, upon the 
part of any of the signers of the treaty to engage in punitive or 
coercive measures as against the nation violating the treaty. The 
effect of the violation of the treaty is to relieve the other signers 
of the treaty from any obligation under it with the nation thus 
violating the same. 
In other words, the treaty does not, either expressly or impliedly, 
contemplate the use of force or coercive measures for its enforce- 
ment as against any nation violating it. It is a voluntary pledge 
upon the part of each nation that it will not have recourse to war 
except in self-defense, and that it will not seek settlement of its 
international controversies except through pacific means. And if a 
nation sees proper to disregard the treaty and violate the same, the 
effect of such action is to take it from under the benefits of the 
treaty and to relieve the other nations from any treaty relationship 
with the said power.49 
Since the entire conception on the basis of which the pact 
was negotiated and adopted was that no provisions for sanc- 
tions were to be written into it, convincing presumptions are 
raised against any argument to the effect that all other sig- 
natories were legally bound to penalize a violator. To say that 
a state had renounced war as an instrument of national policy 
was by no means logically equivalent to saying that a state had 
abandoned its right to remain aloof if another party to the same 
renunciation of war broke its pledge." There is no warrant in 
international law for depriving a nation of the option of ignor- 
ing the adverse breach of a treaty to which it is a party. I n  
such a case a state is entitled to take appropriate reprisals for 
the wrong suffered, but it is not legally obligated to take such 
reprisals. 
At this point one might say that the influence and authority 
of international law would suffer irreparable damage if states 
49 United States Congress, Congressr'onal Record, 70th Cong., 2d Sess., 1730. 
50 Subject, of course, to the requirements of other treaties to which the 
states are parties. It might be argued that there is a duty to make a specific 
public condemnation of each breach of the Pact of Paris. For a discussion 
of this point, see Quincy Wright, "The Denunciation of Treaty Violators," 
American Journal of International Law, XXXII ( 1938), 526-35. 
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made a practice of ignoring breaches of the most solemn and 
important treaty pledges among themselves. It is quite ob- 
vious, and all too well illustrated by a series of deplorable 
events, that failure to halt aggression undertaken in violation 
of the Pact of Paris encouraged new breaches of that instru- 
ment and robbed it of all practical value. Still, the fact that 
disastrous consequences may follow an attitude of indifference 
does not read into the Pact of Paris the obligation to take 
definite measures against a state violating its pledge. Interpre- 
tation of the pact does not differ from that which prevailed 
with respect to Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, namely, that each state remained the judge of its own 
participation in adverse differential treatment of an aggressor. 
This does not mean, however, that those who spoke of obli- 
gations to implement the Pact of Paris were wrong in their 
interpretation of that instrument. They were profoundly right 
in the sense that they were speaking of what must be done 
if the pact was to be effective. One may well say that it is 
inconceivable that a state which had signed the Pact of Paris 
in good faith and which had a genuine interest in the abolition 
of war as a legitimate technique of international intercourse 
would be neutral in the event of a violation and would refuse 
to avail itself of its legal right to make its concern effective. 
If international development were to follow principles upon 
which the pact was based, it would be necessary for all third 
states to take appropriate measures for the restraint of aggres- 
sion, and the first step would be an unequivocal forsaking of 
the attitude of indifference to the methods by which any inter- 
national dispute whatsoever is settled. 
The fact that the pact did not contain sanctions is relatively 
unimportant. If third states directed their policy toward im- 
plementing the pact, adequate procedures had already been 
developed; if they were not sufficiently concerned in estab- 
lishing the principle of pacific settlement, any treaty require- 
ment might be avoided or ignored. There is a real distinction 
between a legal duty arising from the terms of a treaty, literally 
interpreted, and the prerequisites of action calculated to imple- 
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ment the principle upon which that treaty is based, but so far 
as practical action is concerned, they are brought into harmony 
whenever states take the most, not the least, effective measures 
they can to discriminate against any of their number having 
recourse to war. 
The interpretation of the consequences of a renunciation of 
war has been done largely, if not entirely, by those who are 
anxious to see it observed. They have usually been concerned 
with the broader and more important question of the place of 
the Pact of Paris in the development of international organiza- 
tion. They have spoken not of the least that third states can do 
without violating the pact, but of what they must do if it is to 
have practical value and force. Nowhere is this assumption 
more clearly and forcibly stated than in Secretary Stimson's 
speech of August 8, 1932. He said: 
So the entire central point from which the problem of war was 
viewed was changed. . . . The Briand-Kellogg Pact provides for 
no sanctions of force. . . . Its efficacy depends upon the will of the 
people of the world to make it effective. . . . We have recognized 
that its effectiveness depends upon the cultivation of the mutual 
fidelity and good faith of the group of nations which has become 
its signatories. Another consequence is that consultation between 
the signatories of the Pact when faced with the threat of invasion 
becomes inevitable. Any effective invocation of the power of world 
opinion postulates discussion and cons~ltation.~~ 
The real significance of the Pact of Paris, then, must be found 
in its function as a basis for the implementation of the tech- 
niques of peaceful settlement. The Pact of Paris provided a 
basis for permissive sanctions, that is to say, for adverse dif- 
ferential treatment of a signatory state having recourse to war 
as an instrument of national policy. For all practical purposes, 
no country could resort to war without violating a treaty with 
each and every other nation in the world. For the obligation 
of treaty observance there is the reciprocal right to have treaties 
observed by others. States may take appropriate measures to 
protect their rights, including the benefits promised them by 
" The Pact of Paris, 4, 7 ,  11. 
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treaty. This doctrine is entirely adequate to include a case of 
a violation of the renunciation of war as a national policy. It 
offers a legal basis for asserting that an act of war in any part 
of the world ipso facto violates a vital national interest. 
A significant form of modified application of the principle of 
concern is found in the device of nonrecognition, or the Stim- 
son Doctrine as it was known from the American Secretary of 
State who enunciated it. On January 7, 1932, the United States 
government addressed to China and Japan an identic note con- 
taining this paragraph: 
In view of the present situation and of its own rights and obliga- 
tions therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to 
notify both the Government of the Chinese Republic and the Im- 
perial Japanese Government that it cannot admit the legality of 
any situation de  facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or 
agreement entered into between these governments, or agents 
thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States 
or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sover- 
eignty, the independence or the territorial and administrative in- 
tegrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy 
relative to China, commonly known as the Open Door Policy; and 
that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agree- 
ment which may be brought about by means contrary to the cove- 
nants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to 
which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, 
are partiess2 
The doctrine of nonrecognition was applied to the Sino- 
Japanese dispute by the League of Nations, in terms of Article 
10 of the Covenant by a Council resoIution of February 16, 
1932, and in terms of the Covenant of the League and the Pact 
of Paris by an Assembly resolution of March 11, 1932. It was 
also applied in connection with the Chaco dispute in South 
America. 
" United States Department of State, P ~ e s s  Releases, January, 1932. 
92 I N T E R N A T I O N A L  C O N F L I C T  
The Stimson Doctrine gave a new application to the con- 
cepts of recognition and nonrecognition in international law. 
Historically, recognition had been associated with the act or 
process by which a new state or government was accepted into 
and became a participant in the family of nations. The term 
was also used to refer to the acceptance by third states of a 
new treaty or a new international legal situation. This, how- 
ever, was by no means a settled branch of international law. 
Some of the questions involved in the traditional concepts 
were: Is recognition constitutive or declaratory? Does a state 
become an international personality and a subject of inter- 
national law by virtue of its recognition, or does recognition 
merely accept a fact which already existed? Is the act of 
recognition legal or political, or both? Is the distinction be- 
tween de iure and de facto recognition legitimate? Is it per- 
missible for third states to grant or withhold recognition as a 
matter of policy? Does recognition involve or imply some de- 
gree of approval, or is it equivalent to a mere admission of the 
existence of facts? What of the distinctions between the recog- 
nition of states, of governments, of treaties, of belligerency or 
insurgency, and of other situations and facts? Could recogni- 
tion be conditional? Is it revocable?53 
A re-examination of these and other questions involved in 
the concept of recognition would amount to a long and con- 
troversial detour so far as this study is concerned. It is suf- 
ficient to indicate that these controversies exist, as a matter of 
perspective, since the relevant question for the present pur- 
pose is one of the Stimson Doctrine as a method of imple- 
menting the principle of concern. From this point of view, 
certain conclusions become obvious. First, the simple declara- 
tory theory of recognition would be abandoned in favor of the 
53 It is instructive to review the discussions, by Baty, Borchard, Brown, 
Fenwick, Garner, Kelsen, and Wright, published in the Ainerican Journal of 
Inte~nationul Law during the period 1932-1944. See XXVI (1932), 342-48; 
XXVII ( 1933), 509-16; XXX (1936), 377-S1, 679-94; XXXV ( 1941 ), 605-17; 
XXXVI (1942), 10611; XXXVIII (1944), 448-52. For an analysis of the 
subject, with the texts of pertinent documents, see Chesney Hill, "Recent 
Policies of Non-Recognition." 
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constitutive theory that a state becomes a subject of inter- 
national law only through recognition. The new element would 
be a modification of the criteria of eligibility for recognition. 
In the second place, nonrecognition as a sanction to imple- 
ment the principle of concern requires maintenance of the dis- 
tinction between de facto and de iurc situations. Recognition 
cannot be made equivalent to an admission of existence. Recog- 
nition becomes a matter of official cognizance, of acceptance 
as valid on the basis of designated criteria. By way of example, 
an analogy may be drawn with the practice of British and 
American courts. When an attempt is made to submit alleged 
facts which are inadmissible under the rules of evidence, the 
courts do not deny their existence but merely exclude them 
from the notice of the court. The issue is not the ultimate 
truth or falsity of the allegations, but whether their nature and 
presentation warrants admission to the purview of the court. 
Recognition in this sense means "acceptance for a purpose." 
On the other hand, it would not mean approval or disapproval. 
Mere existence is not conclusive as to legal recognition, and 
the latter does not necesarily imply endorsement. It seems ap- 
parent that those who deny any validity to the distinction 
between de facto and de iure recognition are able to reach 
this result only by making recognition equivalent to the ad- 
mission that "what exists, exists." However, it often happens 
that the scope of judicial cognizance is not coterminous with 
the raw facts. That the crux of the matter lies in the acceptance 
of a state, rather than in deciding whether or not it exists, seems 
to be supported by the statement in Moore's Digest of Inter- 
national Law, "Recognition, says Rivier, is the assurance given 
to a new state that it will be permitted to hold its place or 
rank, in the character of an independent political organism, 
in the society of nations. The rights and attributes of sover- 
eignty belong to it independently of all recognition, but it is 
only after it has been recognized that it is assured of exercising 
them."j4 
54 Vol. I, 72. 
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A distinction between de facto and de iure recognition im- 
plies a test of legitimacy.   he mere fact of existingor even of 
exercising actual authority is not sufficient to call forth im- 
mediate recognition of a new state or a new government. 
Under the theory of absolute monarchy the principle of legiti- 
macy in the form of the hereditary right of a dynasty precluded 
any need for a doctrine of recognition. As the concept of 
popular sovereignty became important, the doctrine of recogni- 
tion developed.j5 From the French Revolution through the 
Holy Alliance the defenders of the status quo in Europe put 
the recognition of governments to the test of their freedom 
from the taint of revolution. The better right of the existing 
(monarchic) form of government was asserted. The de facto 
theory countered the argument from legitimacy with the idea 
that any government which could establish itself in fact should 
be admitted to the society of nations. It was natural that the 
United States supported the de facto interpretation (except 
for the Civil War period) until the time of Woodrow Wilson's 
return to a test of legitimacy in the criterion of establishment 
according to constitutional means. Evidence of popular sup- 
port was added to the requirements of actual control, reason- 
able stability, and a capacity for executing obligations. The 
Stimson Doctrine specifically added a test of legitimacy which 
excluded situationsj6 created by other than pacific means. In 
cases of aggression a better right of the victim was asserted, 
even though the aggression might appear to be successful de 
facto. Compliance with the "covenants and obligations" of the 
Pact of Paris became a requirement for the recognition of the 
5 5  See Taylor Cole, "Recognition, International," Encljclopedia of the Social 
Sciences, XIII, 165-68. 
56A general term is used here deliberately. Some of the analyses (for 
example, Hill) make much of distinctions between the recognition of states, 
governments, treaties, situations, etc. These distinctions are valid, but it must 
be remembered that the Manchurian situation involved questions of the recog- 
nition of a new state (Manchukuo), a new government, changes in multi- 
lateral treaties (Pact of Paris, Covenant of the League, Nine-Power Treaty), 
change in the territory of an existing state (China) and title to a portion of it, 
and the question of whether the fighting amounted to belligerency or in- 
surgency (Japan alleging that Manchukuo was established by an indigenous 
separatist movement). 
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legitimacy and legal validity of changes in international rela- 
tionships. 
In the third place, the Stimson Doctrine involved the use 
of recognition as a policy, not as merely a matter of legal status 
arising from a condition of fact. Nonrecognition would be a 
sanction for use against aggression. In a sense, recognition has 
always involved policy determinations in that existing states 
do not have the legal duty of granting recognition. They have 
a decision to make. Under the de facto concept it is a decision 
whether a new state or government has actually established 
itself. Any test of legitimacy, of course, involves policy con- 
siderations over and above this. It is a matter of policy when 
one or more nations refuse recognition to any state or govern- 
ment born of revolution, or to one not based upon popular 
support, or to one which refuses to pay its debts. Likewise, it 
is a matter of policy, not legal duty, to refuse recognition to 
the "fruits of aggression." The Stimson Doctrine was not the 
first policy of nonrecognition against the use of force. The 
theory of dynastic legitimacy invoked it against changes made 
by popular revolution. The Wilsonian theory used it against 
seizures of power contrary to constitutional means. The Stim- 
son Doctrine extended the theory to the external relations of 
states. Aggression against established dynasties, against con- 
stitutional governments, and against other states have been 
successively brought within the scope of a policy of non- 
recognition. The Stimson Doctrine extended a principle de- 
signed for protection of the existing intrastate regime from 
forcible change to protection of the existing interstate situa- 
tion from the same form of attack. A concept historically ap- 
plied largely" to change of governments within states was 
extended to the legal relations between states. 
Thus, the Stimson Doctrine involved a concept of recogni- 
tion as constitutive, in that legal relationships depend upon 
57 When recognition has been based on a test of legitimacy, it has usually 
been concerned with either a revolutionary change of government within the 
same state or with a rebellion attempting to form a new state and government 
in a portion of the former state's territory. 
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recognition; as implying a distinction between de facto and de 
jure situations, with a test of legitimacy; and as a sanction for 
the implementation of policy, as well as a procedure for the 
determination of legal relationships. 
On the basis of a new interpretation of the concept of recog- 
nition the Stimson Doctrine tended to establish or strengthen 
three propositions in international l a ~ . ~ V i r s t ,  de facto occu- 
pation of territory gives no title. It has usually been held that 
conquest alone does not give title, but that there must be con- 
firmation by subsequent treaty, recognition of third states, or 
prescription. The policy of nonrecognition would be a barrier 
to acquisition of title, especially when a large number of states 
have a treaty right in the maintenance of the status quo in the 
disputed territory. There would be a new impediment to the 
completion of title after conquest in that a presumption against 
the legally effective transfer of territory by force would be 
erected. 
Second, treaties contrary to the rights of third states are void. 
Traditionally, there has been a tendency to hold that such 
treaties are voidable at the discretion of the injured state, or 
at least that reparation is due for nonperformance of the 
original obligation. This principle would be followed under 
the Stimson Doctrine. The Pact of Paris is of significance at 
this point. By it, practically every state in the world acquired 
a vested interest in the maintenance of peace. It became im- 
possible for any nation to resort to war or attempt nonpacific 
methods of settlement without violating a treaty with every 
other state. Therefore, changes made without the consent- 
the "recognition"-of third states would be void. Changes must 
be accepted to be valid. 
Third, treaties made under duress, that is by nonpacific 
means, may be considered void. This would establish a general 
principle of international law, based upon the argument that 
duress is equivalent to nonpacific measures and that its use 
would violate the treaty rights of all other states. 
58 Quincy Wright, "The Stimson Note of January 7, 1932," American Journal 
of International Law, X X V I  (1932), 342-48. 
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The main significance of the Stimson Doctrine for the prin- 
ciple of concern was that it made the validity of territorial 
and political changes dependent upon the attitude of third 
states toward the legitimacy of the methods used in effecting 
the changes. It expressed the concern of the international conl- 
munity in the existence and settlement of disputes among its 
members. In the words of Sir John Fischer Williams, "The 
rlovelty of the recent doctrine of Mr. Stimson and the League 
consists precisely in this-that it extends the necessity or oppor- 
tunity of 'recognition' to cases in which it has not hitherto 
been supposed that any claim was addressed to the members 
of the international community and makes the rightfulness of 
action taken depend on the attitude of third Powers. This is 
to endow the members of the international community and 
third Powers with a new and important prerogative."j9 
Historically, a state always had a legitimate complaint if its 
treaty rights were violated. The Stimson Doctrine extended 
this in three ways. First, the network of multilateral treaties 
was much more extensive than formerly, involving in the Man- 
churian case the Covenant of the League, the Pact of Paris, 
and the Nine-Power Treaty. It was therefore much more dif- 
ficult to make unilateral, or even bilateral, changes without 
violating one or more treaties with a large number of third 
states. Second, the Stimson Doctrine contemplated a degree 
of co-ordination in the attitude of third states. Its expression 
would then be a group or concerted affair, and not entirely a 
matter of each nation protecting its own national interests 
individually. This idea was not new, as witness the Concert 
of Europe, but it would be extended and strengthened. Third, 
more emphasis was placed on the methods used to effect a 
change rather than exclusively on the specific territorial and 
political changes being accomplished. Objections to treaty vio- 
lation no longer were confined to this or that substantive 
change, but could include any change brought about by cer- 
tain proscribed methods. There was a basis in international 
59 Grotius Society, Transuctions, XVIII ( 1933), 113. 
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law and organization for asserting that states had a vested 
interest in the maintenance of peace. 
This change of emphasis and extension of the concern of 
third states with international conflict is well illustrated by a 
comparison between the attitude of the United States toward 
a Sino-Japanese dispute in 1915 and that expressed by the 
Stimson Doctrine. In the former case, Secretary of State 
Bryan's note of May 11, 1915, relative to the Twenty-One 
Demands made upon China by Japan, stated that the United 
States "cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which 
has been entered into or which may be entered into between 
the Governments of Japan and China, impairing the treaty 
rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the poli- 
tical or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the 
international policy relative to China commonly known as the 
open door 
The above quotation was similar, and in part identical, with 
a portion of the Stimson note of January 7, 1932. But there 
were two differences, both significant in relation to the prin- 
ciple of concern. The statement of nonrecognition in the Stim- 
son note was preceded by an indication that the United States 
"cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto," thus chal- 
lenging Japanese action on the basis of law as well as policy. 
The other significant difference was that the Stimson note 
added a statement of intention not to recognize any situation, 
treaty, or agreement brought about contrary to the Pact of 
Paris. The Bryan note of 1915 asserted the national interests 
and policies of the United States; the Stimson note of 1932 
asserted the same national interests and policies, plus a demand 
for observance of the Pact of Paris. This was clear evidence of 
an acceptance by the United States of a concern in the method 
by which international disputes are settled. 
The intent of this discussion of the Stimson Doctrine has 
been to ascertain whether it represented an acceptance of the 
principle of concern and, if so, to what extent. However, the 
question of the functional effectiveness of nonrecognition as a 
60 United States Foreign Relations ( 1915), 146. 
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sanction should not be entirely neglected. Certain conclusions 
are evident. First, the policy of nonrecognition was not effec- 
tive enough to get the Japanese out of China. Second, there 
was not sufficient time for the implications of a new concept 
of recognition and nonrecognition to work themselves out. It 
was seven years and a few months from the announcement of 
the Stimson Doctrine to the outbreak of World War 11. The 
final test of a doctrine of nonrecognition would be its implica- 
tions for the doctrine of prescription. That, by definition, takes 
more than seven years. What would happen if political and 
territorial changes brought about by nonpacific means were 
stabilized de facto over a long period of time? 
The practical effects of the nonrecognition of a new nation 
or government would lie in the difficulties of travel, commerce, 
status of nationals before the courts of third states, and the like. 
The unrecognized country would be unable to protect its 
ilationals abroad in the normal manner, to secure respect for 
its flag, to maintain regular diplomatic relations, or to establish 
consular offices. On the other hand, third states would also 
suffer inconveniences from the continuation of such a situa- 
tion. It seems clear that nonrecognition as a sanction would 
be effective only to the extent that a recalcitrant state could be 
brought to terms by a combination of comparatively minor in- 
conveniences, appeal to public opinion, and moral suasion. 
This is not enough for a powerful and determined aggressor. 
In effect, the doctrine of nonrecognition represents an attempt 
to restrain aggression without the use of forcible means. Col- 
lective application of the policy of nonrecognition would be 
important. If all or nearly all third states concurred in this at- 
titude, the difficulties for an unrecognized nation (or govern- 
ment) and its nationals would be greatly increased. If opinion 
and moral suasion, as evidenced by the policies of third states, 
were universal or nearly so, their force would be greatly en- 
hanced. On the other hand, adoption of such a policy by only 
a few nations would minimize the inconveniences suffered and 
would reflect a divided world opinion and a narrower basis for 
moral suasion. 
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One of the most telling criticisms of a policy of nonrecogni- 
tion is that it threatens to leave a gap between the law and the 
facts. The Stimson Doctrine would not be effective as a sanction 
if it meant merely ignoring obvious facts. This would dis- 
credit, not strengthen, the law. What the law cannot effectively 
control or prohibit, it must recognize in the interest of order 
and stability. "We shall do nothing-except administer a little 
opium to our mental and moral vigour-by saying that war and 
conquest, while we allow them to take place, produce results 
which are invalid in law."G1 
This would seem to be a conclusive criticism against a policy 
of nonrecognition unless that policy, alone or in conjunction 
with other measures, could prevent in fact the situation for- 
bidden in law. A disapproved change must either be elimi- 
nated or eventually accepted. A doctrine of nonrecognition, by 
refusing to accept the actual situation and by putting difficul- 
ties in the way of international intercourse, might further dis- 
turb rather than stabilize international relations. In principle, 
the Stimson Doctrine can be defended only on the basis of 
assuming that its implications can be made effective. Refusal 
to ignore facts is valueless, or worse; but refusal to accept a 
state of facts as a step in securing a change in them is of great 
value if the means exist for making the policy effective in 
practice. 
Finally, a question may be raised about the implications of 
a policy of nonrecognition for the problem of peaceful change. 
Would the Stimson Doctrine refuse to recognize changes made 
by force while sanctioning a status quo maintained by force? 
Prohibition of nonpacific methods carries with it an increased 
necessity for the development of effective pacific methods. 
But such a prohibition can be based only upon a concern of 
the group in the existence and settlement of conflicts among 
its members. This partial control of the methods of settlement 
offers a basis for the elaboration of permissible means as a 
society develops. 
61 John Fischer Williams, "Sovereignty, Seisin and the League," British Year- 
book of International Law, VII (1936), 42. 
The various trends in the modified application of the prin- 
ciple of concern, together with various outbreaks of interna- 
tional violence, emphasized the desirability of co-ordinating 
- 
and implementing the general obligations of peaceful settle- 
ment among the American republics. Accordingly, the Seventh 
International Conference of American States, meeting at Mon- 
tevideo, Uruguay, in December, 1933, turned its attention to 
this problem. As a result the conference adopted a resolution 
inviting the adherence of each of the American states to five 
instruments for the maintenance of peace which, the confer- 
ence felt, "if coordinated and converted into obligations en- 
forced in every country of the American Continent, would 
suffice to prevent the crime of war and the disastrous conse- 
quences of every kind which it entails for the present and 
future of all nati~nalities."'~ 
The five peace instruments to be co-ordinated were the 
Treaty for Avoiding and Preventing Conflicts, concluded at 
Santiago, Chile, in 1923 and known as the "Gondra Treaty"; 
the Pact of Paris; the Conciliation Convention, signed in Wash- 
ington in 1929; the Inter-American Arbitration Treaty of the 
same year; and the Argentine Anti-I;C7ar Treaty, signed in Rio 
de Janeiro in 1933." Of this group, the Gondra Treaty of 1923 
and the two Washington conventions of 1929 provided for pro- 
cedures of inquiry, conciliation, and arbitration, and contained 
no references to discriminatory treatment between disputing 
states. The Pact of Paris has previously been discussed.G4 
Seventh International Conference of American States, Final Act, 20. 
63 Same. The Fifth International Conference of American States, meeting at 
Santiago in 1923, had also adopted a resolution recommending "that the Gov- 
ernments adhere to the Conventions of The Hague of 1907, and to the sub- 
sequent Conventions which limit military hostilities, fix the usages of warfare 
and the rights and duties of neutrals, and thus . . . tend to render the Positive 
International Law of the American Nations with regard to measures which 
mitigate the horrors of war and in general, with regard to the law of warfare" 
(Verbatim Record of the Plenary Sessions, 11, 389). The Havana conference 
of 1928 adopted a resolution condemning aggression. 
64 Section 3. 
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The Argentine Anti-War Treaty, signed at Rio de Janeiro 
on October 10, 1933, by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay, condemned wars of aggression among 
themselves and with other states, and declared that the settle- 
ment of controversies of any kind which arose among the 
parties should be settled only "by pacific means which have the 
sanction of international law."" Territorial arrangements not 
obtained by pacific means, as well as the validity of the occupa- 
tion or acquisition of territories brought about by force of arms, 
were not to be recognized. Article 3 of the treaty provided 
that 
in case of non-compliance by any State engaged in a dispute, with 
the obligations contained in the foregoing articles, the contracting 
States undertake to make every effort for the maintenance of peace. 
To that end they will adopt in their character as neutrals a common 
and solidary attitude; they will exercise the political, juridical, or 
economic means authorized by international law; they will bring 
the influence of public opinion to bear but will in no case resort to 
intervention either diplomatic or armed; subject to the attitude that 
may be incumbent on them by virtue of other collective treaties to 
which such States are ~ignatories.~" 
At the same conference the hiexican government submitted 
a Peace Code, Chapter I of which contained statements prac- 
tically identical with Articles 1 to 3 of the Argentine Anti-War 
Treaty. The conference voted to submit the Peace Code 
through the channel of the Pan-American Union to the con- 
sideration of its member go~ernmen t s .~~  
There was also concluded at the Montevideo conference a 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which provided 
in Article I1 that "the contracting states definitely establish as 
6jArticle 1. For the text, see United States Department of State, Treaty 
Series, No. 906. 
66 Same. The remainder of the treaty provided for a procedure of recon- 
ciliation. 
67 Seventh International Conference of American States, 6-63. Chapter I 
of the Peace Code offered a definition of aggression and contained an express 
declaration against resort to armed force for the collection of contractual debts. 
The remaining articles provided for conciliation and the creation of a perma- 
nent commission, arbitration, and the establishment of an American Court of 
International Justice (pp.  62-85). 
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a rule of their conduct the precise obligation not to recognize 
territorial acquisitions or special advantages which have been 
obtained by force whether this consists in the employment of 
arms, in threatening diplomatic representations, or in any other 
effective coercive  measure^."'^ 
The conference also named the "Determination of the Ag- 
gressor and Condition of Neutrals" as a subject to be submitted 
as a base of discussioli for the International Commission of 
American  jurist^.'^ 
The integration and co-ordination of Pan-American peace 
instruments was continued at the Inter-American Conference 
for the Maintenance of Peace, which met at Buenos Aires in 
December, 1936. Although this conference took place after 
the period of modified application of the principle of concern, 
properly speaking, it is considered here because of its intimate 
relation to preceding measures and because only in this way 
can the attempt at integration of an inter-American peace sys- 
tem be viewed in perspective. At the outset the conference 
approved a resolution reaffirming the invitation to the American 
countries which had not already done so to adhere to or ratify 
the five peace instruments recommended by the Montevideo 
c ~ n f e r e n c e . ~ ~  
A Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation, and Re- 
establishment of Peace, concluded at the conference, provided 
that in the event of a menace to the peace of the American 
republics the signatories to the Pact of Paris and the Argentine 
Anti-War Treaty would consult with other governments of the 
American republics, and that in the event of war or a "virtual 
state of war" between American republics the states repre- 
sented at the conference would undertake mutual consulta- 
tions. In the event of an international war outside America 
68 Same, 192-93. The next article provided that "the present Convention 
shall not affect obligations previously entered into by the High Contracting 
Parties by virtue of international agreements." 
69 Same, 113. 
70Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, Final Act 
(Buenos Aires, 1936), 7. The recommendation was extended to include the 
Additional Protocol to the General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation 
of 1929. 
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which might menace the peace of the American republics, 
such consultation would also take place.71 
The Buenos Aires conference also approved a Declaration of 
Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Co-operation which 
proscribed territorial conquest and stated that no acquisition 
made through violence would be recognized, condemned inter- 
vention by one state in the internal or external affairs of 
another, asserted the illegality of the forcible collection of 
pecuniary debts, and finally, provided that "any difference or 
dispute between the American nations, whatever its nature or 
origin, shall be settled by the methods of conciliation, or 
unrestricted arbitration, or through operation of international 
Another resolution of the conference referred the Mexican 
Peace Code to a Committee of Experts on the Codification of 
International Law, and a fourth recommended that the Ameri- 
can states not members of the League of Nations but parties to 
the Pact of Paris and the Argentine Anti-War Treaty "and any 
other similar agreements signed in the future" co-operate with 
the League of Nations in the prevention of war and the pacific 
settlement of international conflicts whenever the respective 
legal systems of such states permitted.73 
A precise statement of the duties and obligations with respect 
to international violence resulting from this group of conven- 
tions could be only provisional and speculative, for two rea- 
sons: ( a )  the task of co-ordinating the various instruments 
was not completed and ( b )  the nature of certain of the textual 
provisions involved was such that their specific application 
could not be stated with any degree of exactness. 
Obvious difficulties inhere in the coexistence of several multi- 
lateral conventions for the maintenance of peace, the stipula- 
tions of which are not identical, although directed toward the 
same object, and none of which has been accepted by all the 
71 United States Department of State, Treaty Series, No. 922. Paraguay, 
upon signing the convention, made a reservation with respect to its "peculiar 
international position as regards the League of Nations" (p. 5). 
72 Same, 16. 
73 Same, 16-17. The delegations of the United States and Costa Rica ab- 
stained from voting on the fourth resolution. 
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states concerned. One party to a conflict might be bound by 
one treaty or combination of treaties, with the other party 
bound by a different treaty or combination. Likewise, each 
party cvould be bound by different treaties or combinations 
with respect to the several third states. The various "combina- 
- 
tions and permutations" would logically be complex, and the 
- 
possibilities of playing one treaty against another are ap- 
parent. Efforts for maintenance of peace among the American 
republics might be effectively co-ordinated by practical inter- 
national statesmanship availing itself of such techniques as 
might be appropriate, but it is nevertheless true that the con- 
ventional basis for effective action was not integrated.7" 
This lack of complete co-ordination among peace instruments 
is, of course, of definitely secondary importance, provided that 
each state is bound by some international agreement not to 
resort to hostilities and that the violation of any such agree- 
ment is coiiceived to be an occasion for the fullest possible 
- 
use of the existing machinery for the maintenance of peace. 
The noncoincidence of adherents to the various conventions is 
a minor difficulty if those conventions function as supplements 
to each other; it is a serious problem if they are manipulated 
so as to interfere with each other. 
The second source of difficulty in appraising the place of the 
principle of differential treatment in the movement for the 
implementation of peace among the American republics is un- 
certainty as to the force of some of the substantive obligations 
undertaken, particularly in the provisions of the Argentine 
Anti-IVar Treaty. It is clear that this convention required non- 
recognition of territorial arrangements brought about by the 
74 The following instrun~ents for the nlaintenance of peace were relevant to 
the application of the principle of differential treatment to American inter- 
national organization: ( 1 )  League of Nations Covenant; ( 2 )  Pact of Paris; 
( 3 )  Argentine Anti-TVar Treaty; ( 4 )  Convention on the Rights and Duties of 
States; ( 5 )  Convention for the Ivlaintenance, Preservation, and Re-establish- 
merit of Peace. As of April 1, 1938, the different colllbinations by which the 
various American republics were bound were as follows: All five: Colombia, 
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, hlexico, Nicaragua; 1, 2, 3, 4: 
Chile, Guatemala; 1, 2, 3, 5 :  L'enezuela; 1, 2, 3 :  Haiti, Panama, Peru; 1, 3, 4, 
5 :  El Salvador; 1, 3: Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay; 2, 3, 4, 5 :  Brazil, United 
States; 2, 4: Costa Rica; 2: Paraguay. 
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use of violence; moreover, an obligation upon the parties to 
consult in the event of a breach of Articles 1 and 2 was indis- 
putably implicit in the convention, since independent and un- 
co-ordinated national policies could scarcely result in a "com- 
mon and solidary attitude." 
The doubtful points related specifically to three qualifying 
expressions in Article 3. It was provided that in the event of 
noncompliance with Articles 1 and 2 by any nation engaged 
in a dispute, the contracting states would adopt a common at- 
titude "in their character as neutrals." The meaning of the 
word "neutrals" in this connection was obscure. If it was used 
in the traditional sense of impartiality between parties to a 
conflict, regardless of the merits of the case, it was not con- 
sistent with the condemnation of aggression by the pact; if it 
merely meant "nonparticipants" or "third states," its use in this 
particular place was superfluous. It might have been used to 
connote that the measures taken for the maintenance of peace 
were to fall short of actual participation in the controversy, 
that abstention from involvement in hostilities against a vio- 
lator of the pact was to be a fundamental rule of any action 
based upon a "common and solidary attitude." 
Article 3 then stated that the contracting parties "will exer- 
cise the political, juridical, or economic means authorized by 
international law; they will bring the influence of public 
opinion to bear but will in no case resort to intervention either 
diplomatic or armed." Even if it be assumed that there would 
be agreement upon what means were "authorized by inter- 
national law," it would seem rather difficult clearly to dis- 
tinguish intervention from "exercising political, juridical, or 
economic means" and "bringing the influence of public opinion 
to bear." If third states interested themselves in a conflict to 
the extent of applying various political, juridical, or economic 
measures against one of the participants in that conflict, they 
would seem to be "intervening" within the traditional interpre- 
tation of that term. No doubt the present qualification might 
be taken as a guarantee against coercion of any American 
republic with respect to its domestic affairs and as a pledge 
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that third states would not, under the guise of collective action 
for the maintenance of peace, take sides in a "private war" for 
their own national aggrandizement. But at any rate, it must 
be admitted that obligations to take "political, juridical, or 
economic means" without "resorting to intervention" were 
open to grave difficulties of interpretation and application. 
A third difficulty lay in the qualifying clause, "subject to the 
attitude that may be incumbent on them by virtue of other col- 
lective treaties to which such states are signatories." The Cove- 
nant of the League immediately comes to mind. Some of the 
signatories of the Argentine Anti-War Treaty were members of 
the League; others were not. What would happen to their 
"solidary attitude" if, for example, the League should attempt 
to apply sanctions? The possibility of adoption of a policy of 
"isolation7' by the United States and the Latin American pre- 
dilection for withdrawing from the League were sufficient 
warning against optimistic reliance on enthusiastic co-operation 
with any action which the League might take. The American 
system of collective security might be able to function effec- 
tively without the support of non-American states. But this 
assumption, too, is undependable. It would not be correct to 
assert that the qualification with respect to "other collective 
treaties" would necessarily produce an impasse, but it would 
be equally incorrect to contend that it did not afford a real 
possibility of doing so. 
In short, a consideration of the obligations imposed by the 
Pact of Paris and various other conventions for the implementa- 
tion of peace leads to the conclusion that a judgment of their 
implications for international law and organization could not 
be derived from their texts alone, but had to be based also 
upon their actual functional interpretation in relevant situa- 
tions. This was true because many of their stipulations were 
permissive rather than obligatory, the force of several im- 
portant qualifying expressions was uncertain, and some of the 
basic provisions were stated in terms of general principles, the 
detailed applications of which were not susceptible to precise 
delimitation in advance. 
C H A P T E R  F I V E  
Disintegration 
THE FOURTH and last phase of international organization for 
the control of conflict during the period 1919-1939 was charac- 
terized by disintegration. The attempt at modified application 
of the principle of concern was unsuccessful. And the only 
alternative to its success was complete failure to incorporate 
the principle into international law and organization as a basis 
for the control of international conflict. The outbreak of World 
War I1 marked that failure. Since the phase of disintegration 
was so acutely and universally apparent, no extended discus- 
sion is necessary to establish its occurrence. Accordingly, this 
chapter will be limited to a recapitulation of the major trends 
in organized attitudes toward international conflict. 
There is some problem in dating the period of disintegration 
of the system of collective security between the two World 
Wars. Important disruptive factors had been evident from the 
beginning. As in the case of the trends of acceptance, limita- 
tion, and modified application, the phase of disintegration was 
a matter more of emphasis than of an exclusive characteristic. 
From this point of view, the period of disintegration commenced 
as attempts at modified application were shown to be inef- 
fectual. This process occurred gradually over a period of time. 
The beginning of the end might be set as 1931, when the 
Manchurian incident launched a cycle of major aggressions 
which disrupted the League of Nations and the system built 
around it. On the other hand, major attempts at modified 
application occurred during 1932-1933. The two years from 
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1931 to 1933 were really a time of overlapping between modi- 
fied application and disintegration, with the eventual develop- 
ment of the latter in inverse proportion to the success of the 
former. Since the object of this study is to trace the pattern 
of international organization vis-A-vis international conflict, it 
seems preferable on the whole to date the phase of disintegra- 
tion as beginning in 1933. In this year the collective attitude 
toward the Sino-Japanese conflict became definitive by virtue 
of acceptance of the Lytton Commission's report and the As- 
sembly resolution based upon it. Although the conflict had 
started in 1931, the decisive test of the collective ability to 
deal with it came in 1933 with the question of the League's 
effectiveness, or lack of it, in bringing the situation under 
control on the basis of its obligations, expressed attitude, and 
the findings of its Commission of Enquiry. In other words the 
interest of this study lies in the failure to deal with the conflict 
rather than in the event as such. Acceptance of the date 1933 
is reinforced by the further fact that the Nazi government 
came to power and Germany gave notice of its withdrawal 
from the League of Nations at this time. 
The principle of concern during the phase of disintegration 
will now be examined briefly from the perspective of the organ- 
ized collective attitude toward three incidents of international 
conflict-one in the Far East, one in South America, and one 
involving a major European power. 
( a )  The Sino-Japanese Conflict 
On the night of September 18-19,1931, Japanese and Chinese 
forces clashed near hlukden in Manchuria. Japanese troops 
occupied hlukden. On September 19, the Council of the 
League heard statements concerning the incidents by Chinese 
and Japanese representatives. Hostilities continued to spread 
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in Manchuria, and on September 21 China appealed to the 
Council under Article 11 of the C0venant.l On the next day 
the Council authorized its President to appeal to the two gov- 
ernments to refrain from any act which might aggravate the 
situation or prejudice the peaceful settlement of the problem. 
Chinese and Japanese representatives were also to be consulted 
on means for the withdrawal of their respective troops. The 
Council decided to transmit records of its proceedings to the 
United States, and on September 24 the latter expressed 
"whole-hearted sympathy" with the attitude of the Council. 
On September 29 the President of the Council reported a 
Japanese statement that the withdrawal of its forces was pro- 
ceeding. On the next day, September 30, the Council adopted 
a resolution which, after noting the replies of the two govern- 
ments concerned, requested them to do all in their power to 
hasten the restoration of normal relations and to keep the 
Council fully i n f ~ r m e d . ~  
Hostilities continued to spread, however, and on October 13 
the Council reconvened at the request of China. Upon invita- 
tion the United States sent a representative to the meeting of 
the Council to consider the situation in relation to the Pact of 
Paris. On October 17 seven states represented on the Council 
sent an identical note to the governments of China and Japan 
calling their attention to the provisions of that pact, and espe- 
cially to Article 2.  The United States government sent a similar 
note shortly afterward. This note was based upon the prin- 
ciple that "A threat of war, wherever it may arise, is of profound 
concern to the whole ~ o r l d . " ~  
On October 24 a draft resolution fixing a date for the with- 
drawal of Japanese forces was lost in the Council by the ad- 
verse vote of Japan. The Japanese military operations in Man- 
churia continued to develop, and measures for the reorganiza- 
tion of the civil administration in Manchuria were undertaken 
under Japanese auspices. At its meeting in November and 
1 For the Sino-Japanese conflict, see Westel W. Willoughby, The Sino-Japa- 
nese Contro~ersy and the League of Nations; United States Department of 
State, Press Releases, November 20, 27, 1937. 
2 Willoughby, 71-72. 3 Same, 109. 
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December, 1931, the Council decided to appoint a Commissioll 
of Enquiry "to study on the spot and to report to the Council 
on any circumstallce which, affecting international relations, 
threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the 
good understanding between them, upon which peace de- 
p e n d ~ . " ~  Direct negotiations between the two parties and mili- 
tary arrangements were excluded from the terms of reference 
of the conlnlission. The United States government indicated 
its gratification at this decision, stating, "This country is con- 
cerned that the methods employed in this settlement shall, in 
harmony with the obligations of the treaties to which we are 
parties, be made in a m7ay which shall not endanger the peace 
of the world and that the result shall not be the result of 
military pressure."j On January 7, 1932, the United States an- 
nounced its policy of nonrecognition. 
On January 25, 1932, the Council resumed consideration of 
the dispute. By this time the hostilities had spread to Shanghai. 
On January 29 China made a new7 appeal under Articles 10, 11, 
and 15 of the Covenant. The Council requested the designa- 
tion of consuls at Shanghai to act as a committee to report on 
the hostilities there and also endorsed mediation by the Ameri- 
can, British, French, and Italian governments. On February 
12 China asked the Council to refer the dispute to the Assembly 
under Article 15, paragraph 9, of the Covenant. On February 
16 the members of the Council other than China and Japan 
addressed to the Japanese government an urgent appeal calling 
attention to Article 10 of the Covenant and stating that "no 
infringement of the territorial integrity and no change in the 
political independence of any hiember of the League brought 
about in disregard of that article ought to be recognized as 
valid and effectual by hiembers of the League."' 
The Council referred the dispute to the Assembly on Feb- 
ruary 19, and a Special Assembly was convened on hiarch 3. 
The next day the Assembly sdopted a resolution calling for the 
cessation of hostilities at Shanghai and recommending negotia- 
tions between Chinese and Japanese representatives, with the 
4 Same, 178. "ame, 187. G Same, 240. 
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assistance of states having special interests there. The United 
States government instructed its military authorities at Shang- 
hai to co-operate. An armistice was finally signed in May. In 
the meantime, the situation in Manchuria was progressing, the 
declaration of independence of "hlanchukuo" having been pub- 
lished on February 18. 
The Assembly continued its examination of the dispute and 
adopted on March 11, 1932, a resolution asserting a policy of 
nonrecognition, declaring that "it is incumbent upon the hlem- 
bers of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, 
treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means 
contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the 
Pact of P a r i ~ . " ~  The same resolution provided for the constitu- 
tion of a Committee of Nineteen which would report to the 
Assembly on the cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of 
Japanese forces at Shanghai; follow the execution of resolu- 
tions adopted earlier by the Council; endeavor to prepare an 
agreed settlement of the dispute; propose, if necessary, that the 
Assembly request an advisory opinion from the Permanent 
Court of International Justice; prepare, if necessary, the draft 
of a report recommending a settlement under Article 15, para- 
graph 4, of the Covenant; propose any urgent measure needed; 
and submit a progress report. The United States government 
on March 12 expressed its gratification at this resolution of 
the Assembly and especially at its adoption of the doctrine of 
nonrecognition. 
The report of the Commission of Enquiry was completed on 
September 4, 1932, and published in the various capitals on 
October 2. The findings of the commission rejected the Japa- 
nese contentions of self-defense and of a spontaneous inde- 
pendence movement in Manchuria. 
The Japanese government asked for at least six weeks in 
which to study the report. The Council heard the observations 
of the Chinese and Japanese representatives at its meeting of 
November 21-23 and voted to transmit the report to the As- 
sembly, which referred it to the Committee of Nineteen with 
7 Same, 300. 
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instructions to draw up and submit proposals of settlement. 
In  connection with this task, the committee submitted to the 
Chinese and Japanese governments draft resolutions under the 
conciliatory procedure required by Article 15, paragraph 3, of 
the Covenant. The two parties were a t  wide variance in their 
suggestions, and the Committee of Nineteen was able neither 
to find a basis for agreement between the governments nor to 
secure Japanese acceptance of any conciliatory procedure 
which the committee would be in a position to endorse. The 
committee then prepared a report, with its recommendations, 
and submitted it to the Assembly, which adopted it on Feb- 
ruary 24, 1933. The Assembly also adopted the findings of the 
Commission on Enquiry as follows: 
Without excluding the possibility that, on the night of September 
18-19, 1931, the Japanese officers on the spot may have believed 
that they were acting in self-defense, the Assembly cannot regard 
as measures of self-defense the military operations carried out on 
that night by the Japanese troops at Mukden and other places in 
Manchuria. Nor can the military measures of Japan as a whole, 
developed in the course of the dispute, be regarded as measures of 
self-defense. Moreover, the adoption of measures of self-defense 
does not exempt a state from complying with the provisions of 
Article 12 of the Covenant. 
Since September 18, 1931, the activities of the Japanese military 
authorities, in civil as well as in military matters, have been marked 
by essentially political considerations. The progressive military 
occupation of the Three Eastern Provinces removed in succession 
all the important towns in Manchuria from the control of the 
Chinese authorities, and, following each occupation, the civil ad- 
ministration was reorganized. . . . This . . . cannot be considered as 
a spontaneous and genuine independence mo~ement .~  
China accepted the Assembly's report. Japan rejected it, 
made a statement of its position, and gave notice of intention 
to withdraw from the League. 
The statement of recommendations in the report adopted by 
the Assembly was presented in three sections.' The first section 
explained that the settlement of the dispute should observe 
the provisions of the Covenant of the League, the Pact of Paris, 
8 Same, 719. 9 Same, 721-26. 
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the Nine-Power Treaty, and the Assembly resolution of March 
11, 1932. It was then stated that settlement of the dispute 
must conform to the following principles and conditions laid 
down by the Commission of Enquiry: compatibility with the 
interests of both China and Japan; consideration for the in- 
terests of the U.S.S.R.; conformity with existing multilateral 
treaties; recognition of Japan's interest in Manchuria; the 
establishment of new treaty relations between China and 
Japan; effective provision for the settlement of future disputes; 
Manchurian autonomy; internal order and security against 
external aggression; encouragement of an economic rapproche- 
ment between China and Japan; and international co-operation 
in Chinese reconstruction. The second section recommended 
the evacuation of Japanese troops present outside the South 
Manchuria Railway zone; the establishment in Manchuria of 
an organization under the sovereignty of and compatible with 
the administrative integrity of China, but with a wide measure 
of autonomy; and the settlement of questions affecting the 
"good understanding" between China and Japan by negotia- 
tions between the two parties with the assistance of an ad- 
visory committee set up by the Assembly. 
The third section of the statement of recommendations 
adopted by the Assembly reaffirmed the application of the 
doctrine of nonrecognition. "The Members of the League in- 
tend to abstain, particularly as regards the existing regime in 
Manchuria, from any act which might prejudice or delay the 
carrying out of the recommendations of the said report. They 
will continue not to recognize this regime either de iure or dc 
facto. They intend to abstain from taking any isolated action 
with regard to the situation in Manchuria and to continue to 
concert their action among themselves as well as with the 
interested states not members of the League."1° 
After the Sino-Japanese conflict broke out anew in the sum- 
mer of 1937, the Assembly adopted a resolution, on October 6, 
10 Same, 726. An advisory committee was set up to concert the action of 
member and nonmember states. The United States accepted the invitation to 
co-operate with this committee; the U.S.S.R. declined. 
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providing that the Assembly "solemnly condemns" the aerial 
bombardment of open towns in China and "expresses its moral 
support for China, and recommends that Members of the 
League should refrain from taking any action which might 
have the effect of weakening China's power of resistance and 
thus of increasing her difficulties in the present conflict, and 
should also consider how far they can individually extend aid 
to China."ll 
On November 3 the parties to the Nine-Power Treaty con- 
vened at Brussels to discuss the Sino-Japanese conflict. Japan 
refused repeated invitations to be present at this conference, 
and on November 15 a declaration was adopted asserting, in 
part, that the conflict was a matter of concern to all nations, 
that there was no warrant in law for the use of armed forces 
for intervention in the internal regime of another country, and 
that a just and lasting settlement could not be achieved by 
direct negotiations between China and Japan. The declaration 
concluded: "Though hoping that Japan will not adhere to her 
refusal the States represented at Brussels must consider what 
is to be their common attitude in a situation where one party 
to an international treaty maintains against the views of all the 
other parties that the action which it has taken does not come 
within the scope of that treaty, and sets aside provisions of the 
treaty which the other parties hold to be operative in the cir- 
cumstances."12 
Again no definite action was taken against Japan, and a few 
weeks later the conference was indefinitely adjourned, after 
adopting on November 24 another declaration expressing con- 
cern in the conflict, reaffirming the principles of the Nine-Power 
Treaty, and urging that hostilities be suspended.13 The same 
attitude was reaffirmed by the Council of the League in May 
and again in September, 1938.14 
11 League o f  Nations, Oficial  Journal, Special Supplement  No .  169, pp. 120- 
25, 148-49. 
1 2  United States Department o f  State, Press Releases, November 20, 1937, 
pp. 380-82. 
13 Same,  November 27, 1937, pp. 399-401. 
l-eague o f  Nations, Oficial  Journal, 1938, pp. 378, 878-80. 
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From this summary it will be seen that the attitude and 
policies of the League of Nations toward the Sino-Japanese 
dispute were based on a collective concern in the existence and 
settlement of international conflict. Japanese action was con- 
sidered to be in violation of the Covenant of the League, the 
Pact of Paris, and the Nine-Power Treaty. Measures based 
upon this judgment consisted of attempts at conciliation and 
mediation, use of the technique of inquiry, and finally, applica- 
tion of the doctrine of nonrecognition. Conciliation, mediation, 
and inquiry were pre-World War I techniques, but in con- 
nection with the Sino-Japanese conflict their scope was some- 
what extended in that they were used in concert by a large 
number of third states applying a common concern and atti- 
tude, rather than as the isolated efforts of a small number of 
third states acting individually. Furthermore, it was no longer 
considered that one party to the dispute could unilaterally 
reject tenders of conciliation and inquiry, retaining its freedom 
to judge the rightfulness of its own action so far as international 
law and organization were concerned. R4ethods of pacific set- 
tlement designed to restrict the scope and frequency of inter- 
national violence when each state was the recognized ultimate 
judge of the legitimacy of its own participation in war remained 
useful for attempts to restrict international violence after ac- 
ceptance of the principle of concern had provided the basis for 
third-party judgment on the validity of participation in war. 
But the context, and therefore the functional significance, of 
these traditional methods had changed. The implications of 
their rejection by one of the parties were different. What had 
formerly been the main reliance of peace efforts had become 
the first mild steps in the collective search for a peaceful solu- 
tion. Their failure now meant not a recovery of freedom of 
action by the disputants, but the occasion for the consideration 
of collective measures of greater efficacy. 
The doctrine of nonrecogntion went farther. It was applied 
for the first time as a collective sanction against one party to 
an international conflict. Neither the traditional methods nor 
the innovation was adequate to achieve their purpose in the 
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Sino-Japanese conflict. The League did not see fit to declare 
that Japan had "resorted to war" in violation of the Covenant, 
Article 16 was not invoked, and economic and military sanc- 
tions were not applied.15 It took more than nonrecognition and 
appeals to public opinion to get the Japanese army out of 
China. This case of international conflict persisted and spread; 
it was not brought under control by group action based on the 
principle of concern. 
( b )  The Chaco Dispute 
Claims to the territory known as El Gran Chaco had been a 
source of controversy between Bolivia and Paraguay for more 
than a century. An outbreak of hostilities in December, 1928, 
brought the conflict to the attention of the League Council 
and the Iiiternational Conference of American States meeting 
at Washington.'' The 1928 incidents were settled in Septem- 
ber, 1929, by a Commission of Neutrals set up by the Confer- 
ence of American States, but the basic territorial dispute was 
not resolved. Hostilities broke out once more in 1932. The 
Commission of Neutrals made efforts at mediation, and in 
August, 1932, the nineteen American republics (other than the 
parties) directed a common appeal to both Bolivia and Para- 
guay, including a warning that they would not "recognize 
any territorial arrangement which has not been obtained by 
peaceful means nor the validity of territorial acquisitions which 
may be obtained through occupation or conquest by force of 
arms."17 
The dispute continued, and the four states bordering on the 
disputants-Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru-showed an in- 
creasing tendency to intervene. The Argentine Foreign Office 
15 Great Britain did declare an embargo on certain shipments of arms to the 
Far East on February 26, 1933, but lifted it on the following March 13. 
10 For the Chaco dispute, see League of Nations, Report of the Chaco Com- 
mission; same, Oficial Journal, Special Supplement Nos. 124, 132-135; Russell 
M. Cooper, American Consultation in  World Affairs, 109-191; Helen Paul1 Kirk- 
patrick, "The League and the Chaco Dispute"; same, "The Chaco Dispute"; 
Mary Mattison, "The Chaco Arms Embargo." 
17 United States Department of State, Press Releases, August 3, 1932. 
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was especially critical, accusing the Commission of Neutrals 
of using the Monroe Doctrine to prevent action by the League 
of Nations, of which both Bolivia and Paraguay were mem- 
bers.ls The League had not assumed any jurisdiction over 
the dispute, apparently in part because of a reluctance to inter- 
fere with the Commission of Neutrals. However, there was the 
further fact that neither party to the dispute had invoked its 
aid. The Council of the League took its first active step in 
September, 1932, by appointing a Committee of Three to fol- 
low the dispute. In December, 1932, the Commission of Neu- 
trals submitted a comprehensive peace proposal, but Paraguay 
rejected it. A peace plan drafted by the foreign ministers of 
Argentina and Chile, and presented with the support of Brazil 
and Peru, likewise was not accepted. 
On May 10, 1933, Paraguay issued a declaration of war. The 
Council of the League then outlined a basis for negotiations, 
which was rejected by Bolivia. However, both parties agreed 
to accept an inquiry by the League, and the Commission of 
Neutrals withdrew in order that negotiations might be centered 
in Geneva. A League Commission of Enquiry was set up in 
Montevideo by the first week in November, 1933, and carried 
on its investigations until the middle of March, 1934. In De- 
cember, 1933, a truce was declared as a result of the co-opera- 
tion of the Pan-American Conference then meeting in Monte- 
video, but the hostilities were resumed in January. The report 
of the Commission of Enquiry set forth the geographic and 
historic aspects of the dispute, proposed a settlement, and 
recommended an embargo on the shipment of arms to both 
parties. This report was approved by the Council in May, 1934, 
and by August 1 the recommended embargo had been applied 
by twenty-eight states. The United States co-operated in this 
measure. 
The report adopted by the Council was, however, not satis- 
factory to either Bolivia or Paraguay. The former, in an at- 
tempt to have Paraguay declared the aggressor and sanctions 
applied, invoked Article 12 and then Article 15 of the Cove- 
18 See Kirkpatrick, "The League and the Chaco Dispute," 111. 
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nant, and asked to have the dispute referred to the Assembly. 
Paraguay, for its part, made a number of observations on the 
report and in effect rejected it, alleging among other things 
that it was partial to the Bolivian viewpoint. Further efforts 
of other American states to settle the dispute during the sum- 
mer of 1933 proved futile. 
The Assembly of the League at its meeting in September re- 
ferred the question to its Sixth (Political) Committee. Paraguay 
objected to the application of Article 15, claiming that it did 
not cover a case where war had already broken out and con- 
ciliation had been attempted. That government preferred con- 
ciliation under Article 11 and recourse to the Permanent Court. 
Paraguay argued that the words "likely to lead to a rupture" 
could not apply when the rupture had already occurred and 
had led to war. The question of the correctness of this con- 
tention was referred to the First (Legal) Committee, which 
decided that the words quoted were meant to exclude minor 
and unimportant disputes. Otherwise, a member of the League 
could evade the application of sanctions against itself merely 
by issuing a declar~~tion of war. The Assembly then proceeded 
to discuss the arms embargo, particularly the question of 
whether it should be applied to both parties rather than only 
to the one designated as an aggressor. 
As a result of its deliberations the Assembly adopted on Sep- 
tember 27, 1934, a resolution calling for conciliation under 
Article 15, paragraph 3. This task was entrusted to a Con- 
ciliation Committee composed of the members of the Council 
and certain other states. If conciliation failed, the committee 
was to draw up a report containing a statement of the facts, 
recommendations for settlement, and any further measures 
for arms prohibition that might be necessary. Both parties 
persisted in their hostile attitudes, and the committee had to 
abandon its negotiations looking to a settlement. In November 
it drew up the report contemplated in the circumstances by its 
instructions. This report was adopted by the Assembly in an 
extraordinary session on November 20, 1934. Both Bolivia 
and Paraguay were severely criticized for failure to appeal to 
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the League immediately upon the outbreak of war. The recom- 
mendations proposed the cessation of hostilities and settlement 
of the substantive question. A detailed procedure was outlined 
for withdrawal of both armies under international supervision, 
for the taking of measures to insure the maintenance of peace, 
for the final delimitation of the frontier, and for arriving at the 
economic clauses of the treaty of peace. With reference to the 
arms embargo the report adopted by the Assembly included 
the following resolution: "The Assembly, having regard to the 
exceptional circumstances of the present case, and without in 
any way creating a precedent, approves, as one of the measures 
to obtain and maintain cessation of hostilities, the prohibition 
of supply of arms and war material to Bolivia and Paraguay, 
and it recommends to the members of the League of Nations 
in the subsequent decisions which they may have to take as 
regards the maintenance, possible modification or withdrawal 
of such prohibition, to have regard to the action taken by each 
of the Parties upon the Assembly's  recommendation^."^^ 
This report and proposed settlement was accepted by Bolivia 
but rejected by Paraguay.'' The Advisory Committee which 
had been constituted by the Assembly to assist in co-ordinating 
the action of the various governments recommended on Jan- 
uary 16, 1935, that the embargo on arms shipments to Bolivia 
be lifted. No mention was made of Article 16, but there was 
an implication that Paraguay should be considered the aggres- 
sor. Otherwise, why a recommendation of adverse differential 
treatment for that country? During February eleven states, 
including some of the principal arms manufacturing countries, 
lifted the arms embargo against Bolivia. However, the United 
States maintained the dual embargo, and no Latin American 
member of the League raised the embargo against Bolivia. 
The discriminatory embargo failed to settle the dispute, just 
as the impartial one had. One result, however, was that Para- 
guay gave notice of its withdrawal from the League, as Japan 
had done two years before. 
19 League of Nations, Oficial Jou~.nul, Special Supplement No. 132, p. 51. 
20 The Paraguayan army was overwhelmingly victorious at this particular 
time. 
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The questions of the legal consequences of Paraguay's with- 
drawal and of the possibility of invoking Article 16 were raised 
when the Advisory Committee met on March 11, 1935. It was 
evident that further sanctions could be applied only after a 
determination that there had been a resort to war within the 
meaning of Article 16. Three different proposals were sub- 
mitted. The first, suggested by the U.S.S.R., favored immedi- 
ate application of sanctions against Paraguay for rejection of 
the Assembly's recommendation. The second, urged by Italy, 
proposed that the question be referred to the Permanent Court, 
since sanctions could not be applied until there was an identi- 
fication of the original aggressor. The third proposal, favored 
by France, suggested that the South American states recom- 
mend the next steps to be taken. Determining the aggressor 
was a difficult problem. Neither party had submitted the dis- 
pute in its earlier stages to the League, and this constituted a 
violation of the Covenant. When the League assumed jurisdic- 
tion, war had already broken out. Assuming that a clear de- 
termination of the original fault could be made, two alternatives 
would be possible. If Paraguay were held responsible, the 
original aggressor and the party rejecting the Assembly's 
recommendations would be one and the same. No great dif- 
ficulty would seem to arise in reaching a definitive conclusion 
about the proper object of sanctions. However, if Bolivia 
were held to be the original aggressor, the question would 
arise whether a violator of the Covenant could remove the 
stigma of aggression by subsequent compliance with the 
League's recommendations for the settlement of a conflict for 
whose origin it was responsible. 
As a matter of fact, it was decided to leave the decision to 
an extraordinary session of the Assembly, convoked for May 
20. However, an American group of mediators had been set 
up a few weeks earlier, and on May 18 the two belligerents 
accepted the principle of direct negotiations. The Assembly, 
meeting two days later, was therefore able to take note of this 
progress, to express its hope that successful results would be 
achieved, and to authorize the Advisory Committee to follow 
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the negotiations and report to the Assembly in September. 
During the summer hostilities ceased,21 and a peace conference 
opened at Buenos Aires on July 1, 1935. Demobilization and 
the restoration of the war area to its previous civilian uses 
proceeded with little difficulty, but settlement of the issues in 
controversy was not achieved even after several months of 
negotiations. However, on October 28 the peace conference 
announced that although no settlement of the war guilt and 
territorial questions had been reached, the war itself had come 
to an end. 
The Chaco dispute presented a difficult and complicated 
situation. The efforts to settle it were many, long, and tedious. 
The cessation of hostilities was finally achieved, but certainly 
that circumstance was by no means a brilliant or clear-cut 
victory for the processes of peaceful settlement. However, the 
above sketch of the main points in the attempts at settlement 
reveals the expression of a collective concern in the existence 
of international conflict, an application of the doctrine of non- 
recognition, and a discrimination through an arms embargo of 
the party rejecting the recommendations made by the Assem- 
bly of the League. Measures based upon the principle of con- 
cern were utilized to an extent, and it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the resulting collective pressure had something 
to do with restraining the scope and duration of this particular 
incident of international conflict. 
( c )  The Italo-Ethiopian W a r  
The relation of the collective attitude in the Italo-Ethiopian 
War to the principle of concern can be stated simply. That 
principle was used, but partially and ineffectively. Italy was 
the first member of the Leaguez2 ever to be found guilty of a 
"resort to war" in violation of the Covenant, and the attack on 
21 By this time Paraguay had met with reverses and the war had developed 
into a wearisome stalemate for both sides. 
2 U n d  the only one, except for the expulsion of the Soviet Union for the 
attack on Finland in 1939 after World War I1 had already started. 
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Ethiopia was the only incident in which the sanctions of Article 
16 were invoked. 
Several futile attempts were made by the League to find a 
solution for the dispute which led to the Italo-Ethiopian War 
of 1935-1938, but the Italian government persisted in rejecting 
all efforts for a peaceful ~ e t t l e m e n t . ~ ~  On October 3, 1935, 
Italian military airplanes bombarded Adowa and Adigrat, and 
a battle took place in the province of Agame. These events 
were characterized by Italy as "necessary measures of defense" 
resulting from the Ethiopian general mobilization of September 
28 and the "continual and sanguinary aggression to which 
Italy has been subjected in the last ten years." The Ethiopian 
government claimed that these facts occurring in Ethiopian 
territvry involved a violation of the frontiers of the empire and 
a breach of the Covenant by Italian aggression. 
The League was thus confronted with the necessity for some 
decision and some action. Alternative major conclusions may 
be drawn from this affair. The first is that the sanctions of 
Article 16, based as they were on the principle of concern, 
were applied and that the application was ineffective. The 
second is that the application of sanctions was based less on 
acceptance of the principle of concern than on the limitation 
by interpretation which had occurred early in the history of 
the League.*" 
The finding of the Council committee set up to make a report 
on the affair was that "the Italian Government has resorted to 
war in disregard of its covenants under Article XI1 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations." On October 7, 1935, the 
states represented upon the Council accepted this verdict, "re- 
cording their opinions individually; thus each State decided 
for itself on thz evidence that resort to war had taken place 
"For accounts of thc Italo-Ethiopian War and the application of sanctions, 
see League of Nations, O$cial Journal, 1935, pp. 639-43, 720-59; same, Special 
Supplcment Nos. 138, 145-151; Royal Institute of International Affairs, Docu- 
ments on International Affairs, 1935, 11; same, Internutional Sanctions; Rappard, 
The Quest fo-r Peace, 188-205, 279-317; Quincy Wright, "The Test of Aggres- 
sion in the Italo-Ethiopian War," American Jo~rrnal of International Law, X X X  
(1936), 27-44; Walters, A History of the League of Nations, 11, 623-91. 
*"ee Chapter 111, section 2. 
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in disregard of obligations under Article 12, and having so 
decided recognized that the specific case for the application 
of the measures prescribed in Article 16 had arisen." 
- 
The Assembly was convened on October 9, and the next day 
the same conclusions were accepted (silence being construed 
as acceptance) by all the member states except Italy, Austria, 
Hungary, and Albania. In the voting, the individual assent of 
each government was required. 
A Co-ordination Committee consisting of all members of the 
Assembly except the belligerent states was appointed to make 
recommendations upon the detailed application of sanctions. 
During October the Co-ordination Committee recommended 
that the arms embargo which certain states had applied against 
Italy and Ethiopia be raised from the latter and that there be 
applied against Italy an arms embargo, a credit embargo, an 
import boycott, an export embargo on certain key products, 
and a provision for mutual support in the application of eco- 
nomic and financial measures. The committee then adjourned 
and left a Subcommittee of Eighteen to continue the co-ordi- 
nation of sanctions, which went into effect on November 18. 
The interpretative principle that sanctions may be applied 
gradually and partially was followed. The application of 
sanctions was delayed, and many key products were omitted 
from the embargo list. Under the circumstances oil was the 
most important material to be excluded. The extension of the 
export embargo to oil and other strategic products was dis- 
cussed, but no action was taken. The "peculiar position" of 
various states was also a factor in the application of sanctions 
against Italy. The proposals of the Co-ordination Committee 
were accepted by all the states members of the League except 
Albania, Austria, Ecuador, Hungary, and Paraguay. (Guate- 
mala, Honduras, and Salvador accepted "in principle.") 25 
"Albania declined to take action, in view of her alliance with Italy. Para- 
guay took no part, as her notice of withdrawal from the League had been given 
on February 24, 1935. The German government took measures to control ab- 
normal trading operations. No action was taken by Japan and Brazil. Egypt 
was the only nonmember of the League to participate in the application of 
sanctions. The United States on October 3 recognized a state of war as existing 
and applied an arms embargo against both belligerents. 
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The representative of Austria stated in the Assembly on 
October 9: "Loyalty towards the League makes it incumbent 
upon my Government at once to draw your attention to the 
serious dangers which sanctions will inevitably entail in the 
economic life of Europe, in particular for those smaller States 
- - 
whose capacity for economic and financial resistance has been 
considerably reduced by the unfavourable conditions imposed 
upon them. My Government is not thinking only of Austria, 
but also of its ~ r e d i t o r s . " ~ ~  
On the same occasion the Hungarian representative said: 
As regards economic sanctions, Hungary is in a very special position. 
In numerous reports and resolutions of the League of Nations con- 
cerning Article 16 of the Covenant, it has been laid down that 
account must be taken of the special conditions and requirements 
of certain countries and that certain forms of economic action 
might produce very harmful effects on the very countries which 
adopt them and might, indeed, involve these countries in serious 
danger. Consequently, I think that it would be more in keeping 
with the League's aims to allow Members of the League some de- 
gree of latitude. Nobody can be better aware than the Council, 
which has for years been supervising the finances of Hungary, of 
the economic and financial difficulties experienced by my country. 
The exclusion of Italy from Hungary's restricted and limited trade 
outlets would completely upset our economic and financial equili- 
brium, which has hitherto been preserved at great cost, largely by 
means of export to Italy.27 
Switzerland made certain reservations and on October 12 
regretted her inability to enforce the import embargo because 
of her Italian population. The statement of its representative 
is of particular interest. He  said: 
The status of the Swiss Confederation, in so far as its external 
relations are concerned, continues to be governed by the principle 
of neutrality. This is the outcome of the history, traditions, written 
constitution, and racial composition of the country. Our neutrality 
26 League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 138, 1935, p. 
101; Royal Institute of International Affairs, Docztments on International Affairs, 
1935, 11, 185-86. 
27 League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 138, 1935, p. 
101; Royal Institute of International Affairs, Docttments on International Affairs, 
1935, 11, 187. 
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is incorporated in international law; it has been recognized as being 
in conforlnity with the interest, firstly, of Europe, and secondly of 
the entire world; the declaration made in London by the Council 
of the League of Nations on February 13, 1920, confirmed it in 
solemn terms. The Confederation would not have agreed to enter 
the League if the price of its participation had been the abandon- 
ment of its ancient status. Everything that we have seen, observed, 
and experienced at Geneva since 1920 has confirmed us in the con- 
viction that our attitude was a wise one. 
Consequently, our general obligations to take part in economic 
and financial sanctions to the exclusion of any military sanctions, is 
not absolute, but must be interpreted in the light of the resolution 
of 1921 regarding the economic weapon. The limits of our obliga- 
tion are determined by our neutrality, which, in our opinion, con- 
stitutes a fundamental principle and at the same time a vital in- 
terest. We do not feel ourselves bound to take part in sanctions 
which, by their nature and effect, would expose our neutrality to 
real dangers-dangers which we must judge in the full exercise of 
our so~ereignty.?~ 
The modification of the application of sanctions by taking 
account of the "peculiar position" of the member states was, 
however, by no means confined to the governments making 
the formal declarations quoted above. France, for example, 
found that the price of carrying out the obligations of Article 
16 would be the alienation of a possible ally against Germany. 
As one observer saw it, the French hoped "that they might be 
able to sabotage the application of the Covenant against Italy 
in order to preserve this self-same Covenant intact for future 
use against Germany-with a triumphant Italian Covenant- 
breaker helping France, in the name of the Covenant, to hold 
Germany in check!"2Q 
Thus, in the only effort of the League to apply sanctions 
under Article 16, each state decided for itself whether an oc- 
casion for the invocation of sanctions had arisen, the coercive 
measures were applied gradually and partially, and the "pe- 
28 League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 138, 1935, pp. 
106, 107; Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International 
Alqairs, 1935, 11, 189, 190. 
2Urnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1935, 11, 4. It is, of 
course, obvious that the fundamental axiom of diplomacy is concern for the 
"peculiar position" of one's state. 
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culiar positions" of the member states had to be taken into con- 
sideration. In fact, the application of sanctions was gradual 
and partial to the extent that the apparent obligation of im- 
mediate and con~plete severance of economic relations was 
interpreted and limited so that only those supplies not vitally 
needed by the aggressor were withheld. As Rappard wrote, 
"The sanctions finally agreed to and applied were extremely 
mild. They in fact merely tended to hamper Italy's foreign 
trade, to limit her imports of war materials, not including oil, 
and to weigh on her balance of payments."30 
Little need be said of the outcome of this one case of the 
application of sanctions. Italy proceeded to conquer Ethiopia 
and to present the League with a embarrassing fait  accompli. 
The failure of sanctions was officially recognized by the As- 
sembly on July 4, 1936. The discussions of the preceding few 
days centered around the theme of recognizing the inevitable. 
Finally, a vote was taken on a resolution declaring faithful 
adherence to Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant, affirming the 
- 
doctrine of nonrecognition, and recommending assistance to 
Ethiopia. This resolution was lost by a majority of 23 to 1, with 
25 governments abstaining." 
Sanctions as applied did not restrain Italy, save Ethiopia, 
or implement collective security. As a matter of fact, half- 
hearted and ineffective sanctions were probably worse than 
none. The following paragraph is worth pondering not only 
in connection with the Italo-Ethiopian War, but also because 
it provides an illustration of one kind of pitfall to be avoided 
in attempts at the control of international conflict: 
As it turned out . . . the action of the League was not only 
negative as far as stopping Italy was concerned. It was actually of 
positive zssistance to her rulers. One of the jokes current in Rome 
after the war was over was a saying that the Italian Empire had 
been founded by Cavour, Mussolini, and the League of Nations. 
To the Fascist Government, in fact, sanctions were a godsend. Up 
to that moment the country was far from being united by the 
30 The Qzmt  for Peace, 298. 
31 ~eag ;e  of Nations, Records of the Sixtecntll Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 
68. 
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adventure. During the preparatory period, as Marshal De Rono 
himself admits, there were constant grumblings on the home front. 
Defeatism was rampant and was encouraged by reports of dis- 
organization in the colonies. Many Italians were saying openly 
that the enterprise was too difficult and would lead them to ruin. 
There were rumours of disaffection between the Army and the 
Fascist Party and even of a rift between the King and Mussolini. 
But as soon as it became clear that Italy was to be penalized all 
opposition was silenced. A common indignation welded the nation 
together.32 
Without ever becoming a member, the United States played 
an important role in the development of the League system. 
We have seen that the United States took a leading part in 
securing acceptance of the principle of concern after World 
War I, in limiting that acceptance by its rejection of the Cove- 
nant, and in &orking out a modified application especially in 
connection with the Pact of Paris and the Stimson Doctrine. 
It is therefore appropriate to inquire whether the United States 
took any comparable leading part in the fourth and last phase 
of the principle of concern during the period 1933-1939. In 
connection with such an inquiry, the question arises of the 
relation of the policy and attitude of the United States to the 
- 
major incidents of international conflict handled by the League 
of Nations. 
Before considering the relation of the United States toward 
the League's position with respect to three major incidents of 
international conflict, it is important to note that the principle 
of concern was accepted to some extent by the United States 
government. That was basic to the Pact of Paris and the 
Stimson Doctrine. The Roosevelt administration continued this 
tradition. The idea that international conflict anywhere is the 
32 George Martelli, Italy Against the World, 163. Rappard reached the same 
conclusion, saying, "As it was, the action of the League, sufficiently unfriendly 
to arouse the national pride of the Fascist Kingdom, yet insufficiently drastic 
and determined to deter her daring but realistic leader from the undertaking on 
which he had set his heart, hastened rather than impeded the conquest of 
Ethiopia." The Quest for Peace, 298. 
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concern of all nations was stated on a number of occasions by 
the President and the Secretary of State, and Roosevelt's 
famous "quarantine" speech of October 5, 1937, contained the 
statement: "The peace-loving nations must make a concerted 
effort in opposition to those violations of treaties and those 
ignorings of humane instincts which today are creating a state 
of international anarchy and instability from which there is no 
escape through mere isolation or neutrality. . . . International 
anarchy destroys every foundation for peace. I t  jeopardizes 
either the immediate or the future security of every nation, 
large or small.''33 
The position of the United States with respect to the Sino- 
Japanese and Chaco disputes will now be summarized briefly, 
and some of the problems raised by the application of sanctions 
against Italy will be indicated. 
It will be recalled that the United States took the lead in 
applying the doctrine of nonrecognition against the Japanese 
conquest of Manchuria. When hostilities again broke out in 
the summer of 1937, the question of application of the Neu- 
trality Act of 1935 became relevant. During the Italo-Ethi- 
opian controversy the President accepted "the engaging of 
armed forces in combat" as the test of the existence of war. 
This was certainly happening in China; yet the Neutrality Act 
was not invoked. This time the definition of war posited cer- 
tain formalities in addition to actual "armed invasion and a 
resultant killing of human beings." In a statement of policy 
with respect to the Sino-Japanese controversy Secretary Hull 
said on August 23 that "from the beginning of the present con- 
troversy in the Far East, we have been urging upon the Chinese 
and the Japanese Governments the importance of refraining 
from hostilities and of maintaining peace. We have been par- 
ticipating constantly in consultation with interested govern- 
ments directed toward peaceful adjustment. This Government 
does not believe in political alliances or entanglements, nor 
does it believe in extreme i~ola t ion ."~~ 
33 United States Department of State, Press Releases, October 9, 1937. 
34 Same, August 25, 1937. 
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On September 14 the President issued a statement pro- 
hibiting merchant vessels owned by the United States govern- 
ment from transporting arms, ammunition, and implements of 
war to China or Japan, and giving notice that any privately 
owned American merchant vessels would transport such car- 
goes at their own risk. The President's statement added, "The 
question of applying the Neutrality Act remains in statu quo, 
the Government policy remaining on a twenty-four hour 
basis."35 
On October 5, 1937, President Roosevelt made his famous 
"quarantine" speech in Chicago, one of the purposes of which 
was to test public reaction toward some sort of collecive action 
to restrain aggression. He said in that speech: "We are de- 
termined to keep out of war, yet we cannot insure ourselves 
against the disastrous effects of war and the dangers of involve- 
ment. We are adopting such measures as will minimize our 
risk of involvement, but we cannot have complete protection 
in a world of disorder in which confidence and security have 
broken down."36 
In reference to the resolution adopted by the Assembly of 
the League on October 6, the United States government asserted 
that the action of Japan in China was contrary to the Nine- 
Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris, and that "the conclusions 
of this Government . . . are in general accord with those of the 
Assembly of the League of  nation^."^^ The United States took 
a leading part in convening the Nine-Power Conference which 
met at Brussels on November 3. The conference produced 
nothing practical, however, and the policy of the United States 
toward the Sino-Japanese conflict remained "in statu qzl0"- 
hostilities were continued, no collective action was taken to 
stop the conflict, and the Neutrality Act was not applied. 
If the Sino-Japanese conflict was an instance of co-operation 
with the League by the United States, the Chaco dispute was 
one of parallel action in applying an arms embargo against 
both parties, but not in subsequently lifting it to discriminate 
35 Same, September 18, 1937. 36 Same, October 9, 1937, p. 279. 
37 Same, October 9, 1937. 
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against Paraguay. The 1934 session of Congress enacted no 
arms embargo legislation which contemplated modification of 
the neutrality policy of the United States or which was passed 
primarily as a means of safeguarding American neutrality. 
However, Congress did authorize the President to prohibit the 
sale of arms and munitions of war in the United States to the 
Chaco belligerents. 
Congressional action in this matter coincided with an at- 
- 
tempt by the League of Nations to secure a general arms 
embargo against Bolivia and Paraguay. At the Council meet- 
ing of hlay 17, 1934, while the report of the Chaco Commis- 
sion of Enquiry was under discussion, the British government 
- 
raised the question of an arms embargo as a contribution to 
bringing hostilities to an enda3' Two days later the Council 
adopted a resolution requesting a Committee of Three to pro- 
ceed with the necessary consultations. On May 20 a telegram 
was sent to the United States Secretary of State seeking in- 
formation about whether his government was prepared to par- 
ticipate with other governments in prohibiting the sale of arms 
and munitions of war to Bolivia and Paraguay. On May 22 
Secretary Hull recommended favorable action on resolutions 
which had recently been introduced into Congress and which 
were designed to prohibit the sale of arms to the two countries. 
The House resolution was passed the next day; the Senate con- 
curred on hlay 24; the President gave his approval on May 28 
and issued a proclamation putting the act into e f f e~ t .~"  
The Bolivian government immediately protested against such 
action by the United States, alleging in a note of June 1 that 
the prohibition was in violation of a treaty of 1858 in effect 
between the United States and Bolivia, which provided, "nor 
- 
shall any prohibition be imposed on the importation or exporta- 
tion of any articles, the produce or manufactures of the Re- 
public of Bolivia or of the United States, which shall not 
equally extend to all other nations." It was further contended 
38 League of Nations, Oficial Journal, 1934, pp. 754-56. 
3Wnited St ~ t e s  Congress, Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 2d Seis , 9375, 
9428, 9430, 9432-34, United States Department of State, Press Relec~scs, June 2, 
1934. 
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that the prohibition was unfair to Bolivia because Paraguay 
enjoyed access to an international waterwaya40 Secretary Hull 
in a note of June 13 answered these contentions by pointing 
out, first, that the treaty of 1858 related to importation and 
exportation while the resolution prohibited only the sale of 
arms and munitions of war in the United States to the Chaco 
belligerents, and second, that the international waterway was 
of no advantage to Paraguay because that country was pro- 
hibited from obtaining by any means of transportation arms 
and munitions of war sold in the United States. 
The prohibition on the sale of arms and munitions in the 
United States remained applicable to both parties until it was 
revoked by a proclamation of November 14, 1935, effective 
from November 29, after the peace conference at Buenos Aires 
had adopted on October 28, 1935, a resolution declaring that 
the war between Bolivia and Paraguay had come to an end. 
Upon the outbreak of the Italo-Ethiopian War the immediate 
question for the United States was whether the provisions of 
the Neutrality Act of 1935 were applicable to the conflict. 
Neither country had declared war; yet hostilities were being 
conducted on a rather extensive scale. Whether or not an 
embargo should be declared by the United States government 
depended on whether or not war had "broken out" or was "in 
progress." President Roosevelt adopted as a test of the exist- 
ence of war the engaging of armed forces in combat. In a 
statement made at the time he issued an embargo proclamation 
on October 5, he said, "we are now compelled to recognize the 
simple and indisputable fact that Ethiopian and Italian armed 
forces are engaged in combat, thus creating a state of war 
within the intent and meaning of the joint res~lut ion."~~ In 
his Armistice Day address a little more than a month later the 
President said, "We are acting to simplify definitions and facts 
by calling war 'war' when armed invasion and a resulting kill- 
ing of human beings takes place."42 
Definition of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict as war was in 
40 United States Department of State, Press Releases, June 16, 1934. 
4 1  Same, October 5, 1935. 42 Same, November 16, 1935. 
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advance of such action by other nations. The members of the 
Council of the League agreed on October 7 that Italy had 
"resorted to war" in violation of its obligations under Article 12 
of the Covenant, and this position was immediately accepted 
by the states represented in the Assembly." Such a situation 
might raise the interesting question of whether the juridical 
position of the United States was, for a few days, different 
from that of other states. Would Italy and Ethiopia have bel- 
ligerent rights and duties with respect to the United States, 
but not toward any other nation? Perhaps it could be argued 
that war within the meaning of the joint resolution was not 
necessarily war in the international sense. 
The declaration of an arms embargo also raised the question 
of a definition of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, 
since the joint resolution passed by Congress provided that 
"the President, by proclamation, shall definitely enumerate the 
arms, ammunition, or implements of war, the export of which 
is prohibited by this Act." There was some question of whether 
all supplies essential to the conduct of war could by definition 
be included in such a category. However, it was interpreted 
by the President as including only those "munitions of war" 
used in actual combat between armed forces. This interpreta- 
tion was in accordance with the clear intent of Congress. A 
specific grant of power to impose an embargo on all supplies 
used in war had not been included in the joint resolution, and 
on the Senate floor it had been understood that the more 
restricted interpretation was to be given to this particular part 
of the act.44 The list of articles to be considered arms, am- 
munition, or implements of war was included in the Presi- 
dent's embargo proclamation. The list was identical with that 
adopted, on recommendation of the National Munitions Control 
Board, by a proclamation of September 25 for the administra- 
tion of section two of the act. It included substantially the 
same articles as the Geneva Arms Trade Convention, the most 
43 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Aflairs, 
1935, 11, 183-91. 
44 United States Congress, Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 
13954. 
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important difference being that certain gases named in the 
President's proclamation were not in the Geneva agreement. 
When the embargo proclamation was issued, it also became 
unlawful, under Section 3 of the joint resolution, for any Ameri- 
can vessel "to carry any arms, ammunition, or implements of 
war to any port of the belligerent countries . . . or to any 
neutral port for transshipment to, or for the use of, a belligerent 
country." On the same day (October 5) the President issued 
a second proclamation giving notice that any citizen of the 
United States who might travel on a vessel of either of the 
belligerents contrary to the provisions of the joint resolution 
would do so at his own risk. There was no occasion to place 
restrictions on the use of American ports by submarines or as 
a base of supply for belligerent warships. 
The policy of the United States government toward the 
Italo-Ethiopian conflict, as announced by the President, went 
further than was required by the act of Congress. In his state- 
ment which accompanied the embargo proclamation President 
Roosevelt, after referring to the "state of war" between Ethi- 
opian and Italian armed forces, said, "In these specific circum- 
stances I desire it to be understood that any of our people who 
voluntarily engage in transactions of any character with either 
of the belligerents do so at their own risk."45 
The determination that the United States should not become 
involved in a foreign war, rather than the purpose to protect 
the full legal rights of every citizen, was presented as the 
fundamental policy of the Roosevelt administration. The Presi- 
dent in his speech of October 2, 1935, at San Diego said, "We 
not only earnestly desire peace, but we are moved by a stern 
determination to avoid those perils that will endanger our 
peace with the 
The Secretary of State, when asked in a press conference of 
October 10 to elaborate on the policy of "transactions at risk," 
replied: "The warning given by the President in his proclama- 
tion concerning travel on belligerent ships and his general 
45 United States Department of State, Press Releases, October 5, 1935. 
46 Same, October 12, 1935. 
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warning that during the war any of our people who voluntarily 
engage in transactions of any character with either of the bel- 
ligerents do so at their own risk were based upon the policy 
and purpose of keeping this country out of war-keeping it 
from being drawn into war. It  certainly was not intended to 
encourage transactions with the belligerents."" In a radio ad- 
dress of October 15, 1935, to the New York Herald Tribune 
Forum on Current Affairs he said that "we are determined not 
to enter into armed conflicts that may arise between other 
countries, and to enforce such policies as may be required to 
avoid that risk. On these matters the great majority of the 
American people are agreed."47 
The President, while at sea on the U.S.S. Houston, sent a 
message which was read by h4rs. Roosevelt on October 17 to 
the Fifth Annual Women's Conference on Current Problen~s. 
After referring to the vital interest of women in the preserva- 
tion of peace, the message continued with the statement that 
"I have pledged myself to do my part in keeping America 
free of those entanglements that move us along the road to 
war."47 
But all interest in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict and its possible 
complications could not be renounced. Expressed devotion to 
the ideal of world peace could not be reconciled with indif- 
ference to the possibility of unnecessarily prolonging a war 
anywhere in the world. The official position on this point was 
well summarized in an address of the Secretary of State on 
"Our Foreign Policy with Respect to Neutrality," written for 
delivery over the radio on the evening of November 6, 1935. 
The address concluded with the following words: 
Moreover, we should not concentrate entirely on means for re- 
maining neutral and lose sight of other constructive methods of 
avoiding involvement in wars between other countries. Our foreign 
policy would indeed be a weak one if it began or ended with the 
announcement of a neutral position on the outbreak of a foreign 
war. I conceive it to be our duty and in the interest of our country 
and of humanity, not only to remain aloof from disputes and con- 
47 Same, October 19, 1935. 
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flicts with which we have no direct concern, but also to use our 
influence in any appropriate way to bring about the peaceful settle- 
ment of international differences. Our own interest and our duty 
as a great power forbid that we shall sit idly by and watch the 
development of hostilities with a feeling of self-sufficiency and com- 
placency when by the use of our influence, short of becoming 
involved in the dispute itself, we might prevent or lessen the scourge 
of war. In short, our policy as a member of the community of 
nations should be twofold: first, to avoid being brought into a war, 
and second, to promote as far as possible the interests of inter- 
national peace and good will. A virile policy tempered with prudent 
caution is necessary if we are to retain the respect of other nations 
and at the same time hold our position of influence for peace and 
international stability in the family of nations. 
In summary, while our primary aim should be to avoid involve- 
ment in other people's difficulties and hence to lessen our chances 
of being drawn into a war, we should, on appropriate occasions 
and within reasonable bounds, use our influence toward the pre- 
vention of war and the miseries that attend and follow in its wake. 
For after all, if peace obtains, problems regarding neutrality will 
not arise.48 
Did the United States exert any effective influence for peace 
in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict? 
The Emperor of Ethiopia had chosen the anniversary of 
American independence as a dramatic time at which to ask 
the American government to examine means of securing ob- 
servance of the Pact of Paris. The answer of the United States 
expressed gratification that the League of Nations was giving 
its attention to the controversy and that arbitration was in 
progress. The Ethiopian appeal to the Pact of Paris received 
no answer beyond the statement that the United States govern- 
ment "would be loath to believe that either of them [Italy and 
Ethiopia] would resort to other than pacific means as a method 
of dealing with this controversy or would permit any situation 
to arise which would be inconsistent with the commitments of 
the Pact."49 
The neutrality resolution of August 31, 1935, and the procla- 
mations issued under its authorization, whatever their merits 
48 Same, November 9, 1935. 49 Same, July 6, 1935, 
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as an American policy, had little power to prevent or discour- 
age the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. According to the best figures 
available to the State Department the value of exports of war 
matkriel to Italy and Italian colonies from January 1, 1935, to 
September 23, 1935, was about $340,000 (nearly all of which 
was accounted for by airplane engines and parts), as compared 
with no exports of this type to Ethiopia or French S~maliland.'~ 
An embargo on "arms, ammunition, and implements of war" 
would have no effect on Ethiopia, which was not getting such 
articles from the United States anyhow. Italy had munitions 
factories and was in a position to fabricate her own arms, pro- 
vided the necessary raw materials were available. The warning 
to American citizens that they traveled on the vessels of a 
belligerent at their own risk may have led to some loss to 
Italian steamship lines, but could hardly be classed as a deter- 
rent to war. 
Since the League of Nations was attempting to stop Mus- 
solini's African campaign by the imposition of sanctions, the 
most important test of the war-prevention influence of Ameri- 
can policy must be found in the effects of that policy on the 
efforts of the League. In this connection two questions must 
be considered: ( I )  As no neutrality policy can be completely 
impartial in effect, were the results of American action more 
favorable to the nation against which the League was acting 
or to the other party? ( 2 )  Was the American policy a hindrance 
to the action of the League?51 
The answer to the first of these questions might seem to be 
obvious. Since Italy could obtain, and had been obtaining, 
some arms and the like from the United States, while Ethiopia 
could not do so, the result of an arms embargo was simply to 
shut off the supply to Italy. Also, since Ethiopia had no mer- 
chant marine, that country could not be adversely affected 
50 Same, October 5, 1935. 
51 The answer to the first of these questions is obviously a factor in the 
answer to the second. The distinction made here is that between the effect of 
American policy on the two belligerents and the relation of that policy to action 
of the League relative to the belligerents. 
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by a warning to American citizens not to travel on the vessels 
of a belligerent nation. The superficial view that an American 
policy of impartiality would in effect be adverse to Italy as 
compared with Ethiopia must be abandoned, however, when it 
is considered that the heart of the question about which coun- 
try would be adversely affected lay in the problem of whether 
an embargo would be imposed on all supplies essential to the 
conduct of a war. Italy could manufacture arms, but needed 
American raw materials, such as oil, scrap metal, and cotton. 
If the United States had included raw materials in its embargo 
of "munitions of war," the result would have been a serious 
handicap to Italy. Under the particular circumstances the real 
incidence of an American embargo depended on what was 
included in the list of prohibited articles. Restriction of the 
list of articles used in actual combat was more favorable to 
Italy than an extension of the list to all articles essential to the 
conduct of a war. Once it was decided to impose an embargo, 
the alternatives were a restricted or extended list of embargoed 
articles. Ethiopia was not able to obtain supplies from the 
United States in any case, and it was to the interest of Italy 
for the United States to adopt a restricted list. 
At the time, the possibility also had to be taken into con- 
sideration that there might be a war between Italy and certain 
League states, particularly Great Britain. In that case the situa- 
tion would be quite different. It might seem that refusal of 
the United States to impose an embargo on all war supplies 
would give Italy a better chance to defend herself, but if it 
could be assumed that the navies of Great Britain and her 
allies would control the seas, Italy would be cut off from 
American supplies, unless, of course, the United States was 
prepared to insist with force on its right to trade with Italy. 
In such conditions the more restricted the list of articles em- 
bargoed by the United States the more supplies the enemies 
of Italy could get from this country. Thus, exactly the same 
impartial neutrality policy would have entirely different impli- 
cations for a given belligerent, merely by reason of the addition 
of another party to the conflict. 
D I S I N T E G R A T I O N  139 
The relation between League policy and American policy 
raised a serious problem. This was especially true because the 
very materials most essential to Italy, such as oil and cotton, 
were precisely the ones which it would have been most dif- 
ficult for the League to control without American co-operation. 
When the United States Congress did not place an embargo 
on all war materials or give the President power to do so in 
co-operation with other nations, the members of the League 
faced the possibility of cutting off supplies to Italy only to find 
their trade diverted to American competitors. The United 
States government was also in a dilemma. If the members of 
the League placed an embargo on the shipment of essential 
war materials to Italy, the United States might be left in the 
position of conflict with the League in its efforts to prevent 
war. On the other hand, if the United States followed the 
policies of the League, the Roosevelt administration would lay 
itself open to the politically damaging charge of attempting to 
involve the country in "entangling alliances" and "League 
wars." 
In this situation the League restricted its embargoes to 
zrticles of which a relatively large part could be controlled by 
the members of the League, while the Roosevelt administra- 
tion undertook to discourage shipments of war materials to 
Italy in excess of normal peacetime trade. Under a recom- 
mendation adopted by the Assembly of the League, the Co- 
ordination Committee on October 21 transmitted to the United 
States and other nonmembers of the League the recent docu- 
ments in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute and its own recommenda- 
tions, with the statement that "the Governments represented 
on the Coordination Committee would welcome any com- 
munication which any non-Member may deem it proper to 
make . . . or notification of any action which it may be taking 
in the  circumstance^."^^ 
The purpose of this committee was to ascertain the attitude 
of the states not members of the League toward the imposition 
of sanctions against Italy. The reply of the United States gov- 
52 United States Department of State, Press Releases, November 2, 1935. 
140 I N T E R N A T I O N A L  C O N F L I C T  
ernment, given on October 26, emphasized devotion to the 
preservation of peace and called attention to the proclamations 
of October 5, as well as to the policy of "transactions at risk." 
There was no direct reference to the League of Nations or to 
its condemnation of Italy. It  was evident that the United 
States government would pursue an independent policy, but 
did not wish to sabotage the efforts of the League. The United 
States would not undertake positive co-operation in the imposi- 
tion of sanctions, but there would be the passive co-operation 
of noninterference. The attitude of the United States govern- 
ment as expressed in the reply to the Co-ordination Committee 
was summarized thus : 
Realizing that war adversely affects every country, that it may 
seriously endanger the economic welfare of each, causes untold 
human misery, and even threatens the existence of civilization, the 
United States, in keeping with the letter and spirit of the Pact of 
Paris and other peace obligations, undertakes at all times not only 
to exercise its moral influence in favor of peace throughout the 
world, but to contribute in every practicable way within the limita- 
tions of our foreign policy, to that end. It views with sympathetic 
interest the individual or concerted efforts of other nations to pre- 
serve peace or to localize and shorten the duration of war.52 
President Roosevelt issued a statement on October 30 in 
which he said that he did not believe the American people 
would wish "struggles on the battlefield to be prolonged be- 
cause of profits to a small number of American citizens and 
that "accordingly, the American Government is keeping in- 
formed as to all shipments consigned for export to both bel- 
ligerents." On the same day Secretary Hull stated that "the 
policy of the Government . . . rests primarily upon the recent 
neutrality act designed to keep the Nation out of war, and 
upon the further purpose not to aid in protracting the war."j2 
The increase in American exports to Italy led to further 
official discouragement of such trade. On November 15 Secre- 
tary Hull made a statement in which he said that "the Ameri- 
can people are entitled to know that there are certain com- 
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modities such as oil, copper, trucks, tractors, scrap iron, and 
scrap steel which are essential war materials, although not 
actually 'arms, ammunition, or implements of war,' and that 
according to recent Government trade reports a considerably 
increased amount of these is being exported for war purposes. 
This class of trade is directly contrary to the policy of this 
Government as announced in official statements of the Presi- 
dent and Secretary of State, as it is also contrary to the general 
spirit of the recent neutrality act."j3 
At the time that the Secretary of State made this statement 
there was considerable discussion concerning the feasibility 
of the adoption by the League of an oil embargo against Italy. 
Oil was a commodity of strategic importance in the conflict. 
If Italy could have no petroleum from other countries, the 
African campaign would cease when the accumulated supply 
was exhausted. But it happened that the members of the 
League, even if they decided for an oil embargo on other 
grounds, could not control the world supply because of the 
large quantities produced in the United States. It may have 
been no accident that Secretary Hull's statement of November 
15 placed oil at the top of the list of materials being shipped 
in increased amounts for war purposes. A week later the Ship- 
ping Board Bureau of the Department of Commerce warned 
the shipping industry, the chief financial backing of which 
came from the government, that the carrying of essential war 
materials, such as those mentioned in the statement of the 
Secretary of State, destined for either of the belligerents was 
distinctly contrary to the policy of the g ~ v e r n m e n t . ~ ~  
There were indications that this warning was motivated 
chiefly by an expectation that the League would impose an oil 
embargo against Italy and by the desire of the United States 
government that American citizens would not insist on sup- 
plying the petroleum necessary to the Italian war machine. 
However, the occasion for the United States to come into such 
a conflict with the League did not arise, as no prohibition was 
placed on the sale of oil to Italy by League members. 
53 Same, November 18, 1935. 54 New York Times, November 23, 1935. 
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The question arises whether the American policy of placing 
an embargo on arms and the like, discouraging the supply of 
war materials to belligerents, and "viewing with sympathetic 
interest" the efforts of other nations to preserve peace was 
effective in accomplishing the purpose of not contributing to 
the prolongation of war. 
It is true that the United States did not interfere with the 
application of sanctions against Italy by the League, but there 
is no way to determine to what extent the United States was 
a factor in the nonapplication of further sanctions. For ex- 
ample, would the League have placed an embargo on oil if 
there had been no possibility that Italy would be supplied by 
American producers? There can be no adequate answer to 
this question until the scholarly world receives the memoirs 
of the statesmen who made the decision-and probably not 
even then. It may well be pointed out, however, that the 
United States was a large producer of oil, that the United 
States government had announced an "independent policy," 
and that even if that government should have attempted to 
curb shipment of oil to Italy, it would have had to rely on 
extralegal pressure and "moral suasion." The highly complex 
considerations of European politics may be sufficient to ac- 
count for the course taken, and the failure to adopt the oil 
sanction may be attributed to any one or any combination of 
factors, such as Baldwin's concern for British ships in the 
Mediterranean, French desire for Italian help against Ger- 
many, or a real fear of a general war. It is naive to assume 
that the action of the League of Nations depended solely upon 
American policy. At any rate, it seems obvious that the failure 
to receive the positive co-operation of the United States to 
that extent reduced the control of the League over supplies to 
Italy, and Americans must face the fact that abstention from 
participation in collective action thereby reduces the effective- 
ness of such collective action. 
The situation in which the United States found itself, neither 
co-operating with the League nor maintaining an attitude of 
indifference, suggested a combination of de iure neutrality with 
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de facto discrimination. That is, this government might apply 
to both sides those measures the incidence of which would be 
more burdensome for the aggressor than for the victim. For 
example, if the aggressor but not the victim needed American 
supplies, a strict embargo could be imposed. However, there 
is little to recommend a policy of refusing to co-operate in a 
collective system and at the same time trying not to interfere 
with it. The effectiveness of collective security depends upon 
joint, co-ordinated action. The best that a de facto "differential 
neutrality" could achieve would be a negative noninterference. 
It would be inc~nsistent with international solidarity and even 
with any norms at all for the regulation of international vio- 
lence. No clear and definite policy could be followed, because 
the situation would change with each war and with each shift 
in the fortunes of any given war. 
The failure of sanctions in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict and 
the abrogation by Germany of the Locarno system in March, 
1936, gave rise to what has been called a "de facto revision7' of 
the Covenant. In particular, the small European states could 
no longer rely on the guarantees of collective security, yet the 
obligations of Article 16 might make it difficult for them to 
abstain from war. If the world, and especially Europe, were 
to be divided into two hostile camps, the smaller states wished 
to avoid participation on either side. Fearful that the status 
qzco powers would employ the machinery of the League to 
involve them against the nonmember powers, they demanded 
a tacit or avowed recognition that they were not bound by the 
coercive obligations of Article 16. They could no longer de- 
pend upon the League system for protection; so they wished 
to avoid the reprisals from powerful and hostile nonmembers 
which participation in that system might imply. 
On July 1, 1936, a joint declaration was signed by the foreign 
ministers of seven of the smaller European states-Denmark, 
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Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzer- 
land. This declaration stated that the foreign ministers had 
exchanged views "on the effects of current events on the 
organisation and working of the League of Nations" and that 
they were in agreement on certain points.55 
The declaration did not repudiate the League nor state an 
intention of withdrawing from it, but questioned the force of 
its obligations, particularly for the seven countries, under the 
existing circumstances. To quote, "The aggravation of the 
international situation and the cases of resort to force that 
have occurred during the last few years, in ,violation of the 
Covenant of the League, have given rise in our countries to 
some doubt whether the conditions in which they undertook 
the obligations contained in the Covenant still exist to any 
satisfactory extent." 
The foreign ministers did not think that certain parts of the 
Covenant, especially Article 16, should remain a dead letter 
while other articles were enforced. They favored the success 
of the experiment represented by the establishment of the 
League, but thought it necessary to consider whether the Cove- 
nant could be amended, or its application modified, so as to 
increase the security of states. That their governments would 
have reservations in the application of sanctions was indicated 
by the statement of the seven foreign ministers that "we would 
place it on record that, so long as the Covenant as a whole is 
applied only incompletely and inconsistently, we are obliged 
to bear that fact in mind in connection with the application 
of Article 16."j5 
After a conference of their ministers for foreign affairs on 
August 20, 1936, the governments of Denmark, Finland, Nor- 
way, and Sweden presented to the Secretary-General of the 
League statements elucidating the position reflected in the 
Declaration of Seven.56 
On January 31, 1938, the delegate of Sweden stated before 
the Special Committee Set Up to Study the Application of the 
5 V o r  the text of the declaration see League of Nations, Oficial Journal, 
Special Supplement No. 154, 1936, p. 19. 
56 Same, 15-19, 20-23. 
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Principles of the Covenant that "in practice, the League no 
longer possesses the characteristics of a coercive League cor- 
responding to the provisions of Article 16 of the Covenant. 
By the force of events, without any amendment of the Cove- 
nant, a practice has become established whereby Members of 
the League do not consider themselves bound to take coercive 
action against an aggressor State."" In further explaining the 
official position of the Swedish government, he said, "What 
is important is that it [the Swedish attitude] should be recog- 
nised as a loyal and legitimate interpretation of the fact that 
changed conditions have made it impossible for the League 
at the present time to act in conformity with the letter of the 
provisions of the Covenant." The Swedish delegate continued 
with the explanation that this was not to imply that the idea 
of collective security was being abandoned for the future or 
that the League should renounce the possibility of effectively 
intervening in a conflict through spontaneous collaboration by 
its members. Rather, he argued, a frank recognition of weak- 
ness was better than maintaining "the fiction of a system of 
automatic and obligatory  sanction^."^^ 
The course of Switzerland took the form of an attempt to 
obtain a renewed recognition of its "unique" position. The 
Swiss government, after joining in the declaration of July 1, 
stated in a letter of September 4, 1936, to the Secretary-Ge11- 
era1 that 
if, notwithstanding the criticisms it incurs, Article 16 should be 
retained substantially in its present form, or if the risks it involves 
should be made still greater, Switzerland would be obliged to call 
attention once again to her peculiar position, which the Council of 
the League, in the Declaration of London of February 13th, 1920, 
described as unique. The Federal Council must in any case point 
out once more that Switzerland cannot be held to sanctions which, 
in their nature and through their effects, would seriously endanger 
her neutrality. That perpetual neutrality is established by age-old 
tradition, and all Europe joined in recognising its unquestionable 
advantages over a hundred years ago.59 
57 Same, Special Supplement No. 180, 1938, pp. 9-10. 
58 Same, 10. 59 Same, No. 154, 1936, p. 29. 
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This position was reiterated in a statement before the Special 
Committee of the League on January 31, 1938.60 The Swiss 
representative referred at that time to "a League from which 
two great neighbouring Powers have withdrawn and from 
which, moreover, two other great Powers in more distant parts 
of the world are absent. In our eyes," he continued, "these 
facts are decisive. They deprive differential neutrality of its 
political and psychological basis. They make the application 
of Article 16 by Switzerland impo~sible."~~ 
The claim of Switzerland to a special position was recognized 
by the Council of the League on May 14, 1938. The Council, 
by a resolution of this date, "takes note that Switzerland, in- 
voking her perpetual neutrality, has expressed the intention 
not to participate any longer in any manner in the putting 
into operation of the provisions of the Covenant relating to 
sanctions and declares that she will not be invited to do so; 
And places on record that the Swiss Government declares its 
determination to maintain unaltered in all other respects her 
position as a Member of the League, and to continue to give 
the facilities whch have been accorded to the League for the 
free exercise by its institutions of their activities in Swiss ter- 
ri t~ry."~'  
The events of 1935-1936 also resulted in a modification of 
the international status of Belgium. King Leopold in an ad- 
dress to his cabinet on October 14, 1936, said, "The reoccupa- 
tion of the Rhine by breaking the Locarno agreements both in 
the letter and in the spirit has placed us almost in the same 
international position as we were in before the War."63 Any 
policy of alliance with a single country would weaken Bel- 
gium's position abroad and cause divisions at home. A mere 
defensive alliance would not be sufficient, since aid could not 
arrive in time to bear the brunt of an attack. "That is why," 
King Leopold continued, "we must follow a policy exclusively 
and entirely Belgian. This policy should aim resolutely at 
60 Same, NO. 180, 1938, pp. 10-13. 61 Same, 11. 
62 Same, 1938, pp. 368-75. 
63 For the documents relative to the new policy of Belgium, see Royal In- 
stitute of International Affairs, Documents on Inte~nationd Afairs, 1936, 250-51. 
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placing us outside any dispute of our neighbors. It responds to 
om national ideal." 
It was subsequently explained that this speech, which was 
devoted prin~ariiy to a justification for Belgian rearmament, 
did not mean that Belgium wished to renounce the League of 
Nations and revert to the prewar status of neutrality. What 
Belgium wanted was to be free from obligations to render 
military assistance to another state, and secondly, to make an 
independent examination of any new agreement for a Western 
pact to replace the Locarno treaties. After a period of negotia- 
tions, there was signed on April 24, 1937, a joint Anglo-French 
declaration which released Belgium from her obligations under 
the Locarno treaties and the Four-Power Agreement of hfarch 
19, 1936. France and Great Britain reaffirmed their own obliga- 
tions under the Locarno agreements and renewed their pledges 
of assistance to Belgium in the event of attack, while the latter 
undertook to defend her frontier against aggression and gave 
assurances of loyalty to the Covenant of the League. 
The Netherlands government also joined the movement 
toward "de facto revision" of the Covenant. Its delegate stated 
on January 31, 1938, that "the Netherlands Government has 
never desired, and does not now desire, a return to the old 
system of general neutrality when a war breaks out. It still 
supports the system of collective security. But this does not 
prevent it from looking the facts in the face. The obligation 
to apply sanctions . . . no longer can be considered . . . as in 
force. For the nlon~ent, there remains the faculty of applying 
sanctions ."G4 
The League of Nations was not slow to take cognizance of 
the necessity for considering the problems raised by the fq'l i ure 
of sanctions. By a resolution of July 4, 1936, the Assembly 
recommended that the Council invite the members of the 
League to make proposals for the improvement of the applica- 
tion of the principles of the Covenant and that the Secretary- 
General be instructed to make a classification of the proposals 
G4 League of Nations, Oficial Journal, Special Supplement No. 180, 1938, 
p. 14. 
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and report to the next meeting of the Assembly. The problem, 
as conceived by the Assembly, was expressed in the preamble 
of the resolution of July 4, 1936, as follows: "Noting that 
various circumstances have prevented the full application of 
the Covenant of the League of Nations; Remaining firmly at- 
tached to the principles df the Covenant . . . ; ~ e i n ~  desirous 
of strengthening the authority of thk League of Nations by 
adapting the application of these principles to the lessons of 
experience; Being convinced that it is necessary to strengthen 
the real effectiveness of the guarantees of security which the 
League affords to its  member^."^^ 
By November 20, 1936, communications had been received 
from twenty-five governments, and seventeen others had made 
statements in the Assembly. The declarations of these forty- 
two governments were duly classified and analyzed by the 
Secretary-General in accordance with the Assembly resolution 
of July 4." 
Some Governments were doubtful about the expediency of 
considering the application of the principles of the Covenant 
at the time. Poland, for example, thought that the study was 
premature and that the discussion should take place "in a 
political atmosphere which had been cleared of the heavy 
anxieties of the present moment." The U.S.S.R., on the con- 
trary, expressed the view that "it is the very presence of these 
anxieties which constitutes the most powerful argument in 
favour of an early consideration of this q ~ e s t i o n . " ~ ~  
The governments stated, in general, that they appreciated 
the value of the League and desired its maintenance and 
prosperity, but there was disagreement over functions, obliga- 
tions, and methods. Some governments tended to emphasize 
65 For the text of the Assembly resolution, see same, No. 154, 1936, p. 6. 
This was a companion resolution to the one ending sanctions against Italy. For 
the revisionist movement, see S. Engel, League Reform: An Analysis of Official 
Proposals and Discussions, 1936-1939. 
66 For this classification and analysis, see Engel, 44-97. The communications 
received are reproduced in the same document (pp. 6-40). For an analysis of 
the statements, see Georg Schwarzenberger, "The States Members of the 
League and the Reform of the Covenant," I1 (1936), 351-59. 
67 League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 154, 1936, 
p. 47. 
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collective security, prevention of war, or disarmament, but 
others stressed the necessity of effective application of the 
Covenant as a whole. A substantial number of governments 
favored the maintenance or strengthening of the Covenant. 
Others, however, advocated a restriction of obligations under 
the Covenant on the ground that formal obligations should 
more nearly correspond with what could actually be under- 
taken. Several governments stressed the importance of a gen- 
uine intention to apply the Covenant. Most were opposed, or 
at least not favorable, to the idea of amending the Covenant. 
Accessory agreements and interpretations by Assembly resolu- 
tions were suggested as methods of revision, while Colombia 
proposed that doubts over the interpretation of the Covenant 
be settled by the Permanent Court of International Justice, 
and the New Zeaiand government recommended that all mem- 
bers of the League hold a national plebiscite on the application 
of Article 16. 
Twenty-two governments referred to the League's lack of 
universality as an obstacle or expressed the desire that it 
should be made universal. The Peruvian government wished 
to make the conditions of admission and withdrawal more 
strict. The majority of governments desiring the universality 
of the League declared in favor of regular co-operation with 
nonmembers. Colombia, Panama, and Uruguay put forth pro- 
posals for regional or continental unions to be substituted, to 
a greater or lesser extent, for the League of Nations, and the 
French government stated that "it would be a serious mistake 
to compromise this principle of ~niversal i ty ."~~ 
Certain governments proposed to change the composition of 
the Council by abolishing the permanent seats, causing mem- 
bers of the Council to be elected on a regional basis or sub- 
stituting a system of rotation for election, or combining the 
two. Argentina and Panama desired an examination of the 
respective jurisdictions of the Council and Assembly, and Peru 
advocated proportional representation of continental groups 
in the organization of the Secretariat. 
6s Same, 61. 
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The general unanimity rule (Article 5) gave rise to little 
comment, although it was proposed that in some cases the 
rule should be interpreted in a particular way; for example, 
that the votes of the parties to a dispute should not be counted. 
With reference to the reduction and limitation of armaments 
(Article 8) several governments expressed the opinion that 
new discussions should be undertaken. More specific proposals 
included the publicity of budgetary expenditures for arma- 
ments, supervision of the manufacture of and trade in arms, 
establishment of a permanent disarmament commission, and 
creation of an international force. 
In connection with Article 11 attention was called to the 
necessity of preventive action and of League intervention at 
an early stage. The Russian delegate expressed the opinion 
that Article 11 cannot "avert a breach of the peace which arises 
from calculated aggressiveness and the pursuit of conquest, 
for which disputes are deliberately engineered."69 Some gov- 
ernments suggested that in procedure under Article 11 the 
votes of the parties concerned should not be counted or that 
the rule of unanimity should be abolished. The Bulgarian 
government proposed that Article 11 be supplemented by 
bilateral conventions, and several other governments thought 
that the Convention of September 26, 1931, to Improve the 
Means of Preventing War should be the complement of 
Article 11. 
There were several proposals, especially from the Argentine 
government, that the Covenant of the League be co-ordinated 
with the Pact of Paris and the Argentine Anti-War Treaty. 
Several governments made references to an improvement 
in the methods for pacific settlement of disputes; for example, 
the development of procedure under Article 13 and the recom- 
mendation that decisions to ask the Permanent Court of In- 
ternational Justice for an advisory opinion be taken by a 
majority vote. 
Some general observations on the subject of Article 10 were 
made, and its relations to Articles 16 and 19 were pointed out. 
69 Same, 68. 
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Since the failure of action under Article 16 to halt aggression 
was largely responsible for the discussion of revision of the 
Covenant, it is interesting to note the statements about that 
article. The declarations and proposals of several governments 
indicated that they regarded collective security as one of the 
most important elements in the Covenant. The view was ex- 
pressed that application of Article 16 should be contingent on 
certain conditions. Peru called attention to the disproportion, 
from the point of view of degree of civilization, often existing 
between two parties to a dispute-specifically the Italo-Ethi- 
opian conflict. Hungary wanted "the repressive clauses of the 
Covenant" brought into equilibrium with Articles 11, 13, and 
19; New Zealand stressed the importance of a definite method 
of rectifying international grievances; Denmark, Finland, Nor- 
way, Sweden, and Canada referred to the close connection 
between Articles 8 and 16. 
Some governments were doubtful about the practical value 
of the principle of collective security under the existing circum- 
stances. The Argentine government stated that those pro- 
visions of the Covenant no longer in harmony with the realities 
of international life should be given an optional character. 
The delegate of Canada said that his government had made 
no absolute commitments either for or against participation 
in war or other forms of force and that any decision with 
regard to such participation would be taken in the light of all 
existing circumstances. Ecuador referred to a "right of ab- 
stention," and Panama and Peru pointed out the difficulty of 
requiring participation in collective action from states with 
relatively remote interests in the conflict giving rise to such 
action. The Swiss government declared that the sanctions 
system creates inequalities, since sanctions cannot be applied 
in all cases, and the risks involved are much greater for some 
states than for others. 
With reference to economic and financial sanctions the 
Swedish government made the general observation that their 
application depended on general political factors rather than 
on the adoption of modified texts. Four governments referred 
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to the necessity for making some sort of advance preparations 
for the application of such measures. The question of economic 
and financial sanctions raised the problem of whether they 
should be automatic. The Chinese government declared that 
measures under Article 16, paragraph 1, should be automatic, 
immediate, and all-inclusive; Colombia proposed that they 
come into force automatically as soon as the competent organs 
of the League had determined the aggressor; and New Zealand 
expressed the view that sanctions would be ineffective unless 
they were immediate and automatic, and took the form of a 
complete boycott. On the other hand, several governments 
declared against automatic sanctions. Two governments, Peru 
and the U.S.S.R., suggested that there should be some dif- 
ferentiation among states as to their obligations to apply 
sanctions. 
The Lithuanian government expressed the opinion that 
sanctions should not be restricted to negative action, but that 
direct nonmilitary assistance should be given to the victim of 
aggression. Several other governments referred to the Con- 
vention of October 2, 1930, for Financial Assistance. The dele- 
gation of Panama proposed "diplomatic and moral" sanctions 
and compensation for damage caused by aggression. 
The question of military sanctions also evoked a diversity of 
views. The Chinese and Portuguese governments emphasized 
the utility of this type of action. Most of the governments 
which expressed an opinion believed that military sanctions 
should not be universally obligatory. The Argentine govern- 
ment presented a typical view in stating that military measures 
should not "be binding on Members not implicated in the dis- 
pute, or only having an indirect interest therein."70 The New 
Zealand government, however, indicated its willingness to join 
in the collective application of force against any future ag- 
gressor, and Colombia stated that military sanctions should be 
obligatory for states situated in the same continent as the 
aggressor. 
A number of governments were in favor of regional pacts of 
70 Same, 81. 
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mutual assistance as a device for supplementing the guarantees 
of the Covenant. There was usually a stipulation that thesc 
pacts should satisfy certain conditions; for example, that they 
should be open to the accession of other states, concluded in 
conformity with League principles and supervised by the 
League, and designed to supplement, not weaken, the Cove- 
nant. Most of the proposals for the application of Article 16 
and regional pacts of mutual assistance would increase the 
functions of organs of the League in determining the aggressor 
and applying sanctions. 
In addition to the foregoing declarations and proposals 
there was a variety of comments on other aspects of the Cove- 
nant. The Bulgarian government considered it important to 
co-ordinate Articles 18 and 20 by refusing registration to 
treaties incompatible with the Covenant. A number of gov- 
ernments declared themselves in varying degrees in favor of 
the principle of Article 19. Four of the Latin American gov- 
ernments comn~ented on Article 21. Haiti and Iraq wished 
some sort of re-examination of the mandate system. 
There were a substantial number of references to the desir- 
ability of certain forms of international co-operation-economic, 
financial, and "in bringing about a closer understanding be- 
tween peoples." Several governments wished to separate the 
Covenant from the Peace Treaties. Finally, Colombia proposed 
that the Permanent Court of International Justice settle doubts 
about the interpretation of the Covenant. 
The foregoing summary of the comments of forty-two gov- 
ernments on the problems of revising the Covenant points to 
two conclusions: ( a )  a wide variety of questions with respect 
to nearly every part of the Covenant was raised, and ( b )  the 
focal point of the comments and proposals was obviously 
Article 16. 
By a resolution of October 10, 1936, the Assembly set up a 
Special Committee of twenty-eight member states to study the 
proposals which had been made and to prepare a report.71 
This committee held its first session December 14 to 17, 1936, 
71 Same, 41-43. 
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to determine its method of work. Bourquin of Belgium was 
elected chairman, a list of the principal questions raised in the 
government communications and declarations was drawn up, 
and a number of rapporteurs were instructed to make an analy- 
sis of the problems to be examined. On May 31, the rap- 
porteurs held an unofficial exchange of views. A meeting of 
the committee on September 30, 1937, resulted in the framing 
by a committee of jurists of proposals with regard to the separa- 
tion of the Covenant from the Peace Treaties; approval of a 
draft resolution declaring that the League should take steps 
to co-ordinate its action with states nonmembers of the League, 
but bound by the Pact of Paris and the Argentine Anti-War 
Treaty; and approval of a proposal to request suggestions from 
nonmember states.72 
The third session of the Special Committee, held January 31 
to February 2, 1938, was devoted to an examination and dis- 
cussion of a report by Lord Cranborne on the participation of 
all states in the League of  nation^.^^ One aspect of'this ques- 
tion related to the rules and procedure for the admission of 
nonmember nations to the League, and a memorandum deal- 
ing with this subject was prepared by the Secretariat. The 
entire report of Viscount Cranborne was devoted to the central 
problem of the universality of the League.74 
The Cranborne report was an analysis of the situation, sum- 
marizing all points of view, rather than an argument for any 
one position. Universal membership in the League, this report 
stated, might mean the inclusion of all politically organized 
territory, all states to which membership was open under 
Article 1 of the Covenant, or all nations whose participation 
was essential to any genuine scheme of international co-opera- 
tion; or more immediately, it might mean the extension of 
League membership to those states which were nonmembers 
and whose co-operation was particularly essential. 
The grounds for the desirability of universal membership in 
the League were ( a )  that the conceptions on which the League 
was based implied universality as an ideal; ( b )  that the Cove- 
72 Same, No. 180, 1938, p. 5. 73 Same, 5-60. 74 Same, 41 ff. 
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nant was framed on the assumption that the League would 
be universal and could not function effectively otherwise; and 
( c )  that lack of universality engendered the danger of a system 
of alliances and division into rival armed campse7" 
In answer to the question of why League membership was 
not universal, three classes of nonmembers were identified. 
First, some states were opposed to the idea of general inter- 
national co-operation as such and wished to maintain their 
- 
international contacts on an ad lzoc basis. Second, some na- 
tions were not opposed to the general idea of international 
co-operation but hesitated to assume definite commitments. 
Third, other states fell in neither of the two other classes but 
disapproved of certain features of the League as constituted. 
Considerations of the importance and feasibility of obtaining 
universal membership led to a discussion of the three possible 
types of organization for the League, with the implications of 
each type. First, a league of nations might provide for the 
actual enforcement of peace by the imposition of sanctions in 
some form. This, stated the Cranborne report, might be called 
a "coercive" league. As an alternative, there might be a league 
involving no obligation whatever to impose sanctions. Ma- 
chinery for the pacific settlement of international disputes 
would be provided, but failure to use it or abide by its decisions 
would involve no commitments on the part of third members 
to use force to deter a delinquent state. This type of league 
would be "noncoercive." A third type would be an "inter- 
mediate" league, which would avoid obligations for a definite 
and predetermined course in the event of aggression. As each 
threatening situation arose, the members would meet and con- 
sult. Decisions would be on an ad lzoc basis, and the possibility 
of coercive action would not be excluded. Third members 
of such a league would have a right,76 but not a duty, to impose 
sanctions, although there might be some regulation of the use 
of coercion. In the words of the report, "One of the legal 
75 In a summary of opinions with respect to  functioning of the League if 
membership were universal, it was pointed out that universality would not 
guarantee effectiveness. 
76 The report used the word "faculty." 
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effects of giving such a faculty would be that no member which 
had violated the Covenant could, as a matter of juridical right, 
complain of the use of force against it by other members, or 
lequire of these the observance of the rules of neutrality in the 
dispute i n ~ o l v e d . " ~ ~  
If the device of an "intermediate" league were adopted and 
sanctions were made "facultative" instead of obligatory-and 
this would seem to be a temptingly plausible compromise-the 
modification of Article 16 would go beyond the previously 
prevailing interpretation. Formerly, the application of sanc- 
tions was incumbent upon members of the League in case of 
a "resort to war" within the meaning of Article 16; only the 
existence of such a situation was open to the decision of the 
members. In an "intermediate" league the obligation itself 
would be replaced by a permissive grant. The "shall" of Article 
16 would be changed to "may." 
The discussion of the Cranborne report by the Special Com- 
mittee reflected the fundamental dilemma involved in its terms 
of reference. The League of Nations must be "universal" to 
function effectively, but it could be made universal, if at all, 
only by eliminating from the Covenant all obligations which 
gave it practical meaning. One might say, paradoxically, that 
so far as the restraint of aggression was concerned, the League 
could be effective only by satisfying two mutually exclusive 
conditions. And this would be merely to say that the League 
under the circumstances could not be depended upon to con- 
trol international violence. In the words of the Cranborne 
report, 
those whose ideal is a more or less coercive League, and who want 
universal membership in order to make such a League effective, 
are confronted with the possibility that the principal condition on 
which alone this ideal can be realised can perhaps only be achieved 
by sacrificing a large part of the ideal itself. Those, on the other 
hand, whose ideal is a non-coercive League, for the reason, amongst 
others, that universal membership would thereby be facilitated, 
must not overlook the possibility that the achievement of it in these 
"League of Nations, Oficial Journal, Special Supplement No. 180, 1938, 
p. 42. 
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conditions might add little to the world which it would not have 
possessed without a League at all.7a 
The prevailing attitude of the members of the Special Com- 
mittee was that the letter of the Covenant could not be carried 
out under the prevailing conditions, but that the idea of col- 
lective security should not be abandoned for the future. 
The special Committee came to no decision for a proposed 
course of action and restricted itself to transmitting to the As- 
sembly a brief report of progress, with the minutes of its 
meeting and the reports submitted by its r a p p o r t e u ~ s . ~ V h e  
committee had an unenviable task. Difficulties arising from a 
denial of the basic postulates of collective security could not 
be overcome by devising a slightly different form of collective 
security. Little could reasonably be expected from an attempt 
to remedy an indisposition to apply the Covenant by tinkering 
with its machinery. Particular defects of the Covenant were 
irrelevant to the larger question. Efforts to eliminate those 
defects were entirely in order, but the fundamental problem 
was the nonuse, not the imperfection, of the instrument. A 
sufficient juridical and organizational basis of collective se- 
curity existed. The difficulty lay in the political, social, eco- 
nomic, and ideological spheres. 
An analysis of the trend of opinion, undertaken by the New 
Commonwealth Institute, pointed up the dilemmas involved in 
a "cle facto revision" of the Covenant. One report analyzing 
the statements of governments on the subject of revision of the 
Covenant was issued in December, 1936.'O A second report 
(December, 1937) was concerned with an analysis of the work 
78 Same, 43. 
79 In addition to the Cranborne report, these included discussions of the co- 
ordination of peace instruments, regional or continental organization of the 
League, methods of re\ision, and Articles 10, 11, and 16. Same, 76 ff. In 
September, 1938, the Assembly adopted a resolution to refer a report of the 
Sixth Committee, relating to Article 16, to the members of tlte League, a 
resolution endorsing co-operation between the League and nonmember states, 
and a resolution recommending the separation of the Covenant from tlte Peace 
Treaties. A resolution providing that recommendations migltt be made under 
Article 11, paragraph 1, without the consent of the parties to a dispute was 
defeated, with Hungary and Poland voting in the negative, and eleven states 
abstaining (same, No. 183, 1938, pp. 97-100, 142-52). 
80 Schwarzenberger, 11, 351-59. 
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of the League's Special Committee and concluded: "To re- 
capitulate-the first part of our survey has shown how under 
the unanimity rule of the Covenant, the League machinery 
for the repression of aggression can be reduced to a more 
theoretical existence and how as a result, a de facto revision 
of the League, transforming it into a non-coercive League, has 
in fact taken place. In the Reform Committee the struggle 
still continues between those forces which want to see a legal 
seal on this de facto situation and those which wish to leave 
the door open for a return to the full application of the Cove- 
nant."sl 
In order to obtain the opinions of qualified students of this 
question, it was decided to send a questionnaire to a number 
of specially chosen collaborators all over the world, excepting 
Germany, Italy, and Japan. Replies were received from men 
in public life and authorities on international law and relations 
of fourteen different nat ional i t ie~.~~ Unanimity was nearly 
reached on the proposition that there had been a "de facto 
revision" of the Covenant, and most collaborators denied that 
the attitude of League members was consistent with their 
legal obligations. The majority felt that any alteration in the 
text of the Covenant would, under the circumstances, mean a 
retrogression rather than a reform. 
There was substantial agreement that a connection existed 
between hostilities in different regions and that little faith 
could be placed in the device of localizing war. Authorities 
on international law were convinced that the collective method 
was better than "individual peace." 
Many of the replies stressed the importance of conditions 
indispensable to a genuine system of international justice and 
security. A relatively high percentage favored a short-term 
solution similar to the ideas of Winston Churchill, according 
to which the peace system would be based on a defensive 
alliance between Great Britain, France, possibly the U.S.S.R., 
81 Same, I11 ( 1937), 271-72. 
82 For an analysis of these replies, see Georg Schwarzenberger, "An Analysis 
of the Replies to Our Questionnaire on the De Facto Revision of the Covenant," 
60-74. 
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and any other League members desiring to participate. This 
system, it was claimed, would have a great superiority of force, 
liomogeneity of interest, and the benevolent neutrality of the 
United States. It would also provide a method for peaceful 
change between members and would be open to adherence 
by other states. 
Numerous replies pointed out that methods existed to pre- 
vent the outbreak of a major war, but that the question was 
one of whether governments would avail themselves of these 
opportunities. The majority believed that security should come 
before redress of grievances and disarmament, but many em- 
phasized the point that they must be dealt with simultaneously. 
The following paragraphs, selected from the many expressions 
of contemporary opinion toward this dilemma, state clearly the 
predicament of the times: 
Statesmen, backed to a large extent by public opinion, have come 
to the conclusion that it is simpler, safer and less costly, to keep 
itadividually out of war, to re-arm to the best of their ability and 
means, so as to divert aggression to a more vulnerable victim-and 
for the rest, to hope for the best.83 
For the present [I9391 I think our course of action in regard to 
the League is clear. We should recognise the fact that main negotia- 
tions must take place outside the League, and that a method which 
would have been right in relation to one issue in 1935 may be 
wrong, and dangerously wrong, in relation to other issues, under 
different conditions, in 1939. We should, however, keep the League 
organisation active. . . . 
Rigidly to oppose every act inconsistent with the Covenant . . . 
would inevitably, in the actual political and strategic conditions 
[in 19391, involve immediate war on a large scale with no very 
good prospects of achieving both victory and a result worth the 
pricesg4 
The phase of disintegration in the principle of concern was 
characterized by the formal retention of that principle in inter- 
national organization, together with the disappearance of even 
a pretext of effective application. Instead of control by the 
group of conflict among its members, there was the attempt 
83 Schwarzenberger, "The States Members of the League," 111, 265. 
84 Arthur Salter, Security: Can W e  Retrieve It?, 169-70. 
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of each to keep out of trouble and hope for the best. What- 
ever the necessity and merits of this attitude as a policy, it 
was the negation of an institutionalized control of international 
conflict. 
In one challenge to collective security, remonstrances, con- 
ciliation, inquiry, and collective nonrecognition were insuffi- 
cient to halt the conflict and protect the victim, but the offend- 
ing member of the League withdrew from the organization. 
In another and comparatively minor case, hostilities came to 
an uneasy and inconclusive end after long and tedious negotia- 
tion, and the offending member likewise withdrew from the 
League. In a third case, sanctions under Article 16 were at- 
tempted on a timid and limited scale, and the aggressor 
secured from the League a recognition of the conquest of the 
victim. These three by no means encompass all the incidents 
of international codic t  from 1933 to 1939. They represent 
selected case histories of the trend. And there were no cases 
which exhibited a contrary trend. 
The basic attitude toward the principle of concern during 
this difficult period was epitomized in the concept of neo- 
neutrality, meaning neutrality combined with a positive atti- 
tude of interest in war prevention as contrasted with the 
passivity and impartiality of the traditional concept of neu- 
trality. This was a concept which insisted "upon non-participa- 
tion in war while at the same time seeking to make a con- 
tribution to war p reven t i~n . "~~  The first object of policy was 
to avoid conflict, preventive measures were welcomed as long 
as they were not felt to jeopardize the chances of avoidance, 
and hopes of genuine group control were discarded. The 
various governments did not repudiate the principle of con- 
cern. They paid allegiance to it and explained why they 
could not apply it. 
The "de facto revision" of the Covenant in effect carried 
forward the process of limitation by interpretation which had 
taken place early in the history of the League and which had 
persisted. It had been recognized that the obligations of the 
85 Philip C. Jessup, foreword to Georg Cohn, Neo-Neutrality, vi. 
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Covenant were subject to the decision of each member as to 
their applicability, to a gradual and partial application, and to 
the reservation of the peculiar position of each member. Now 
the recognition was sought, and obtained, that obligations did 
not exist at all, that the measures contemplated by the Cove- 
nant were facultative or permissive. Just as the Covenant was 
"interpreted" and not amended when limitations were placed 
upon the initial acceptance of the principle of concern, it was 
revised "de facto" and not amended (or formally repudiated) 
during the phase of disintegration. In this process it was 
obvious that the problem of revision was not one of this or 
that specific provision, but that it arose from the existence of 
a fundamental situation in which no international machinery 
for the international control of international violence could be 
made effectively applicable. 
International organization between the two World Wars 
reflected an acceptance of the principle of concern (1919- 
1920), a limitation of the acceptance (1920-1925), a modified 
application ( 1925-1933), and a rejection or disintegration 
(1933-1939)." The question naturally arises of whether a 
decisive event or turning point can be identified in the record. 
Different writers have expressed a wide variety of views on 
this matter, with a general tendency to place the determining 
factors either in the making of the peace after World War I 
or in failure to halt the cycle of aggressions beginning in 1931. 
Some, however, take an intermediate point of view. The fol- 
lo~ving typical judgments may be cited: 
Sigmund Neumann has contended that, "The collective 
security system was already lost at Versailles. The drawn-out 
and futile discussions over an Anglo-American military guar- 
antee of France's Rhine frontier and the collapse of the Geneva 
85 The periods are ones of substantial emphasis, rather than of exclusive 
characteristic. 
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security system gave ample proof of the fact that France 
could not put any faith in such over-all schemes."87 
Ranshofen-Wertheimer made the suggestion, based on at- 
titudes in the Peace Conference and remarks of Lord Robert 
Cecil, that "the Anglo-American group in Paris did not realize 
that they had already abandoned any possibility of a viable 
and effectual international agency."88 
The German viewpoint, as might be expected, was to put 
the blame on the settlement made at the end of World War I. 
Hitler, for example, said in his speech of May 21, 1935, "When 
in 1919 the Peace of Versailles was dictated to the German 
people, death sentence was pronounced upon collective co- 
operation among nations."89 
In contrast, there was the view that, "The turning-point 
came in 1931. . . . But the more serious blow came in 1935."90 
Quincy Wright in 1938 thought that the disintegration of 
the international community began with the failure to stop 
Japanese aggression in Manchukuo and that it had reached a 
point where it could no longer be deniedS9' 
Raymond Swing contended that the turning point, in the 
sense of the last real chance, came as late as the Brussels Con- 
ference of 1937.92 
C. J. Friedrich's opinion is typical of the intermediate point 
of view. "The year 1923 marked the parting of the ways. 
English diplomacy and the English public henceforth recog- 
nized that something more than the League was necessary. 
One finds few explicit statements of what that something was 
or should be. British thought and action show rather clearly 
that Great Britain was at least glancing at the balance of power 
as a possible way out. For the time being, it was hard to dis- 
cover what might produce an effective balance."93 
87 The Future in Perspectiue, 106. Other statements in the same book seem 
to modify the idea that the cause was completely lost so early. 
88 World Organization, 19-20. 
89 F .  J. Berber (ed.) ,  Locarno: A Collection of Documents, 128. 
90 John I. Knudson, A History of the League of Nations, 355. 
91 Schwarzenberger, "An Analysis of the Replies," 68. 
92 "HOW We Lost the Peace in 1937," Atlantic Monthly, CLXXIX (1947), 
33-37. 
93 Foreign Policy in the Making, 148-49. 
D I S I N T E G R A T I O N  163 
The same writer also stated, "Although recognized by few 
at the time, balance-of-power politics re-appeared in the mid- 
dle 'twenties. Its failure became manifest in the portentous 
events of 1931-33, when Japan seized Manchuria and Germany 
once again fell under the control of the  militarist^."^" 
F. P. Walters divided the history of the League into: ( a )  the 
years of growth, 1919-1923; ( b )  the years of stability, 1923- 
1931; ( c )  the years of conflict, 1931-1936; and ( d )  the years 
of defeat, 1936-1939.9' 
E. H. Carr distinguished four periods in international rela- 
tions between 1920 and 1939: ( a )  the period of enforcement, 
1920-1924; ( b )  the period of pacification, 1924-1930; ( c )  the 
period of crisis and the return of power politics, 1930-1933; 
and ( d )  the re-emergence of Germany and the end of the 
treaties, 1933-1939.9F 
Reference may also be made to a French writer, Georges 
Le Brun Keris, who interpreted the history of the League in 
terms of three great crises-that of the initial period, the con- 
stitutional crisis of 1926, and the general crisis commencing in 
1930.07 
In my opinion, to the extent that a turning point can be 
identified, it came with the rejection of the Geneva Protocol 
in 1925-the last real attempt to transfer the controlling de- 
cision to an instrumentality of the more inclusive group. Rejec- 
tion of the Geneva Protocol demonstrated that the principle 
- - 
of concern was not to be incorporated in international organi- 
zation in any way that would be significant for asserting group 
homogeneity in the control of conflict among the constituent 
members. It only required a major test to reveal the actual 
locus of controlling decisions" a i d  to set a precedent for a 
series of aggressions culminating in World War 11. 
" War:  T h e  Causes, Efec ts ,  and Control of International Violence, 55-56. 
95 A History of t h e  League of A'ations, I, vii-xv. 
Qqnternational Relations between the T w o  TVorld Wars ,  1919-1999, v-vii. 
" Les Prolets de Reforme de la Socie'te' des Nations et le Det;eloppement dti 
Pacte, 6.  
9s Note that the rejection of the Geneva Proctocol put collective security on 
a regional basis and t h ~ t  he Far East was not in the "region" of any of the 
leading members of the League. IIamilton Fish Armstrong has referred to the 
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Failure to institutionalize any significant procedure of con- 
trol through the more inclusive group left the maintenance of 
peace to the national policies and the alliances of the individual 
states. This distinction was blurred because national policies 
could still be expressed to some extent through the techniques 
and procedures of the League. For the same reason, the 
chronology relative to the principle of concern in international 
organization would not necessarily follow the chronology of 
actual disruptions of the peace. The various national policies 
might result in the maintenance of peace for a varying length 
of time even though the principle of concern were not ac- 
cepted. Reliance on self-help is not equivalent to perpetual 
conflict. Nevertheless, a combination of conflict situations, in- 
adequacy of self-help to control them, and rejection of the 
principle of concern can have only one outcome. 
Geneva Protocol as the real turning point in the history of the League. Foreign 
Affairs, XXVI (1947), 4. 
C H A P T E R  S I X  
Reafi~matiolz: The United Xatiolzs 
THE ALLIED victory over the Axis powers in World War I1 
brought a new question about the nature and basis of inter- 
national legal and political organization for the future. The 
answer was the United Nations, anticipated and planned dur- 
ing the war, and brought into existence through a Charter 
signed in 1945. The League of Nations belongs to history, but 
the United Nations is a crucial issue of the moment. For the 
United Nations the time span is so short, the events are so 
close, and the ultimate result is so uncertain, that no definitive 
statements can be attempted. There is adequate basis, how- 
ever, for inquiring about the relationship of the new organiza- 
tion to the principle of concern. How does the United Nations 
compare with the League in this respect? It will be recognized 
at once that close and rigorous analogies are inappropriate and 
likely to be misleading. The two international organizations, 
while similar in many important respects, also reveal some 
important differences, and in any case the world situation of 
the 1950's is unique, as was that of the 1920's and the 1930's. 
What is called for, therefore, is not an item-by-item com- 
parison, but an examination of experience since 1945 in terms 
of its own characteristic development. 
The Charter of the United Nations expresses a vigorous 
reafiirmation of the principle of concern as the basis of con- 
temporary international organization. The preamble avers the 
determination "to save succeeding generations from the scourge 
of war7' and "to unite our strength to maintain international 
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peace and security." Prominent among the stated purposes is 
that of taking effective collective measures for the prevention 
and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression 
of "acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace." One of 
the principles subscribed to by all the members of the United 
Nations is that international disputes shall be settled "by peace- 
ful means in such a manner that international peace and se- 
curity, and justice, are not endangered." It is provided that the 
principle of nonintervention in matters essentially of domestic 
jurisdiction shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures. The Charter even extends the principle of concern 
beyond the membership of the United Nations by asserting an 
obligation to prevent nonmembers from jeopardizing interna- 
tional peace and security (Article 2, paragraph 6 ) .  
The General Assembly of the United Nations is authorized 
to deal with any questions relating to international peace and 
security-a broad mandate indeed. In case of any dispute 
"the continuance of which is likely to endanger the mainte- 
nance of international peace and security," the parties con- 
cerned have an obligation to seek a solution by a pacific means. 
The Security Council has the duty of intervening to expedite 
a settlement at any stage which it deems necessary. If enforce- 
ment action is called for, the Security Council "shall determine 
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide 
what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore inter- 
national peace and security" (Article 39) .  Thus, the dominant 
conception of the Charter is that any disruption of international 
peace is a matter of concern to all members of the United 
Nations. 
All the nations represented at the San Francisco Conference 
ratified the Charter and became original members of the 
United Nations. Although universal membership has not been 
attained, all the Great Powers have been members from the 
beginning. Thus, the kind of geographical limitation which 
was so serious for the League of Nations did not recur for the 
new organiz a t '  lon. 
The United Nations has tended to take a broad view of its 
own competence under the Charter. The General Assembly's 
authority to discuss and to make recommendations covers the 
entire question of world peace, while the Security Council has 
the "primary responsibility" of maintaining international peace 
and security. Thus, anything which constitutes a "threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" is brought 
within the orbit of the United Nations. The principal "reserve 
clause" limiting this delegation of authority is the provision of 
Article 2, paragraph 7, "Nothing contained in the present 
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any state or shall require the members to submit such mat- 
ters to settlement under the present Charter." 
- 
A relatively broad or narrow range for the jurisdiction of the 
United Nations clearly depends upon the interpretation given 
to the scope of its chief function as limited by this reserve 
clause. In practice the tendency has been to follow a broad 
interpretation and to give primacy to the responsibilities of the 
United Nations rather than to the limitations upon its au- 
th0rity.l When the Indonesian case was brought before the 
Security Council in 1947, the government of the Netherlands 
argued strongly that the relation of Indonesia to the Nether- 
lands was a matter essentially of domestic jurisdiction and that 
the military action was of no concern to the Security Council 
since it constituted a domestic police action rather than a 
breach of international peace. Other members took the posi- 
tion that the Indonesian Republic had been given de facto 
recognition, thereby gaining an international standing, and that 
the situation actually was a breach of the peace within the 
meaning of the Charter. The question of jurisdiction was not 
1 Authoritative sources for following the work o f  the United Nations are, in 
addition to the official documents, the Yearbook of the  United Nations, Annual 
Reports of the Secretary-General, and the United Nations Bulletin (now the 
Review ) . 
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explicitly decided by the Security Council, but it proceeded to 
deal with the situation on the assumption that it had a com- 
petence to act. 
During its first session the General Assembly was asked to 
consider the treatment of persons of Indian origin in the Union 
of South Africa. The government of India charged that this 
group had been discriminated against and that such measures 
violated agreements between the two countries and were con- 
trary to the principles of the United Nations Charter concern- 
ing human rights and freedoms. The Union of South Africa 
argued, on the other hand, that the treatment of its own na- 
tionals was a question essentially of domestic jurisdiction, that 
there were no applicable bilateral international agreements, 
and that the principles of the Charter did not by themselves 
create an obligation respecting particular individual liberties. 
The General Assembly did not formally decide the question of 
jurisdiction, but it did adopt a resolution which stated that the 
situation was one which impaired friendly relations between 
two states and that the treatment of the Indian miniority in 
the Union of South Africa should be in conformity with inter- 
national obligations. By passing the resolution, the General 
Assembly acted on the assumption that it had some competence 
in the matter, and it implicitly followed the principle that a 
question normally of domestic jurisdiction becomes one of in- 
ternational concern if it impairs friendly relations among 
states. 
The Spanish and Czechoslovak cases raised questions involv- 
ing the internal governmental regime of a state. The Security 
Council dealt with the question of Franco Spain in 1946. The 
Soviet Union and Poland argued that the very existence of a 
government established with aid of the Axis aggressor consti- 
tuted a threat to peace and therefore that definite measures 
should be taken to overthrow it. Other members of the Se- 
curity Council felt that while the Franco regime was a "po- 
tential menace" to international peace and security, it did not d 
constitute a "breach of the peace" within the meaning of 
Article 39 of the Charter. The General Assembly then dis- 
cussed the question and passed a resolution, later modified, 
barring Franco Spain from membership in international agen- 
cies and conferences connected with the United Nations and 
recommending the recall of ambassadors from Madrid. It was 
clear from the proceedings in both the Security Council and 
the General Assembly that the reservation of domestic jurisdic- 
tion was not controlling if a decision should be reached that 
the internal governmental regime constituted a breach of, or 
threat to, international peace. 
When the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia 
was brought to the attention of the Security Council in 1948, 
it was the Soviet Union which claimed that a change in gov- 
ernmental regime was a matter of domestic jurisdiction. The 
United States representati~re argued that this would be true 
only if there had been no assistance, direct or indirect, from a 
foreign power and if there had been no threat of force or 
other external interference with the political independence of 
Czechoslovakia. A proposal to appoint a Security Council sub- 
committee to investigate the situation was lost on account of 
the negative vote of the Soviet Union, and the case was not 
taken up by the General Assembly. 
The ultimate significance of the limitation concerning mat- 
ters of domestic jurisdiction is not clear as yet. This provision 
has been invoked at various times in support of a restrictive 
interpretation of the Charter, but it has not proved to be a 
serious limitation on the work of the United Nations. The 
approach to an interpretation has not been a technical or 
legalistic one. When this issue has been raised, the organs of 
the United Nations "have quite clearly been concerned with 
the attainment of the major objectives and purposes of the 
United Nations and have shown an unwillingness to accept 
any interpretation of Article 2 (7) which would prevent action 
from being taken in a situation deemed to be of international 
concern in terms of these  purpose^."^ 
The original conception was that the peace treaties with the 
2 Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United h7ations: 
Commentary and Doctrments, 121. 
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enemy states would be concluded by the Allies at the end of 
World War I1 and that the United Nations would have the 
responsibility of maintaining peace and security thereafter. 
Article 107 of the Charter provided, "Nothing in the present 
Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any 
state which during the Second World War has been an enemy 
of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as 
a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility 
for such action." 
As disagreement among the victors precluded the achieve- 
ment of stable postwar settlements, it became necessary for the 
United Nations to function in a different situation from that 
which had been contemplated. The interpretation of Article 
107 therefore became significant for the scope of United Na- 
tions activity, especially when new disputes arose over the 
basis for dealing with unsettled old ones. If all such cases were 
kept from the United Nations, its competence to deal with 
threats to the peace would be restricted. This, however, did 
not occur. When the Korean situation was referred to the 
General Assembly in 1947, the Soviet Union argued that con- 
sideration was barred by Article 107, which was intended to 
leave with the victors in the war the determination of the 
terms of peace and the necessary control measures. The posi- 
tion taken by the General Assembly was that Article 107 was 
permissive and therefore did not bar action through the United 
Nations. 
The same question arose in the Security Council over the 
Berlin blockade in 1948. The Soviet Union claimed that the 
solution of problems relating to Germany was a matter for the 
governments responsible for military occupation and that the 
Council of Foreign Ministers had been set up to deal with the 
settlement of all issues related to former enemy countries. The 
United States, on the other hand, took the position that the 
immediate question did not deal with Germany as a former 
enemy state but with the threat to international peace and 
security growing out of the relations among the occupying 
powers. The Berlin blockade was lifted, not by direct action 
of the Security Council, but as the result of a series of informal 
negotiations. 
It is safe to conclude that Article 107 of the Charter does 
not of itself restrict the competence of the United Nations in 
dealing with the maintenance of international peace and se- 
curity. Whether or not a given situation constitutes an existing 
threat to peace, rather than what has been the history of the 
dispute, is the important consideration. 
Other provisions in the Charter have also been interpreted 
in a manner consistent with a broad scope for the United 
Nations. For example, Article 73 ( e )  requires the transmission 
of information on nonself-governing territories. Despite the 
objection of some of the countries concerned, upon the basis 
of this provision and its general powers of discussion the Gen- 
eral Assembly has established a committee to consider the in- 
formation received and to make recommendations to the 
governments responsible for the administration of dependent 
territories. Since these governments are in a minority in the 
General Assembly, they often find themselves being critically 
examined on matters which they consider to be in the area of 
domestic jurisdiction. 
Another interesting case of Charter interpretation concerns 
the voting procedure in the Security Council. Article 27 of 
the Charter provides that on matters other than procedural, 
decisions shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven mem- 
bers, "including the concurring votes of the permanent mem- 
bers." This was designed to insure that substantive decisions 
of the Security Council would not be taken without unanimity 
among the Great Powers. From the language it might be 
assumed that a definite affirmative vote of each permanent 
member would be necessary. That, however, has not been the 
interpretation in practice. Decisions have been taken if there 
were at least seven affirmative votes and if no permanent mem- 
bers actually cast a negative vote. This has considerably abated 
the rigors of the unanimity requirement and reduced the use 
and "abuse" of the veto, since it has been possible for the Se- 
curity Council to make decisions when a permanent member 
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was neither willing to vote for a resolution nor yet determined 
to block its adoption if a sufficient majority of other members 
favored its3 By extension of the same reasoning, an absence 
from a meeting is considered to have the same effect as an 
abstention. Therefore, a veto cannot be cast by the simple 
expedient of boycotting a meeting. A "concurring vote" is 
deemed to exist unless there is a positive indication of non- 
concurrence. The importance of these interpretations is shown 
by the fact that a Security Council decision was possible in the 
Korean case of June, 1950, when otherwise the resolution be- 
fore the Council would have been blocked in the absence of an 
actual affirmative vote by the Soviet Union. 
During the latter part of 1950 the "Uniting for Peace" resolu- 
tion was adopted by the General Assembly. The essence of 
this resolution lay in its provision that if the Security Council, 
because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, 
failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security in any apparent threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the Gen- 
eral Assembly should consider the matter immediately with a 
view to making appropriate recommendations for collective 
measures, including the use of armed force when necessary. 
It must be noted that such decisions would be recommend;- 
tions, not binding legal obligations, and that recourse to the 
General Assembly would not overcome the disunity among the 
Great Powers. Nevertheless, a procedure was supplied by 
which the United Nations might act when the occasion arose 
and a sufficient number of its members were able and willing 
to do so. Through the "Uniting for Peace" resolution the 
United Nations gave primacy to its major objective and re- 
sponsibility for the maintenance of peace, rather than to a 
specific set of procedural and organizational arrangements. 
Even though the organs of the United Nations have followed 
a broad interpretation of their competence under the Charter, 
the controlling decisions remain with the member states. The 
3 Goodrich and Hambro ,  213-27; A m r y  V a n d e n b o s c h  and Wi l lard  N .  Hogan ,  
The United Nations, 145-50. 
General Assembly's recommendations may, and often do, have 
strong practical force, but the question of their acceptance 
and implementation still lies with the members. The Security 
Council, on the other hand, has the constitutional authoriza- 
tion to make binding decisions. However, the voting procedure 
is such that no such decision can be made without the "concur- 
rence" of the permanent members. The result is that on any 
question of enforcement action each of the Great Powers "de- 
cides for itself." In the Korean case the Security Council reso- 
lutions took the forms of a determination that the North 
Korean attack constituted a breach of the peace and recom- 
mendations calling upon members of the United Nations to 
come to the assistance of the Republic of Korea. The major 
reason for putting the resolutions in this form was that the 
Security Council had no military forces under its own com- 
mand. Although Article 43 of the Charter provided that armed 
forces and facilities would be made available by agreement 
between the Security Council and the members of the United 
Nations, no such agreements had been made because of the 
"cold war." In any case, the arrangements contemplated by 
Article 43 indicate that the controlling decisions about the 
armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council were to 
be made by the member states. 
Since the United Nations is an association of sovereign states 
and not a separate level of governmental authority, its decisions 
and actions depend upon the co-operation of a sufficient num- 
ber of its members. No authoritative definitions are provided 
for such concepts as threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, 
and acts of aggression. It is not always easy to draw a firm line 
between a "threat to the peace" within the meaning of the 
Charter and a "potential (or actual) menace" to peace. Opin- 
ions may differ on whether the unrest in French North Africa 
in 1953, for example, should be construed as a threat to inter- 
national peace sufficient to take the case out of the category 
of essentially domestic jurisdiction. Also, one might wonder 
why the military conflict between North and South Koreans 
had been promptly referred to the United Nations, but the 
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fighting in Indo-China had persisted for years before being 
brought to that forum. When does an internal codic t  or civil 
war become a threat to or breach of international peace? This 
question will have to be answered for each case as it arises, and 
no doubt the basic significance of each case in relation to the 
international political situation will be the controlling point. 
Although there is room for disagreement on whether the United 
Nations should or should not take up certain cases, the record 
on the whole has been a positive one. There has been com- 
paratively little evasion of responsibility by narrow and arbi- 
trary interpretation of the organization's mandate. 
The United Nations has a record of broad interpretation 
of its own constitutional authority. However, to make decisions 
and to carry them out effectively are two different things. The 
major difficulty and principal frustration for the United Nations 
have been in the problem of implementation, that is to say, in 
the practical application to the existing international situation. 
Since the United Nations is an associative organization of mem- 
ber states retaining the principle of "sovereign equality," it 
has neither the means nor the authority to enforce its own 
decisions through its own machinery. Therefore, the practical 
effectiveness of United Nations decisions depends upon a com- 
mon agreement to implement its presuppositions and the de- 
velopment of supporting national policies. 
These prerequisites have been achieved to some extent, but 
far from completely. East-West tensions and the formation of 
hostile blocs preclude the agreement and joint action needed 
to provide the foundation for a stable peace. A big "cold war" 
and a series of little "hot wars" are incompatible with general 
co-operation against acts of aggression and threats to the peace. 
The major test which the United Nations received in the first 
eight years of its existence was the Korean case. If the perma- 
nent members of the Security Council-the United States, Great 
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Britain, France, China, and the Soviet Union-had been in 
accord on the handling of this case, the two contending re- 
gimes in Korea could not have constituted a threat to world 
peace, whatever the implications for Korea itself. The situa- 
tion which actually existed, however, found the United States 
taking the lead in resisting the North Korean aggressors, with 
the support of Great Britain and France (both heavily occu- 
pied elsewhere); with the Soviet Union friendly and helpful 
to the aggressors; and with the mainland of China under the 
control of a regime which put armies in the field against the 
United Nations forces. The act of aggression was resisted and 
thwarted, but by military conflict rather than by acceptance 
and implementation of the Security Council decision by all 
parties concerned. 
Lack of co-operation among the Great Powers is not the only 
problem in effecting the purposes and authority of the United 
Nations. There is also the defiance of the smaller countries on 
some matters. The Union of South Africa, for example, refuses 
to accept the recommendation of the General Assembly on the 
question of its nationals of Indian origin and on the former 
mandate of Southwest Africa. Also, the proposal for the inter- 
nationalization of Jerusalem has been rejected by both the 
Jews and the Arabs. On the Kashmir question India and 
Pakistan have co-operated with the Security Council to some 
extent, but neither has shown an inclination to surrender its 
own basic viewpoint. These examples serve as reminders that 
even if Great Power unanimity existed, there would still be a 
problem of implementing the decisions made by United Na- 
tions organs. 
The absence of adequate co-operation in the acceptance and 
enforcement of United Nations decisions has had important 
consequences. First, there has been a decreased reliance upon 
the United Nations as the primary guarantor of international 
peace and of national security. This does not mean that the 
United Nations has lost its importance or that for practical 
purposes it has been reduced to a cipher, but that its sig- 
nificance and impact have been fundamentally changed. There 
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are many complexities and intangibles, but one cannot look 
closely at the record since 1945 without coming to the con- 
clusion that the United Nations has been a real force in many 
situations. It serves an important function as a meeting place 
between East and West, as an instrument for multilateral 
negotiations, and as an agency with substantial effects and 
implications in practical international politics. 
The United Nations has been a constructive factor in such 
disputes as those concerning Palestine, Indonesia, Kashmir, 
and Korea. Through efforts of the General Assembly and the 
Security Council, with the support of member states, fighting 
has been stopped or prevented and force has been used against 
overt aggression. One of the useful aspects of the United 
Nations is that it sometimes provides a device for escaping an 
impasse. In connection with the Berlin blockade, for example, 
the negotiations which relaxed the tension began with a con- 
versation in the delegate's lounge at Lake Success, after all 
other avenues seemed to be blocked. When the peace treaty 
with Italy was being written, no agreement could be reached 
in the Council of Foreign Ministers on the disposition of the 
former Italian colonies. This deadlock was broken only by an 
agreement to refer the matter to the General Assembly, with 
the undertaking to accept its recommendation as binding. 
Incidentally, the final decision of the General Assembly was 
different from the various proposals originally supported by the 
Great Powers. 
The existence and activities of the United Nations put the 
question of peace and war in a changed context. The obliga- 
tions of the Charter, the automatic conferences, the work of 
the Secretariat, the debates-all combine to emphasize multi- 
lateral diplomacy and to alter the stage on which governments 
deal with each other. The United Nations provides techniques 
which would not otherwise be available for easing the transi- 
tion to independence for a colonial people or for providing a 
more acceptable means for channeling capital investment to 
underdeveloped areas. Even in the case of an act of aggression, 
as in Korea, the situation probably would have been quite dif- 
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ferent if defense of South Korea had been undertaken by a 
unilateral national decision of the United States. With all this, 
however, it remains true that under conditions of international 
tension and East-West hostility, security cannot be guaranteed 
by the United Nations but must also be sought through na- 
tional strength and the formation of alliances. General co- 
operation becomes a desirable but limited possibility, rather 
than the chief method for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. 
Second, there has been a shift in emphasis from the Security 
Council to the General Assembly. When the Charter was 
drafted, the former was given the "primary responsibility" for 
the maintenance of international peace and security. However, 
the Security Council has never received military forces of its 
own, and in any case, it cannot even make a substantive 
decision if one of the permanent members chooses to exercise 
its veto privilege. Effective operation of the Security Council 
depends upon the principle of unanimity, requiring co-opera- 
tion among the Big Five. When threats to peace and acts of 
aggression occur and the necessary co-operation is not forth- 
coming, the Security Council is not in a position to exercise 
its "primary responsibility." The General Assembly, on the 
other hand, can deal with such situations and make recom- 
mendations by a two-thirds vote. Consequently, the United 
Nations can act when a sufficient majority of its members is 
able and willing to do so. The shift in the organizational 
center of gravity reached an extreme form in 1953. Although 
the Charter requires the Security Council to be organized so 
as to be able to function continuously, it held few meetings 
during that year and the truce in Korea was referred directly 
to the General Assembly. 
Third, regional security arrangements have developed as the 
primary form of international co-operation for the protection 
of national security, in contrast to the essentially universalist 
concept of the United Nations Charter. The Organization of 
American States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the 
Soviet security sphere, the Arab League, and other regional 
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arrangements developed as security for a given group of coun- 
tries against actual or assumed threats from other groups. 
Article 51 of the Charter recognizes that "collective self-de- 
fense" in the event of an armed attack is valid until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Arrangements such as NATO 
therefore can be brought within the framework of the Charter, 
but they assume importance only when partners on the Se- 
curity Council feel that they must protect themselves against 
each other. The impossibility of effectively implementing the 
universalist assumptions of general international co-operation 
under existing conditions gives occasion for regional groupings 
designed to increase security by combined efforts and, in the 
long run, to strengthen the general organization by helping 
to discourage acts of aggression. 
Fourth, there has been a growing tendency to invoke the 
principle of self-help in some form. Peoples who are disil- 
lusioned by the experiences in attempting international co- 
operation for the maintenance of peace may react with the 
slogan of "going it alone." National military strength is relied 
on, and if another country is seen as a serious threat, the at- 
tempt is made to build up a margin of armaments to provide 
security. The whole process of international tensions, threats 
to national security, and an armament race is accompanied by 
feelings of frustration and anger and by strong expressions of 
nationalism. The attitudes thus aroused in turn make it more 
difficult to organize security on the basis of international co- 
operation. The phenomenon now known as "neutralism" is 
also an expression of the principle of self-help in that it im- 
plicitly denies the assumptions of co-operation in the mainte- 
nance and enforcement of peace. If an international organiza- 
tion is committed to act against aggression, the members can- 
not well be "neutral" between an aggressor and the victim, 
nor toward those who are attempting to restrain the former 
and protect the latter. Yet the policies of some governments 
seemed to reflect the idea that the enforcement action in Korea 
was merely a conflict between two rival alliances with which 
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they had no direct concern. I t  is true that the dwarfs are in 
danger when the giants are battling, and naturally they do not 
relish the necessity of "taking sides." This painful dilemma, 
however, does not arise under the assumption of Great Power 
unanimity. Without the East-West conflict, there would be no 
occasion for "neutralism" to develop. 
The basic problem of the United Nations lies in the fact 
that implementation and enforcement of its decisions depend 
upon supporting national policies and co-operative action by 
the members, and these have not been forthcoming to a suf- 
ficient extent. Yet the United Nations cannot achieve the 
desired result by fiat, nor can it directly carry out its own 
decisions. The contrast between this situation and that of the 
League of Nations, which interpreted its own authority much 
more narrowly, lies in the willingness of a majority of the mem- 
bers of the United Nations to attempt an enforcement of the 
provisions of the Charter. 
The term "collective security" has often been used with refer- 
ence to the League of Nations and the United Nations, al- 
though it does not occur in either the Covenant or the Charter. 
Frequent use in both scholarly and popular literature con- 
cerning international relations has made the expression fa- 
miliar-apparently quite simple and almost self-explanatory. 
Attempts to frame a precise definition, however, reveal that 
the concept is complex and illusive. Perhaps the best way to 
approach a clarification is to suggest a definition and then to 
give a brief explanation of what is meant by the definition. 
Collective security, then, refers to "general co-operative action 
for the maintenance and enforcement of international peace." 
Collective security involves, first of all, an acceptance of the 
principle of concern. It presupposes that every state has an 
interest in the occurrence of international conflict and in the 
methods by which international disputes are settled. There- 
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fore, the idea that war is a fact outside the realm of law, to- 
gether with reliance on the principle of self-help as a basis for 
international organization, is incompatible with a collective 
security system. 
Collective action, if necessary to maintain or restore peace, 
is also involved. Not all collective action, however, can be 
described as collective security. For example, the members 
of an alliance in a balance-of-power system take collective 
action among themselves against a rival alliance. The refer- 
ence to general co-operative action indicates that the over- 
whelming majority must unite against an aggressor. Under 
a collective security system, reliance is placed on a preponder- 
ance of power exercised through the instrumentalities of the 
international community, rather than on a balancing of power 
among rival groupings of  nation^.^ 
The word "action" includes the various techniques of pacific 
settlement and does not refer solely to the application of 
forcible sanctions. Collective security, therefore, is not syn- 
onymous with military action, but it does imply a resort to 
force if other means are inadequate to prevent aggression. 
If this were not so, co-operative action for the maintenance 
of peace would be thwarted at the first serious and determined 
challenge. Collective security may be expressed through efforts 
to prevent war, but it potentially involves the use of force to 
restore peace if aggression occurs. 
Much of the confusion over the term "collective security" 
arises from a failure to distinguish between its use as an 
objective, a condition, and a method. The purpose, of course, 
is to achieve a situation under which acts of aggression and 
other breaches of the peace will not occur. If this objective is 
reached, the world would then be in a condition of collective 
security. Sometimes the principle is criticized because this 
condition has not been reached either under the League of 
Nations or the United Nations. This, however, is not con- 
clusive, as can easily be shown by a simple analogy. National 
4For a statement of the contrasting assumptions involved, see Wright, A 
Study of War, 11, 781-83. 
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security is not actually achieved in a situation of serious inter- 
national tensions, yet it remains a valid primary objective. It 
seems preferable to think of "collective security" as a method 
of reaching an objective. The method is co-operative action 
based on the principle of concern; the objective is a stable 
international order. In other words, collective security may 
be considered as one way of working toward the goal of na- 
tional security. Since collective security is sometimes defined 
in terms of the machine~y for joint action,"t should be under- 
stood that the method implies the appropriate organizational 
and procedural means. 
Opposition to reliance upon a collective security system 
such as that contemplated by the Charter of the United Na- 
tions comes from three sources. One of these is found in the 
various groups which reject the basic validity of the principle 
of concern. This attitude may be exhibited in isolationism (in 
the true meaning of the term) or in "neutralism" of one kind 
or another. It may reflect the belief that a Great Power should 
"go it alone" or that a small country should avoid the danger 
of taking sides. These are adaptations of the principle of self- 
help, relying upon national action or upon alliances in the face 
of immediate threats, but accepting no commitment in the 
event of a breach of the peace as such. 
Another source of opposition is the "world government" 
school of thought, which holds that peace is incompatible 
with the continuance of national sovereignty. This approach 
views the nation-state system as productive of wars and holds 
that dependence cannot be placed in the co-operative action 
of sovereign states to preserve the peace. Effective supra- 
national government, therefore, is essential in the nature of 
the case, and it follows that any lesser collective security system 
is by definition inadequate. 
Finally, some scholars criticize the concept of collective se- 
curity on the ground that it is in principle unworkable. For 
example, Hans Morgenthau has stated three assumptions 
which must be fulfilled if collective security is to operate as a 
5 Georg Schwarzenberger, Power Politics, 494. 
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device for the prevention of war, yet which, he has concluded, 
cannot be made to work in the contemporary world. These 
assumptions are that "(1)  the collective system must be able 
to muster at all times such overwhelming strength against any 
potential aggressor or coalition of aggressors that the latter 
would never dare to challenge the order defended by the col- 
lective system; ( 2 )  at least those nations whose combined 
strength would meet the requirement under (1) must have 
the same conception of security which they are supposed to 
defend; ( 3 )  those nations must be willing to subordinate what- 
ever conflicting political interests may still separate them to 
the common good defined in terms of the collective defense 
of all member  state^."^ 
The first two of these assumptions are obvious, if a collec- 
tive security system is to be completely effective. Morgenthau 
draws the conclusion, however, that the tendency for a conflict 
of interests between status quo and revisionist nations, such as 
has existed since 1919, means that "the attempt to freeze the 
particular status quo by means of collective security is in the 
long run doomed to f a i l~ re . "~  This conclusion on the impotence 
of collective security, however, does not take into considera- 
tion the nature of the available alternatives. One might make 
a plausible case that neither unilateral action by individual 
Great Powers nor a system of balance-of-power alliances is 
adequate to provide for orderly and peaceful change of a par- 
ticular status quo and that the prerequisites and conditions for 
an effective world government are not presently available. In 
such a case, no coilstructive principle of action would remain. 
Assumptions about the essentials of an effective collective se- 
curity system and the recognized difficulties in applying this 
principle do not preclude the possibility that in some cases an 
attempt to apply this method may be at least as hopeful as any 
alternative course of action. The "failure" of the League of 
Nations has not restored traditional neutrality as a dependable 
6 Politics among Nations, 389; cp. also, Frederick L. Schuman, International 
Politics, 127, 235-38, and The Commonwealth of Man, 344-420. 
7 P. 390. 
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basis of international organization, nor has it pointed to re- 
liance on the supranational principle of government. 
Rlorgenthau assumes that the diplomacy of collective se- 
curity must aim at transforming all local conflicts into world 
codicts and that it will result in spreading wars rather than 
preventing them. He approves, instead, of the type of diplo- 
macy which attempts to localize wars, citing the instance of 
British efforts in the summer of 1914 to limit the conflict be- 
tween Austria and Serbia. It  is difficult to see how the con- 
clusion drawn from this incident can be prejudicial to the prin- 
ciple of collective security. It  seems to indicate that under 
modern conditions a war once started is likely to spread and 
that the methods of traditional diplomacy are not adequate to 
prevent this result. I t  is the nature of war in modern society, 
rather than the principle of collective security, which prevents 
the localization of war. 
Morgenthau's third assumption is even more questionable. 
One of the stated implications is, "Collective security expects 
the policies of the individual nations to be inspired by the ideal 
of mutual assistance and a spirit of self-sacrifice which will not 
shrink even from the supreme sacrifice of war should it be 
required by that ideal."' First of all, this involves the am- 
biguous concept of "national self-interest." It  is axiomatic, of 
course, that an invasion of a nation, or one of its neighbors, 
will be viewed with greater concern than some conflict on the 
other side of the globe. Nevertheless, it is not possible in prin- 
ciple to draw a line around a conception of national interest 
to exclude the possibility that the start of a war anywhere may 
be regarded as a violation of national security interest. Under 
a balance-of-power system, factors which tend to upset the 
balance are viewed as threats to national interests, especially 
by the status quo powers. Countries do not wait until an in- 
vasion occurs before they begin to form protective alliances, 
but take their cue from any situation which seems to contain 
the seeds of a future threat. In view of the nature of modern 
warfare, is it realistic to say that the American people have 
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less of a "national interest" in preventing any act of aggression 
from sparking a world codlagration than they had in European 
policy toward South America in 1823, the Oregon boundary 
in the 1840's, the Spanish treatment of Cubans in 1898, or the 
terms upon which certain Latin American countries would 
satisfy their European creditors? 
Was it really to the "national interest" of France and Great 
Britain in 1935 and 1936 to appease Mussolini in the hope of 
his co-operation against Hitler? It is not necessary to invoke 
a spirit of self-sacrificing altruism to condemn the policy ex- 
pressed in the Hoare-Lava1 agreement and the hesitancy to 
apply effective sanctions in the Italo-Ethiopian case. Likewise, 
one may condemn the neutrality legislation of the 1930's on 
the grounds that it contributed to the spread of Axis aggression 
and was therefore contrary to the national interest of the 
United States. The debacle of collective security during the 
1930's was not due to a refusal to subordinate national interests 
to collective security, but to mistaken conceptions of what 
was required to protect national interests. 
The United States since 1945 has shown a "national interest" 
in the status of Greece, Turkey, Iran, Palestine, Indonesia, 
Korea, Austria, Germany, Japan, and a host of other countries. 
It seems reasonable to suppose that a concern based upon 
"national interest" would also be shown if, say, Greece should 
attack Bulgaria, or Italy and Yugoslavia should come to blows 
over Trieste. Even attacks by our "friends" on our "enemies" 
would put the "fat in the fire" and perhaps affect us adversely. 
In fact, it would be difficult to imagine any breach of inter- 
national peace today in which the United States would not 
have a "national interest." Or, to take another country, why 
should Turkey send troops to Korea? In answer, one might 
refer to its relation with the NATO powers and its concern 
with Soviet expansion. But if Turkey has a "national interest" 
in the Korean conflict under the circumstances, the concept 
does not have to be stretched much further to cover any act 
of aggression. What collective security requires is not the 
renunciation of national interests-the forsaking of national 
R E A F F I R M A T I O N  185 
egotisms and the national policies serving them. It requires 
only the reinterpretation of the "national interest." There is no 
valid reason for setting collective security and national interests 
rigidly in opposition to each other and assuming that the latter 
must be sacrificed if the former is to exist. I t  is a matter of 
enlightened self-interest, rather than of self-sacrificing altruism. 
As Kenneth W. Thompson has written: "The uses of collective 
security are more modest and limited than its more ardent 
advocates appreciate. Yet if participants base their policies 
on enduring political principles and judge and measure each 
action by the interests and power involved, it need not be an 
inevitable blind alley. Between the scylla of blind acceptance 
and the charybdis of logical rejection we must aim to establish 
the intellectual foundations required for an empirical and 
pragmatic approach to the modern concept of collective se- 
curity."' 
Collective security is a method of organizing the widest 
possible co-operation in efforts to maintain international peace 
and security. Even if the prevailing distribution of power 
does not permit it to work ideally, applications of the method 
may make a margin of difference in the handling of inter- 
national disputes and breaches of the peace. Since 1945 it has 
been utilized with varying degrees of success. Co-operative 
action based on the principle of concern has taken place in 
such serious situations as those in Palestine, Indonesia, and 
Kashmir. Attempts to "prove" on the basis of arbitrary as- 
sumptions that collective security is inherently unworkable are 
not convincing in the face of the actual use of this method 
and the achievement of significant, although imperfect, results. 
It certainly is not clear that better results would automatically 
ensue from a reliance exclusively upon unilateral diplomacy 
and the traditional type of alliance. 
In the case of Korea, collective security was put to the test 
of military enforcement. The relative degree of success in 
terms of long-range objectives is debatable, but there is no 
disputing the fact that the aggressor did not gain a square 
9 "Collective Security Reexamined," 772. 
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inch of territory by three years of fighting. The results in this 
case cannot be completely discounted on the ground that the 
United States took a decisive role because of its own national 
security interest. The fact remains that the effort was a co- 
operative one; there is no proof that the situation would have 
been improved if the United Nations were not in existence 
and if the United States had intervened as a unilateral act. If 
the Korean case proves anything concerning national interest 
and collective security, it seems to point to the fact that the 
national interest of the United States requires an implementa- 
tion of methods for general co-operative action to maintain 
international peace and security. 
The United Nations, as a collective security system, repre- 
sents an acceptance of the principle of concern as a basis for 
international organization, together with decentralized institu- 
tional arrangements for the making and executing of decisions. 
As in the case of the League of Nations, the controlling de- 
cisions and the effective power remain with the constituent 
members of the more inclusive organization, and the latter does 
not have any significant authority or means for enforcement 
directly upon individuals. This is not to say, however, that the 
United Nations does not have usefulness and possibilities. 
The real question is to what extent and under what conditions 
co-operative action for the maintenance of international peace 
and security is feasible. In any political community, peace 
and order can be maintained only by the acquiescence and co- 
operation of the dominant groups within the society. To put 
it axiomatically, peace necessitates the co-operation of those 
with power to disrupt the peace. If a sufficient degree of 
acquiescence and co-operation is not maintained, civil war 
breaks out or the society is otherwise disrupted. If a society 
has a government effectively incorporating the principle of 
concern, there exists an authority more inclusive and more 
powerful than any of the competing groups within that society. 
This is true of the typical contemporary nation-state. In the 
absence of such a superior authority, however, the acquiescence 
and co-operation upon which peace depends can be shown 
only through voluntary decisions and joint action. Conflicts 
of interests and difference in assumptions are likely to be more 
sharply focused, and there is no higher authority to resolve 
them. This is the case with contemporary international society. 
In this situation the immediate alternatives for international 
organization, aside from the creation of an effective world gov- 
ernment by fiat, lie between (1) the principle of self-help 
expressed through national unilateralism and restricted group- 
ings on the basis of special interests, and ( 2 )  the principle of 
concern expressed through a collective security organization 
and efforts to implement co-operative action for the mainte- 
nance of international peace and security. 
The principle of concern was incorporated in international 
organization with the establishment of the League of Nations. 
During the next twenty years this principle went through a 
cycle of acceptance, limitation, modified application, and dis- 
integration. After World War I1 the principle of concern was 
reaffirmed, and under the United Nations it has been imple- 
mented to a significant extent. This has not been done, how- 
ever, completely, or even sufficiently, because of the existence 
of hostile blocs in the place of general co-operation. Joint 
action based on unanimity of the Great Powers and support of 
the other members has been replaced by international tensions 
and the "cold war." But, as F. P. Walters has written, 
Before the League, it was held both in theory and practice that 
every State was the sole and sovereign judge of its own acts, owing 
no allegiance to any higher authority, entitled to resent criticism or 
even questioning by other States. Such conceptions have disap- 
peared for ever: it is not doubted, and can never again be doubted, 
that the community of nations has the moral and legal right to 
discuss and judge the international conduct of each of its members. 
The belief that aggressive war is a crime against humanity and that 
it is the interest, the right and the duty of every State to join in 
preventing it, is now everywhere taken for granted.lO 
The question for the future is whether a sufficient majority 
of United Nations members can validate in action the prin- 
1" History of the  League of Nations, I ,  1-2. 
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ciples of the Charter, thus laying the foundation for a more 
effective application of the principle of concern. There is no 
answer to this question as yet, but one thing is clear: The rec- 
ord of the United Nations in its first eight years was one of 
response, not withdrawal, in the face of challenge. 
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